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Summary  findings
Expanding the microfinance market can promote  financially sustainable, can reduce their susceptibility to
economic growth and reduce poverty in many countries.  political influences. Alternatively, governments and
But expanding this market is advantageous only if the  donors could support the sector through temporary
increased activity is sustainable. Ravicz draws lessons  subsidies to private sector initiatives to help them defray
from five Indonesian microfinance initiatives in rural  start-up costs.
areas and proposes ways for governments and donors to  Supervision can be improved if a country's
support the microfinance sector.  microfinance industry, assisted by its central bank,
Those programs demonstrate that microfinance  establishes industrywide standards. Microfinance
initiatives can provide a valuable service to low-income  institutions could contract for supervision services from
people at a temporary, affordable cost to governments or  commercial banks. The central bank could monitor
donors. Incentives for customers and staff are key  supervisors to ensure that they exercise due diligence.
features of successful microfinance operations that enable  This study finds that institutions can efficiently reach
them to operate with low subsidies or on a self-sustaining  clients in remote areas through subdistrict-based units
basis. Programs should also charge adequate real interest  and field staff. They need not rely on group lending
rates, aggressively pursue repayment, and achieve a  techniques, savings requirements, or intermediary
significant volume of business.  organizations between banks and borrowers to boost
To accelerate progress toward self-sustainability,  efficiency.
programs can track the subsidies they receive, and their  Initiatives can serve female borrowers without targeted
supporters can impose hard budget constraints and  marketing if loan products meet women's needs and are
declining subvention support.  accessible to them.
Government-owned  microfinance initiatives are  Governments could increase the usefulness of
vulnerable to politicai pressures that undermine their  microfinance to agriculture by encouraging state-owned
commitment to sound banking practices. Granting these  microfinance institutions to develop and pilot-test loan
institutions autonomous status, imposing hard budget  products that meet smallholders' needs.
constraints, and privatizing them when they are
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UNDP  United Nations Development ProgramEXECUTIVE  SUMMARY
Rural  residents  in many  countries  could  benefit  from the expansion  of formal  and semi-formal
microfinance  if financial  institutions  can serve  clients  with more  useful  and less-expensive  financial
products  than those available  from moneylenders.  However,  significant  expansion  of the
microfinance  sector is only  feasible  if it can be accomplished  without  subsidy,  or at an initial  cost
that the government  can support and in a way  that will enable  it to become  self-sustainable.  This
report (i) examines  five Indonesian  microfinance  programs  that currently  serve  low-income  clients
in low-density  areas; (ii) reviews  the legal and  regulatory  issues  that affect  the Indonesian
microfinance  market;  (iii)  discusses  lessons  learned;  and (iv)  recommends  ways  governments  and
donors  could  promote  the sector's health  and sustained  growth  internationally.
Program  Descriptions
The Indonesian  central  government  or a local government  owns  the five programs  examined  in
this report. Four were established  between 1979  to 1989. Four are involved  exclusively  in
financial  services  or support  to these services,  while  one also provides  other services  to clients.
The programs  vary considerably  in size and geographic  scope (Table  1).
Badan Kredit Kecamatan  (BKK)  Table 1:
financial  institutions  are owned  by the  Scope  of Programs  in 1996
South  Kalimantan  provincial
government and located in sub-district  Year  Number  of  Number  of
capitals. The province has 110  units for  Founded  Provinces  Units
its 109  sub-districts.  Field  staff  travel  BKK  (South  1985  1  110
to surrounding  villages  to transact  Kalimantan)
business. The 34 BKK  units created  LKP  (Dompu  1989  1  4
before 1992 make loans and accept  District)  1989  Oa  323
deposits. The 76 units created  after  P4K  1979  6b  NA
1992 only make loans.  BKD  1898  3  4,806
(excludes
Lumbung  Kredit  Pedesaan  (LKP)  is a  inactive  units)
system of semi-formal  financial  a/ PHBK is expanding to three more provinces.
institutions  owned  by the provincial  b/ P4K is expanding  to 12  more provinces.
government  of Nusa Tenggara  Barat
(NTB). LKP is very similar  in structure  and function  to BKK.  This review  examines  only  the four
LKP  units in Dompu  District.
Program  Hubungan  Bank dan KSM (PHBK)  is a microfinance  program  sponsored  by the Central
Bank  of Indonesia  (BI) and  the German  government's  Agency  for Technical  Cooperation  (GTZ).
The program  operates  in 10 provinces  and is expanding  to 3 more. In March 1996,  323 banks or
bank branches  were participating  in this program,  and the number  was growing  rapidly. The
program  provides  technical  assistance  to private  and state-owned  banks,  non-government
organizations  (NGOs),  and borrower  groups  to help  them develop  group lending  skills. Client
groups can obtain  loans  and open savings  accounts.
vPembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani-nelayan Kecil (P4K) is a group-based
microenterprise lending and promotion program targeting the rural poor. P4K operates in 6
provinces and has expanded on a pilot basis to  12 more.  Ministry of Agriculture extension
workers act as agents for the government-owned Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI) to extend lending
and savings services to the rural poor.  The program also provides training in microenterprise
skills, and attempts to link borrower groups with community activities and social service agencies.
Badan Kredit Desa (BKD)  is a system of village-based  financial institutions.  The units are
owned by individual villages and operated by village governments. BKD units are located in the
rural areas of Java.  There are 5,345 units, of which 4,806 were active in 1996.  Units make loans
and accept deposits.
Loan Characteristics
Loan products vary by institution but generally carry high interest rates and have short repayment
periods.  PHBK and P4K make group loans.  LKP and BKD make individual  loans.  BKK
primarily makes individual  loans, although some of its units have begun to make group loans.
Programs' nominal effective annualized interest rates range from about 24 percent for P4K, to
over 400 percent for those PHBK loans that pass through several intermediaries. Most of the
programs' loans have effective annual real (inflation adjusted) interest rates of 50 percent or more.
This is much higher than the BRI Unit Desa real interest rate of about 21 percent for prompt
payers.  The programs' maximum loan terms vary from 3 to 18 months.  Most loans require
weekly or monthly repayments. None of the programs requires collateral for small loans.
Outreach and Sustainability
The programs' average loan sizes range from 7 to 13 percent of Indonesia's GDP per capita
(US$67 to US$130).  This ratio for 9 of the world's most respected microcredit programs is 16 to
136 percent.  Women account for 40 to 62 percent of the programs' borrowers, versus 20 to 90
percent for the internationally respected programs.  The programs accept voluntary savings
deposits, and have a savings requirement to obtain at least some loans.'  Four of the five programs
have experienced rapid growth in the number of loans they have issued in recent years (Table 2).
Four of the five programs had annual default rates of 3 percent or less in 1994 and 1995. This
level of default is satisfactory by international microcredit standards.  BKK can now operate on a
sustainable basis without subsidies. LKP and PHBK have experienced rapidly declining subsidies
in recent years.  P4K's subsidies increased from 1993 to  1995, but even in 1995 its subsidy was
significantly  lower than in the early 1990s (Table 2).
Savings  accounts  generally  earn  interest  at a rate  approximately  equal  to the inflation  rate.
viTable 2:
Program Outreach and Sustainability
BKK  LKP  PHBK  P4K  BKD
________________________________  1993  1995  1993  1995  1993  1995  1993  1995  1993  1995
Outreach  _
Average loan size percent of  9  10  9  7  10-13  7-13  7  7  8  7
GDP/capita  l
Annual number of loans issued  18  35  3  4  10  27  113  164  1,713  1,607
_  (thousands)a
,Annual loan volume (US$ millions)  1.4  3.4  0.2  0.3  1.6  5.5  6.2  10.9  110.6  113.4
Loan volume real growth rate (percent)  NA  42  -20  28  7  73  162  -14  8  -8
Women percent of borrowers  NA  40  NA  62  NA  50  NA  50  NA  40
Sustainability  I
Average real interest rate (percent)  49  50  137  137  89  89  16  16  111  111
Real interest rate required to eliminate  118  50  288  172  550  244  68  81  NA  NA
subsidies  (perceent)I
Annual default rate (percent)  23  3  12  6  5  1  NA  2-3  4.4  2.6
Loan volume in arrears percent of  27  6  17  20  20  11  6  19  18  18
volume  outstanding
or Number of groups with arrears
percent of groups with outstanding
loans
I  Voluntary savings percent of loans  16  31  35  18  NA  NA  NA  NA  5  5
Information was not available for items labeled "NA" in the above table.
a/ For PHBK and P4K figures are estimates based on number of loans issued to groups and estimated average
number of members in each group.  For BKD, the figure is an estimate based on the number of loans issued in
December of each year.
Lessons  Learned  and  Recommendations
The programs show that microfinance initiatives can:
*  provide low-income people with a valuable service at an initial, affordable cost to
governments or donors;
*  obtain strong financial performance through the use of incentives  for staff and clients;
*  reduce, and even eliminate,  the need for subsidies by charging high real interest rates,
aggressively pursuing repayments, and achieving a significant  volume of business;
*  face political pressures that undermine their commitment  to sound banking practices;
*  be weakened by poorly-designed supervision systems;*  reach clients in remote areas through sub-district based units and field staff,
*  serve female borrowers without targeting them in marketing efforts if loan products
meet women's needs and are accessible to them.
Poverty Reduction and Economic Development.  Although this review does not measure
microfinance programs' impact on poverty reduction and economic development, a general
examination of the programs indicates that expansion of microfinance is an efficient tool to
promote these goals.  These programs make very small loans, charge interest rates higher than
those of commercial banks, and enforce debt repayment.  The majority of the programs'  clients
are too poor to secure the larger and less expensive loans available from commercial  banks. The
fact that the programs face overwhelming demand for credit despite their rates and strict
enforcement of repayment, indicates that low-income clients obtain high returns from the
investment of these funds.
These programs require very large subsidies when they are first introduced.  However, after they
have expanded in scale and demonstrated a firm commitment to repayment performance, subsidies
can decline dramatically.
If unsubsidized private provision of microfinance is expanding, government and donor support for
this sector is not as critical as it is if the microfinance market is less developed.  However, even if
the private sector is dynamic, governments and donors can promote microfinance in remote areas
where required initial start-up costs are high, and private firms are hesitant to enter the market in
the short- to medium-term.
Incentives for  Customers and Staff  Carefully-designed  incentives for customers and staff are
key features of successful and sustainable microfinance programs.  Most of the programs
reviewed here encourage staff to maintain high collection rates and maximize profits by linking
staff compensation to the volume of repayments collected and/or profitability. Most also promote
demand by making it relatively easy for customers to obtain loans.  All facilitate physical access to
services through the use of conveniently located facilities and/or field staff and credit agents.
Most have relatively simple application procedures and provide customers with loans within a few
days or weeks of the initial inquiry. None of the programs require physical collateral for small
loans.  They promote prompt repayments by linking borrowers' access to future loans and their
future loan sizes to punctual repayment of current commitments. P4K' s recent problems with
arrears demonstrates what can happen when programs do not rely on incentives to promote
repayment. P4K did not have incentives for credit agents to pursue repayment collection, and
began to experience arrears problems. The situation was  compounded  when it canceled
operations in districts that were experiencing mounting arrears.  As a result, many groups that
were repaying promptly defaulted when it became obvious that they would not receive additional
loans.
Subsidies.  If governments and donors limit microfinance subsidies, they can promote the long
term health of the market.  Many government and donor-supported microfinance programs make
very low-interest loans, and frequently do not enforce repayment.  These programs are usuallyunsustainable and create a negative demonstration effect. Governments and donors can minimize
these problems by ensuring that all of their microfinance initiatives follow market-based principles.
However, the programs reviewed here demonstrate that subsidies can play a valuable temporary
role in the supply of microfinance. If these programs were not subsidized in their early years, they
would have been forced to charge interest rates that clients could not pay.  Subsidies have given
these programs time to develop the approaches, scale, and staff and client experience necessary to
move towards self-sustenance while charging high but affordable interest rates.
The programs have reduced their subsidy dependence over time.  They, and others like them,
could likely move more rapidly towards self-sustainability  if they were aware of the full magnitude
of their subventions, and were under pressure to reduce them.  Microfinance initiatives should (i)
institute accounting and reporting formats that accurately track all (including in-kind) subsidies,
and (ii) appropriately provision for bad debt and depreciate fixed assets.  Their backers could
encourage the institutions' self-sustenance by establishing annual subsidy reduction goals.
Governments and donors also can eliminate programs' long-term subsidy dependence by
structuring their support of the sector in the form of temporary set-up subsidies (that do not
include interest rate subsidies) for private providers that would subsequently have to generate
profits to remain in the market.  PHBK operates in this way.
Government Control.  Government-owned financial institutions can be vulnerable to political
considerations and public perceptions that depress system productivity. BKK and LKP faced
pressures to relax their underwriting and collections efforts during the 1992 elections, and this
risk is ever-present for state-owned financial intermediaries.  Many BKD units' lending decisions
are based partially on borrowers'  standing in their villages rather than on their creditworthiness.
Several of the programs have accounting and reporting procedures that are significantly
influenced by political considerations.  Managers with BKK and LKP said that when the programs
began, borrowers assumed that government programs would not strictly enforce repayment
requirements.
Governments can weaken the microfinance sector by granting market power to government
bodies that do not adhere to best practice standards.  In Indonesia, Presidential Regulation No.
71/1992 requires that all microfinance institutions too small to become rural banks either
discontinue deposit-taking services, or become cooperatives.  Also, the government discontinued
plans to expand the BKD system because the Department of Cooperatives feared that the units
would compete with the microfinance activities of the Koperasi Unit Desa (KUD) village
cooperative system.  Yet the cooperative movement has not always adhered to prudent banking
standards in its microfinance activities.
If a government chooses to operate a microfinance program, it should ensure that political
considerations do not undermine the program's commnitment  to sound banking practices.
Granting a government-owned microfinance institution autonomous status can help reduce the
political pressure it faces.  Governments can force  institutions to operate with hard budget
constraints and declining subventions. When the institutions are commercially  viable, governmentscan privatize them.  For example, BKK could now be privatized.  If a government develops a
microfinance program that operates in collaboration with private banks, it can train the banks to
provide microfinance services without continuing government assistance. Widely publicizing
government programs' successes in moving towards, or achieving, self-sustainability  also helps
reduce the political pressure to which they are subject.
Supervision.  In an effort to improve microfinance supervision, the  Indonesian government
requires semi-formal  financial institutions that accept deposits to become rural banks or
cooperatives.  However this requirement is difficult  for many small institutions to comply with,
and may not improve their supervision. Further, it has limited the volume of their lending growth,
and may have induced some to expand their branch networks in sub-optimal ways.
The long-term health of the microfinance market is predicated on good supervision. To improve
supervision, microfinance institutions, with central bank assistance, could develop microfinance
standards regarding underwriting; collections; lending limits;  loan classification;  provisioning for,
and writing-off, bad debts; the acceptance of required and voluntary savings; accounting;
reporting; etc. These standards could be applicable to semi-formal  microfinance institutions; banks
and cooperatives that function as microfinance institutions; and commercial banks' rnicrofinance
activities.
Ideally industries should have primary responsibility  for supervising themselves.  One way to
accomplish this is for mricrofinance  institutions to contract for supervision services with a
commercial bank that the central bank judges to have the ability to perform adequate oversight.
To ensure that supervisors correctly fulfill  their duties, central banks could penalize supervising
institutions that do not exercise due diligence. Supervising institutions could bolster employee
performance through incentive-based staff remuneration.
Serving Clients  in Remote Areas.  Of the modalities reviewed here, the BKK/LKP system of a
network of small, sub-district based units with field staff is probably the best means of reaching
households in low-density areas.  This system functions well because (i) customers have relatively
easy access to banking services, (ii) lenders control their agents thereby ensuring that they work in
the banks' best interests, and (iii) services can be delivered in a relatively cost-effective way.
BKK and LKP demonstrate that relatively low-subsidy programs can serve individuals not only
groups.  Also, programs need not rely on intermediaries  to reach borrowers.
The modalities that PHBK employees in more remote areas (i.e. systems in which NGOs and/or
borrower groups function as financial intermediaries) are expensive to implement and can
experience poor repayment performance. The P4K system, which is divided between BRI and the
Ministry of Agriculture, is very cumbersome and inflexible.  Also, the program's reliance on
agricultural extension workers as credit agents reduces the lender's ability  to enforce loan
repayment and pursue repeat business because it does not directly control this staff.  Further,
borrowers have difficulty accessing the lender directly, and extension workers may be distracted
xfrom their core jobs.2 BKD offers maximum  convenience for borrowers in remote areas and has
minimal overhead costs.  However, units lack dynamism, with village-level  managers frequently
lending to only a small number of regular customers.
Serving Women and Farmers  The fact that women account for a relatively large share of
borrowers in the programs reviewed is primarily a "demand-pull"  rather than a "supply-push"
phenomenon.  Most of these programs do not deliberately  seek to attract female borrowers.
Rather the programs' loans are better suited to petty trading than to agriculture. In Indonesia,
women are heavily represented among petty traders.  Further, the programs transact business in
villages and do not require collateral for small loans.  These features facilitate women's access to
services.
The performance of these programs demonstrate that if microfinance  institutions offer products
that woman find useful and can access, they will seek these services without targeted marketing
efforts.
Few of the programs reviewed offer loans that are of significant  use to farmers.  Loans are usually
of short duration and payments are generally required on a weekly or monthly basis. Managers of
several of the microfinance programs are reluctant to make loans for agricultural use.
If microfinance programs wish to service farmers, they should tailor loan products to smallholder
needs.  This might include offering seasonal loans that do not require frequent repayments. It is
likely that these loans would not have to carry lower interest rates than current products to be
affordable for at least some agricultural uses. 3 For programs that do not already offer these
products, staff might benefit from training in how to evaluate the credit risk of agricultural loans
and encouragement to consider applications for agricultural use.  To reduce the risk of entering
this market, programs could introduce these loans initially on a pilot basis.  They could then
evaluate demand and repayment performance to determine the loan products and staff approaches
that obtain the best results.
2 Indeed,  many agriculture  extension  experts  recommend  that extension  workers' responsibilities  be limited to
information  dissemination.
3Often  farmers  obtain  seeds  and fertilizer,  and pay  for these inputs  with the crops  they subsequently  grow.  In
Indonesia, the implicit interest rates on these in-kind transactions can be as high as those microfinance
institutions charge.
xi4 ￿1.  INTRODUCTION
Households derive important benefits from financial services. In most developing countries, rural
residents rely primarily  on moneylenders for credit, and may not have access to safe, convenient
savings services. Rural residents could benefit from the expansion of formal and/or semi-formal
microfinance institutions if they can reach clients with financial  products that are more useful and
less-expensive that those available from moneylenders. However, significant  expansion of the
microfinance sector is only feasible if it can be accomplished by the private sector, or at a cost that
the government can support.  This report (i) examines five Indonesian microfinance programs that
currently serve low-income clients in low-density areas and require reasonable and/or declining
subsidies; (ii) reviews the legal and regulatory issues that affect the microfinance market in
Indonesia; and (iii) discusses how additional microfinance programs that provide very large
subsidies compete unfairly with private sector and more market-based government programs.
The report concludes with the lessons that can be learned from the microfinance institutions
discussed, and recommends ways governments and donors could best support the sector in the
future.
Evolution  in the Theory  of Microfinance
Policy makers have long acknowledged the importance of rural households' access to credit.
Credit allows households to start or expand business activities, and/or increase profit margins
through the purchase of inputs at wholesale prices. This can augment individual  households'
incomes and promote rural development.
The private sector has generally  been reluctant to enter this market.  Low population densities,
poor infrastructure, and the small value of individual  savings and loan transactions raise the costs
of providing services to this population.  Also, remote, low-income populations are frequently
perceived as being poor credit risks because they often lack access to collateral, their incomes
may be dependent on highly weather-sensitive agricultural production, and their ethnicity and
culture is frequently different from that of the urban-based financial community. In addition, until
recently, conventional wisdom held that low-income households could only afford to pay very low
interest rates.
The importance of financial services for low-income households together with the private sector's
reluctance to enter this market and the perceived inability of low-income populations to pay
market interest rates led governments to launch highly subsidized rural credit programs.  These
programs suffered from a number of shortcomings. First, because the programs offered very low-
interest loans, the volume of funds they could supply was limited, and it was impossible for the
lending institutions to achieve self-sustainability. Second, lending volume and sustainability  were
further eroded because these institutions lacked an incentive to undertake careful underwriting
and enforce timely repayment. Third, state-run programs, particularly those that lack a profit-
incentive, are very vulnerable to political influences. Borrowers are frequently selected for
political reasons rather than because they fit the profile of the ostensibly  targeted beneficiaries or
are sound credit risks. Finally, wealthy households appropriated the benefits of many of these
programs because they preferred to borrow from them rather than from the unsubsidized formal
sector (Khandker et al., 1995; and Von Pischke et al., 1983).However,  the successful  experience  of a number  of low-subsidy  or no-subsidy  microcredit
programs  demonstrated  that these programs  could achieve  self-sustainability,  were affordable  for
borrowers,  and were much  less  likely  to be appropriated  by the wealthier  strata of society
(Christen  et at., 1995,  and Yaron, 1992b).
In recent  years,  microfinance  experts  also  have  begun  to recognize  the importance  of rural
financial  institutions  providing  savings  services. Access  to savings  can help  households  achieve
consumption  smoothing  goals and  permits  them to accumulate  resources  for investment  purposes.
Savings  allows  households  to reduce  risks,  thereby  contributing  to their ability  to make  higher
risk/ return investments  (Christen  et al., 1995).  Savings  mobilization  helps  institutions  to grow
by increasing  the funds  they  have available  for lending  purposes. Institutions  can use information
on clients' savings  habits  to help  assess  their creditworthiness.
Microfinance  In Indonesia
Indonesia  has a rich and largely  successful  history  of microfinance.  The country's first
rnicrofinance  program  (the Badan Kredit Desa)  was established  in 1898. Today,  the country  is
home  to a large number  of highly  diverse  microfinance  institutions  and programs. These range
from Bank Rakyat  Indonesia's  (BRI's) giant Unit Desa network  - which  in 1996  had 3,595
branches  and outstanding  loans  of almost  US$1.74  billion  - to very small,  village-owned
microfinance  initiatives.  The abundance  and diversity  of these programs,  many  of which  have
very strong  outreach  and are financially  viable,  make Indonesia  an excellent  location  to review
microfinance  activities.
Programs  Selected  for Inclusion  in This Study
This study  provides  a detailed  examination  of four microfinance  programs  and a partial  analysis  of
a fifth. All  of the programs  serve  low-income  clients  in remote areas. The programs  reviewed  are
outlined  below.
Badan Kredit  Kecamatan  (BKK). BKK  financial  units are ovvned  by the provincial  government  of
South Kalimantan,  and are located  in sub-districts.  The province  has 110  units for its 109  sub-
districts. Mobile  field staff  travel  from the units to surrounding  villages  to transact  business.
BKK units created  before 1992  make  loans  and accept  deposits;  those created  after 1992  only
make  loans. Most units make  only  individual  loans,  but some  have  begun  to loan  to groups. The
BKK system  of South  Kalimantan  is modeled  on the BKK  system  of Central  Java. However,  the
two systems  operate independently.  This  report examines  the South  Kalimantan  system.
Lumbung  Kredit  Pedesaan  (LKP). LKP  is a system  of semi-formal  financial  institutions  owned
by Nusa Tenggara  Barat province  (NTB).  The LKP  system  is similar  to BKK. Small  financial
services  units located  in sub-district  capitals  serve  most of the villages  in that sub-district  via field
staff. LKPs  are located  throughout  NTB. This  report reviews  the four LKP units operating  in
Dompu  District.
Program  Hubungan  Bank dan KSM (PHBK). PHBK  is a group-lending  program  sponsored  by
the Central  Bank of Indonesia  (BI) and the Germnan  government's  international  development
2agency (GTZ).  It operates in Bali, Java, North Sumatra, Lombok, South Sulawesi, and NTB.
Operations will begin shortly in Irian Jaya, North Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. The program
provides technical assistance to private and state-owned banks, non-government organizations
(NGOs), and borrower groups to help them develop group lending skills. This report reviews the
entire program's performance.
Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani-nelayan Kecil (P4K).  P4K is a group-based
microenterprise promotion and lending program targeting the rural poor.  It is sponsored by the
Ministry of Agriculture and several international donors. Ministry of Agriculture extension
workers act as credit agents for BRI to help the bank reach groups of the rural poor.  The
program also provides training in microenterprise skills, and links borrower groups with
community activities and social service agencies.  P4K operates in Java, Bali, and NTB; and has
expanded on a pilot basis to  12 more provinces. This report reviews the entire program's
performance.
Badan Kredit Desa (BKD).  BKD is a system of village-owned financial institutions located in
rural Java.  Each BKD unit is owned by a village and operated by three village residents. The
head of the BKD is usually the village head. BKD staff are paid on commission and generally
transact business one day per week.  They operate from a village public building or the home of
one of the village leaders.  There are 5,345 B3KDs,  of which 4,806 were active in 1996. This
report reviews the entire system's performance.
Method
Research for this report was carried out in May and June 1996 in Indonesia. The author met with
program managers for five microfinance initiatives, and reviewed financial and outreach
information for them.  The author observed field activities for three of the five programs.
Report Structure
This report contains four chapters and seven annexes. Chapter 2 reviews major legal and
regulatory issues impacting the sector.  Chapter 3 summarizes findings for the five programs
studied.  Chapter 4 examines lessons from the analysis  and explores how governments and donors
might continue to support the sector.  Annexes 1 through 5 contain detailed analyses  for the five
programs examined. Annex 6 summarizes recommendations for how the programs could meet
best practice standards in loan classification, bad debt provisioning, and loan write-off policies.
Annex 7 explains the meaning and calculation of the Subsidy Dependency Index - a tool used to
measure the direct and indirect subsidies that financial  institutions receive.
32.  LEGAL  AND  REGULATORY  ISSUES
Introduction
The legal  and regulatory  framework  for Indonesia's  financial  system  has been  detailed  in several
reports (Hanna, 1994; Hanson and Kenward, 1996; and World Bank, 1992). This section briefly
reviews  some  of the legal  and regulatory  issues  that impact  microfinance.
Government  Regulation  No.71/1992  Supporting  the 1992 Banking  Law
Semi-formal  financial  institutions  undertake  a large share  of Indonesia's  microenterprise  lending.
According  to Government  Regulation  71/1992,  small  financial  that accept deposits  must convert
to rural  banks or cooperatives. Institutions  created  after the 1992  Law was promulgated  must
meet a minimum  capital  requirement  of Rp. 50 million  (US$21,400)  to become  rural  banks. This
capital  requirement  is beyond  the capacity  of virtually  all semi-formal  financial  institutions.
Conversion  to cooperatives  may  be detrimental  to these  institutions  as it places  them under  the
aegis  of the government-sponsored  system  of cooperatives,  which  has a poor record in
management  of financial  institutions.
In practice,  this Regulation  has inhibited  the expansion  of microfinance  in Indonesia  and forced
systems  to develop  in sub-optimal  ways.  For example,  new  BKK  microfinance  units in South
Kalimantan  are attempting  to comply  with the Regulation  by not accepting  deposits. This
deprives  their customers  of a valuable  service  and limits  their growth and self-sustainability.  New
village-based  financial  institutions  known  as Tempat  Pelayanan  Simpan  Pinjam  (TPSP) are
currently  being  introduced  throughout  the country. To conform  with  the Regulation,  these are
being established  under  the auspices  of the government-sponsored  system  of cooperatives.
However,  there are early  indications  that the cooperative  system's  influence  may  undermine  the
financial  viability  of TPSPs.
The Regulation  also sets out a complicated  system  of geographic  limits  on rural  bank activities.
In theory,  rural banks can only conduct  business  in sub-districts  adjacent  to the sub-district
containing  their head office  or in other sub-districts  within  their head office's  district. In sparsely-
populated  rural areas,  these restrictions  limit  rural  banks' ability  to reach remote  clientele  who
generally  have  no other means  of obtaining  formal  sector credit. In practice,  Bank  of Indonesia  is
aware of this problem,  and this provision  of the Regulation  is only  sporadically  enforced.
However,  its existence  serves  as a deterrent  to rural  banks' serving  remote clients.
Allocation  of Government  Enterprise  and Private  Sector  Profits  to Support  Poverty
Reduction
Ministry  of Finance  Regulations  issued  in 1994  and 1995,  as well  as a Presidential  Regulation
issued  in 1995,1  require  all state-owned  corporations  to use 5 percent of their profits  to support
poverty  reduction  initiatives.  Private  firms  and individuals  with incomes  greater than Rp. 100
Ministry  of  Finance  Regulation  no.  316/krmk.0  16/1994,  Presidential  Regulation  no.  90  year  1995,  and  Ministry  of
Finance  Regulation  of 1995  in support  of Presidential  Regulation  no.  90.
4million  (US$42,800)  also are required  to give  2 percent  of their profits/income  to the Family
Planning  Board's large  and highly  subsidized,  group-based  grant/lending  program  called
Tabungan Kesejahteraan Rakyat/Kredit Usaha untuk Kesejahteraan Rakyal
(TAKESRA/KUKESRA).  The program  raised  Rp. 500  billion  (US$214  million)  in its first year
of operation. It provides  loans  with a 6 percent  interest  rate, and returns 10 percent of payments
to the borrower  after  the loan is repaid.
State-owned  corporations'  contributions  are frequently  used  for programs  managed  by state-
owned  banks  that offer grants  or highly  subsidized  loans  to microentrepreneurs  or cooperatives.
The managers  of microfinance  programs  that provide  loans  at or near  market  rates believe  these
programs  pose unfair  competition  because  they  lend at highly  subsidized  rates. Further,  they  feel
that the programs  undermine  borrowers' repayment  discipline  because  repayment  expectations  are
generally  low.
Kredit Usaha Kecil (KUK) Small Loan Requirement
The KUK  requirement  states  that all commercial  banks  must lend  20 percent of their  total
portfolio  to small  borrowers. In practice  however,  "small  borrowers"  are defined  as enterprises
with net worth of less than  Rp. 200 million  (US$85,600)  or annual  sales  of less than  Rp. I billion
(US$428,9000).  Loans  to these customers can be up to Rp. 350 million  (US$150,000). Because
of these very broad  definitions,  the KUK  requirement  in practice  probably  has little  impact  on
microenterprise  finance  markets.
53.  COMPARISON  OF  MICROFINANCE  PROGRAMS
This chapter summarizes the structure and performances of five Indonesian microfinance
programs.  Annexes 1 through 5 review each program in greater detail.
Program  Descriptions
The programs vary  Table 3
considerably in size and  Scope of Programs in 1996
geographic scope (Table 3).
BKK and LKP operate  Year  Number  of  Provinces  Number
primarily or exclusively  in a  Founded  of Units
single Indonesian province.  BKKa  1985  1  110
PHBK and P4K function  LKP  1989  1  4
primarily  in Java and Bali,  (Dompu
but are expanding to cover  PHBK  1989  10  323
a significant portion of  Expanding  to 3 more
Indonesia. BKD operates  P4K  1979  6  NA
in Java.  It was established  Expanding  to 12  more
b  z at the turn of the century,  BKI)  1898  3C  4 8 06d
and has existed in its  a/ There  are  independent  BKK programs  operating  in Central  Java  and
current form since 1952.  South  Kalimantan.  This  report  reviews  performance  for  the  BKK  program
P4K, PHBK, BKK, and  in South  Kalimantan.
LKP were all created  b/ BKD  have  existed  in their  present  fonn since  1952.
between 1979  and 1989.  c/ BKD  units  are in East,  Central,  and West  Java  and Jogyakarta.  BKD-type units  known  as TPSPs  operate  in 23 provinces  outside  Java. All programs receive some  wd  There  are 5,345  BKD  units  of  which  4,806  are  active.  In addition,  almost
form of direct or indirect  1,000  BKD-type  units  known  as TPSP  have  been  established  since  1994.
subsidies from government
and/or donors, although
subsidy levels vary significantly  by program.  Of the five programs, only P4K provides services
not explicitly related to the financial sector.
Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) began in 1985 when the provincial government of South
Kalimantan began to create semi-formal  financial services units endowed with modest facilities
and low-interest loans/capital endowment grants of approximately US$5 .000 each.  After the
promulgation of the 1992 Banking Law, the provincial government stopped creating BKKs and
began to establish Lembaga Pembiayaan UIsaha  Kecils (LPUKs).  The only difference between
BKKs and LPUKs is that the former accept deposits and the latter do not.  There are 34 BKKs
and 76 LPUKs - one unit in each of the province's 109 sub-districts (kecamatans) and one
additional unit.
Units are owned by the province.  Each unit is located in a sub-district capital and serves most of
the villages in that sub-district via customer visits to the faciliity  and relatively frequent visits to the
villages by field staff.  The units do not receive fixed or regular subsidies from the government but
do benefit from in-kind and indirect subsidies. The provincial development bank (BPD)
6supervises the units.  The South Kalimantan BKK system is modeled on the BKK system of
Central Java but functions entirely independently of it. This report reviews only the South
Kalimantan system.
Lumbung Kredit Pedesaan (LKP).  LKP is a system of semi-formal  financial institutions owned
by the province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB). This report reviews only the four LKP units
operating in Dompu District of NTB.  These units were established between 1989 and 1991.  The
LKP system is similar to BKK in structure and function.  Small financial services units are located
at the sub-district capital and serve most of the villages in that sub-district via approximately-
weekly visits to the villages by field staff. The units make loans and accept deposits. The units do
not receive regular subsidies, but benefit from a variety of in-kind and indirect subsidies. In
addition, several have received additional capital endowment grants.  NTB's provincial
development bank supervises the program.
Program Hubungan Bank dan KSM (PHBK).  PHBK is a group lending program sponsored by
Bank of Indonesia (BI) and the German government's development agency (GTZ).  It began in
1989, and currently operates in Bali, Java, North Sumatra, Lombok, South Sulawesi, and NTB.
Operations will shortly begin in Irian Jaya, North Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. The program
provides technical assistance to private and state-owned banks, NGOs, and borrower groups to
help them develop group lending skills. The program does not charge a fee for this assistance.
Participating banks include private rural banks called Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPRs), provincial
development banks (BPDs), public and private commercial banks, and provincial and village-
owned financial facilities. Program managers have found that BPRs are the most eager to
participate.  In March, 1996, 323 banks or bank branches were participating in the program, and
the number was growing rapidly.
The program operates along three basic models. In the first model, borrower groups function as
financial intermediaries. Banks provide them with a group loan which they on-lend to their
members. NGOs train groups and provide general support to them.  Model 2 functions similarly
to Model 1 with the exception that the NGO itself functions as a financial intermediary between
the bank and the credit groups.  In Model 3, the bank lends to a channeling group.  Each member
of the group receives a portion of each loan which he or she is responsible for repaying. The
group assumes joint liability in the event that one member defaults. NGOs are not involved in this
third model. Bank of Indonesia (BI) supervises banks and NGOs participating in the program.
Pembinaan Peningkatan Pendapatan Petani-nelayan Kecil (P4K).  P4K is a group-based
microenterprise promotion and lending program targeting the rural poor.  It began in 1979, and is
funded by the Indonesian government and several donors.  The program is implemented  by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).  The program focuses primarily on
credit provision, savings promotion, and building microenterprise skills. Staff also link borrower
groups with community activities and social service agencies. The program operates in Java, Bali,
and NTB.  It has expanded on a pilot basis to 12 additional provinces. Neither BRI nor
participating client groups pay the program for the services they receive.
7Ministry of Agriculture extension agents act as financial services agents.  They identify poor
households, help them form groups, and generally serve as intermediaries  between groups and the
participating bank (BR!).  Extension agents receive incentive bonuses for identifying  and training
groups, but not for facilitating groups' repayment of their loans.  P4K is jointly supervised by the
Ministry of Agriculture, P4K headquarters managers, and B:RI.
Badan Kredit Desa (BKD). BKD is a system of village-owned financial  institutions located in the
rural areas of Java.  It was founded in 1898. There are 5,345 BKDs, of which 4,806 were active
at the end of 1996. BKDs were established with small capital grants from provincial
governments.  Each BKD unit is owned by an individual village and operated by three residents
of the village. BKD staff are paid entirely on commission. BKDs generally transact business one
day per week.  They operate from a village public building or the home of one of the village
leaders. The units make loans and accept deposits.  BKDs are supervised by BRI.
Loan Products
Loan products vary by institution but generally carry high interest rates and have short repayment
periods.  PHBK and P4K make group loans only. LKP and BKD make only individual  loans.
BKK primarily makes individual  loans, although it has recently begun to make group loans.
Interest rates vary significantly  across programs and within programs across loan and borrower
types.  Interest rates range from a low of about 24 percent for P4K to a high of over 200 percent
for those PHBK loans that pass through several intermediary organizations. These rates are
generally very high in comparison to the 32 percent effective rate that BRI Unit Desa charges on
its loans if borrowers repay promptly.  For the programs reviewed here, interest rates are higher
when several intermediaries separate the bank from the end user.  Several programs also charge
higher interest rates on small loans and loans with frequent repayment requirements, as these
loans have a particularly high administrative-cost-to-loan-size ratio.  Finally interest rates also
vary depending on the extent to which borrowers are required to absorb full program costs.  For
example, BRI is able to charge a relatively low interest rate for P4K loans because the P4K
program pays for credit agents and does not pass this expense on to BRI.  BKK borrowers pay a
higher interest rate because they must pay the full cost of credit underwriting and loan servicing.
8The programs' maximum  Table 4
loan terms range from 3  Summary  of Loan  Product  Terms
to 18 months.  The
overwhelming majority  Clients  Loan  Forced  Interest  Loan
of loans for these  Term  Savings  Rate a  Size
programs are for 12  Percent  (Percent) (US$)
months  or less.  Most  of Loan
programs prefer to offer  BKK  Primarily  2.5 - 18  Up to  51 - 196  22 -
loans with short loan  Individuals  months  10  440
terms believing that the  LKP  Individuals  12  10  128  22 -
credit risk on these loans  (Dompu  Only  weeks  220
ilesthan  the risk onDitit__________ is less than the risk on  PHBK  Groups  3 - 12  20  46 - 450  NA
longer term credits.  The  Only  montlhs
programs'  loan sizes  P4K  Groups  12 - 18  Up to  24 - 154b  44 -
range from a minimum  Only  months  25  132
of US$1 I to a maximum  BKD  Individuals  1-9  10  131 - 347  11 -
of about US$440  (Table  Only  monthse  428
4).  In contrast,  BRI  a! Estimated  effective  annual declining  balance  interest rates
Unit Desa loans  calculated  by taking  into account  the interest  rates  and fees  that
averaged US$896 in  these programs  charge,  their forced savings  requirements,  and
1995 (Charitonenko  the interest  they  pay  on  forced  savings. b/ Higher  rate is rate charged  by groups  to their own members. Loans
Church et al., 1997).  from  BRI carry  a rate of 24 to 33 percent  for the first four loans, and 62
None  of the programs  percent  for the fifth credit  and all credits  thereafter.
reviewed  here  requires  c/ Eighty percent of loans have  a term of three months  or less and have a
collateral for small loans.  maximum  size  of US$257.
BKK.  Loan terms for BKK loans vary by unit but none offers a loan for shorter than 10 weeks or
longer than 18 months.  Officially,  the interest rates on loans vary based on loan size and
repayment frequency. In practice, the rate that an individual  borrower pays depends on the
options allowed to him or her by the branch manager.  Some BKK units have forced savings
requirements of up to 10 percent of the loan amount.  On a declining  balance basis and including
forced savings requirements if applicable, interest rates range from 3.5 to 9.5 percent on a
monthly basis or 51 to 196 percent annually. Loans range in size from US$22 to US$440.  Some
units are experimenting with group loans.
LKP.  The LKP has one loan product - a 12 week loan repayable weekly in 12 equal installments.
The first installment represents the interest due on the loan; the next, a forced savings payment;
and the final 10, repayment of capital.  The forced savings earns interest and can be reclaimed
after the loan is repaid.  The effective declining balance interest rate for this product, taking into
account a fee and required savings, is 8.3 percent on a monthly basis or 160 percent annually.
Loans range in size from US$22 to US$220.
PHBK.  In PHBK, banks, NGOs, and credit groups all are free to choose the terms under which
they will make loans.  Loan products vary from one BPR that made loans for 10 weeks with daily
repayments, to other banks making 12 month loans with monthly repayments.  The PHBK
9program encourages financial intermediaries  to require a 20 percent forced savings deposit in lieu
of collateral. Loans to end users under the PHBK program generally carry rates that - on a
declining  balance basis, and including fees and forced savings requirements - ranged from 3.2
percent to 15.3 percent monthly or 46 to 450 percent per year. 2 Lenders are free to determine
their own loan size ranges.  In practice, loans to end users probably do not exceed US$400 to
US$500. The program's average loan size is probably about US$1 10.
P4K  For P4K, loan terms are usually from 12 to 18 months  Repayment frequency can be
monthly, quarterly, semi-annually,  or annually, depending on the use of the loan.  In theory the
program attempts to match repayment frequency with the expected cash flow pattern for the
investment. In practice, loans generally have monthly repayment requirements. Groups must save
up to 20 percent of the loan amount before obtaining a credit.  Assuming monthly installments and
taking into account the forced savings requirement and a small incentive for timely repayment,
effective interest rates on a declining  balance basis are about 1.6 to 2.3 percent per month or 22 to
31 percent annually. After the fourth loan, the terms change, and the effective interest rate
increases to 4.1 percent per month or 62 percent annually on a declining  balance basis.  When the
program expands to new provinces, all credits will carry the thgher interest rate.  In addition,
many P4K groups collect voluntary savings from members and lend these funds out to other
members.  Typically,  groups lend out these funds at a rate equivalent to 8.1 percent per month or
about 150 percent per year on a declining balance basis. Loans to individual end users range in
size from US$44 to US$132.
BKD.  Most BKD units have only one loan product - a 10 week loan with an interest rate and
payment terms similar to that of the LKPs.  In practice, however, borrowers' ability to withdraw
their required savings varies by BKD office. Many BKDs allow withdrawals only for religious
holidays or do not allow withdrawals at all, such that the forced savings becomes a fee.  The
annualized interest rate for this product is 7.2 percent per month or 131 percent per year on a
declining  balance basis assuming that the forced savings is returned without interest after the loan
is repaid.  The interest rate is 13.3 percent per month or 347 percent annually if the forced savings
payment is never returned.  Loans range in size from US$22 to US$263.
Savings Products
With the exception of some BKK units, the programs offer voluntary savings products and have
savings requirements for most borrowers.  The programs'  interest rates paid on voluntary and
required savings deposits are generally approximately equal to inflation or slightly positive in real
termns.  They are also roughly in line with the 9 percent rate that BRI pays on Unit Desa deposits
of Rp. 25,000 to Rp. 200,000 (US$11 to US$86). 3
2 Loans  with the lowest  interest rates for end users  are those made  by commercial  banks directly  to channeling
groups. Loans  with the highest  interest  rates for the ultimate  beneficiary  are those that pass from rural banks
to NGOs,  to credit  groups,  to end users.
3BRI  Unit Desa  pays a 0 percent  interest rate on deposits  of less than Rp. 25,000 (US$11),  9 percent  on deposits  of
Rp. 25,000  to Rp. 200,000  (US$11  to US$86),  and 12 percent  on deposits  over  Rp. 200,000  (over  US$86).
10BKK.  Only the 34 original BKK  Table 5
units accept voluntary savings or  Summary of Savings Product Terms
require forced savings. Voluntary
and compulsory savings earn an  Interest  Rate  Interest  Rate
annual interest rate of 9 percent. All  on  Voluntary  on  Required
of the BKK units limit  their volume  Savings  Savings
of lending because they lack funds.  a  (Percent)  (Percent)
Program  organizers  feel,  however,  LKP (Dompu  10  10
that the supply  of savings  is price  District)
inelastic,  and that increasing  the  PHBK  12 - 22b  12  -16
interest rate paid on deposits would  P4K  9  9
not significantly  increase the volume  BKD  9  0
of funds mobilized.
a/ For  units  established  before  1992.  Units
LKP.  LKP units have one voluntary  established  after  1992  do not  accept  savings.
savings instrument: a demand deposit  b/ Figures  are  for  BPRs  in Sumbawa.  Higher
rate  IS  for time  deposits. with no restrictions on withdrawal.
This instrument, and the bank's forced savings accounts, earn interest at a 10 percent annual rate.
PHBK  All banks participating in PHBK offer groups the opportunity to hold voluntary saving
accounts.  The interest rate paid on these accounts varies by bank.  In Sumbawa, private rural
banks (BPRs) were paying an interest rate of 12 to 16 percent per year on demand deposits.
These rates are positive in real terms, although generally  below the level paid by BPRs in more
competitive markets.  The interest rate paid on time deposits ranged from 16 to 22 percent per
year for a 1 year deposit.  Forced savings earn interest at the same rate as voluntary demand
deposits.
P4K  P4K groups are encouraged to voluntarily save funds with BRI.  In addition, individuals
may deposit funds with their credit group to be on-lent to other group members. BRI pays
groups an interest rate on savings equal to the amount it pays on its popular SIMPEDES savings
accounts.  This is 9 percent for small deposits.  Groups themselves determine what interest rate
they will pay to members for funds that are on-lent to other group members. This rate varies by
group but is considerably more than the rate paid by BRI.
BKDs.  BKDs have accepted voluntary savings deposits since 1992.  These accounts earn interest
of 9 percent per year. BKDs pay no interest on forced savings.
Supervision
The five programs are supervised in diverse ways, and supervisors exercise varying degrees of
control over programs' policy decisions.
BKK and LKP units are supervised by the district branches of their provinces' development banks
(BPDs).  In addition to supervising performance, the BPDs make all major policy decisions for the
BKK and LKP units, including the types of savings and lending products units can offer, the terms
they can charge on these instruments, how they should provision for bad debt, when they should
11write off loans, what their underwriting and loan servicing procedures should be, whom they
should hire, how they should train staff, etc.  BKK has one full-time supervisor for every 8.5
units, the four LKPs in Dompu District has 1 full-time supervisor.
Banks' and NGOs' PHBK activities are supervised by Bank of Indonesia staff and consultants.
Groups that function as financial  intermediaries are supervised by NGOs; and groups that simply
channel credits to members are supervised by banks.  Supervisors do not make policy decisions
for the banks. NGOs, or borrower groups participating in PHBK, although they do make policy
recommendations in some areas.  Supervisors also train participating banks, NGOs, and groups.
Implementation of P4K is split between group development, which is controlled by the Ministry of
Agriculture, and lending, which is controlled by BRI.  P4K managers receive data from BRI but
appear to have virtually no influence over BRI's P4K policies and procedures.  Within BRI, the
program is overseen by the Small Business, Food, and Cooperative Division. P4K managers exert
greater influence over the Ministry of Agriculture's program activities.
BRI managers at regional and head offices define the business of BKDs, and make major policy
decisions.  BKDs are supervised by BRI staff or contract workers.  BKDs generally receive at
least monthly supervision visits.  Supervisors review the units' bookkeeping, cash handling, and
portfolio quality. They arrange for excess BKD funds to be deposited with BRI branches,
organize BRI loans to BKDs, and facilitate BKD units' lending to each other.  Supervisors can
dismiss unit staff.
This analysis found that even BKK, LKP. and BKD, which are supervised by provincial
development banks or a commercial bank, do not always follow best practice standards for
microfinance institutions. Even though the BPD branch in Dompu District had one full-time
supervisor for its four LKP units, one unit manager was able to effectively bankrupt his unit by
making fraudulent loans and embezzling funds.  Several of the programs sometimes allow
political considerations to influence underwriting and loan servicing decisions. Few adequately
provision for bad debt.  Reporting formats and accounting procedures are geared more to
informing politicians and donors than to obtaining timely information concerning recent
performance trends.  For example, few programs appropriately age arrears, track annual default
rates, account for subsidies, or systematically  write off loans.  This lack of timely and accurate
data makes it difficult for managers to assess profitability and gauge the impact of new products
and procedures.  Further, managers are handicapped in their efforts to recognize and diagnose
problems early, and to track the results of remedial actions.  Annex 6 discusses these issues in
greater detail and reviews best practice standards concerning how the programs should handle
these procedures.
Program Performance
This section reviews programs'  sustainability  and outreach.  Sustainability  is measured by arrears
and default rates, and the size of the subsidy required to sustain operations. Outreach is measured
by the volume of annual lending and savings activities (scope) and the population it serves (depth
of market penetration).
12Sustainability. It is difficult  to compare arrears and default rates for the programs studied because
few provide complete information on the aging of bad debts.  Furthermore, programs write off
bad debts sporadically or not at all so annual arrears figures include bad debts incurred over a
lengthy previous period.  Also, the programs report arrears information in different formats that
are often not comparable. Finally, arrears data for some programs contained obvious errors.
Given these shortcomings, arrears information is useful primarily as an indication of likely trends.
This section provides information on the percent of outstanding loan volume in arrears for BKK,
LKP, and BKD, and the percent of groups with outstanding loans that are experiencing arrears for
PHBK and P4K. 4
BKK experienced a serious arrears problem in 1993. However, the volume of loans in arrears in
1994 and 1995 were the lowest for the five programs reviewed - 6 percent.  The LKP program
had about 20 percent of its portfolio volume in arrears in 1995. It experienced an increasing
arrears problem from 1992 to  1995. PHBK experienced early problems with arrears.  However,
groups with arrears declined from a high of 29 percent of groups with outstanding loans in fiscal
1992/93 to about 13 percent in fiscal 1995/96.  P4K experienced very low arrears through 1993,
but the program's arrears have grown in recent years.  By 1995, groups with arrears accounted
for 19 percent of groups with outstanding loans.  Preliminary  data for 1996 indicate that in that
year arrears were likely higher. The volume of BKD loans in arrears was 23 percent in 1992, and
declined to 16 - 18 percent over the next three years (Table 6).
The Committee of  Table 6
Donor Agencies for  Percent of Outstanding Loan Volume in Arrears or Percent
Small Enterprise  of Groups with Outstanding Loans in Arrearsa
Development set as an
acceptable  standard  for  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
microenterprise lending  BKK  NA  NA  27  6  6
that 10  percent or less  LKP  NA  15  17  NA  20
of total loans should  (Dompu
have  late payments  of  District)
30 days or more.  The  PHBK  21  29  20  11  13
programs do not  P4K  5  5  6  1  1  19
separate out loans in  BKD  NA  23  18  16  18
arrears by 30 days or  a/ For  BKK, LKP.  and  BKD,  these  figures  represent  the  percent  of
more.  However, the  loan  volume  in arrears  net  of previous  years'  defaults.  For  PHBK
above data, which  and  P4K  these  figures  represent  the  percent  of  groups  with outstanding  loans  that  are  experiencing  arrears. measure  the volume  orr  v
number of loans in
arrears by one day or more, indicates that BKK arrears are below this international standard, and
4 For  BKK,  LKP,  and BKD,  the  volume  of  loans  in arrears  for each  year  is estimated  by  netting  out  of the
programs'  stated  figures  the  cumulative  defaults  that  the  programs  experienced  in previous  years. In this
way,  the  author  simulates  a situation  in which  the  programs  wrote  off  defaults  each  year. It was  not  possible
to make  this  adjustment  for  PHBK  and  P4K. Thus,  to the extent  that  these  programs  do not  write  off  defaults
adequately,  arrears  are  somewhat  overstated.
13PHBK arrears are probably approximately equal to it.  The other three programs have arrears
rates that are likely somewhat above this standard.
PHBK and P4K do not reliably track  Table 7
annual defaults.  For BKK, LKP, and  Default Rates (Percent)
BKD the programs' information on
defaults  occasionally contradicts other  _
data or is inconsistent across years.  BKK  NA  NA  23  3  3
Thus the default rates in Table 7 should  (Dompu
be viewed as indicative figures.  BKK  District)
experienced  defaults  of about 23  PHBK  Estimated  by Program  Management  to be a cumulative
percentof  outstanding loan volume in  PK  rate of 2-3  percent since  program  inception percent or outstandmg loan volume m  P4K  Estimated  by Program  Management  to be a cumulative
1993. However, defaults accounted for  rate of 2-3 percent since program  inception
only 3 percent of loan volume in 1994  BKD  1NA  41  2  3
and 1995.  For LKP, defaults were 12
percent of outstanding loan volume in 1993, and about 6 percent in 1995. Program managers for
PHBK and P4K, placed their cumulative default rates at 2 to 3 percent.  BKD's default rate was 6
percent in 1992 and 2 to 4 percent from 1993 to  1995. The Committee of Donor Agencies for
Small Enterprise Development states that microfinance lenders should have annual losses from
defaults of 4 percent or less of outstanding loan volume. Over the last two years, all of the
programs except LKP have achieved this standard.  BRI Unit Desa had a bad loan write-off rate
of 4 percent in 1993 (Christen et al., 1995).
14This report  defines  Table  8
subsidyi  as  Interest  Rates  Required  to Eliminate  Program  Subsidies
including  all direct
and indirect gifts  Required Interest Rates to  Current  Rates
and loans of assets,  Eliminate  Subsid (Percent)  (Percent)a
personnel,  and  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
services; exemptions  BKK  NA  NA  139  64  64  64
from taxes; and the  LKP (Dompu District)  NA  187  325  225  198  128
implicit benefit of  PHBK (total subsidy)  659  723  613  427  277  107
paying liability and  PHBK (cash subsidy)  263  282  257  212  159  107
equity holders a  P4K (total subsidy)  461  168  84  91  98  27
below-market rate  P4K (cash  and  322  109  61  77  86  27
of return.  Under  subsidized  loan  to BRI)  NA  NA  N  NA  NA  131-34
this definition,  all of
these programs  a/ Estimated  average  annualized  interest  rate including  fees,  forced  savings
currently  receive  requirements,  and interest  paid on forced savings.
b/ If BKD units return  the borrower's  forced  savings  when the loan is repaid,  the some form of  effective  interest  rate is approximately  131  percent  on an annualized  basis. Some
subsidy.  However,  units do not return forced  savings,  or do so  with a considerable  delay. If the
the extent  of these  forced  savings  is never returned,  the effective  interest rate is 347  percent.
subsidies  varies.
Table  8 provides  estimates  of the interest  rates  that  programs  would  have been  required  to  charge
over time to eliminate  all subsidies, appropriately  provision  for bad  debts,  and pay a market  rate
of return  to liability and equity holders.6
BKK would  have had to charge  an interest  rate  of 64 percent  in 1995.  This rate  is equal to the
average  rate  it currently  charges.  This indicates that  while the program  receives  subsidies,  the
profit it earns is sufficient  such that it does not require  subventions  to  operate  on a sustainable
basis.  The LKP  program  would  have had to  charge  a rate of 198 percent  in 1995, down  from 325
percent  in 1993.  The  1995 figure is however  somewhat  higher than the  rate required  in 1992.
P1HBK  would  have had to charge  a 227  percent  interest  rate in fiscal  1995/96 to fully cover  all
costs  attributed  to the program.  To cover  all costs  excluding  the in-kind  costs  of salary and
overheads  BI attributed  to the program,  the program  would  have had to  charge  159 percent.
While PHBK's  full-cost  figure is the highest  of the programs  reviewed,  its required  interest  rates
have  declined every year  since 1992.  Indeed,  PHBK's  required  rates  in fiscal  1995/96 are only
about  65 percent  as high as the rates  required  in the previous  year.  P4K's  interest  rate required  to
All five programs  fund part of their portfolios  from savings  accounts  required  from borrowers. These  required
savings  accounts  earn an interest  rate below  that which the program  would  have  to pay to obtain  marginal
additional  resources  from another source. For the purposes  of this analysis,  this practice  is considered  to be
equivalent  to generating  additional  fee income  from loans and is not counted  as a subsidy.  An alternative
approach  would  have been  to assume  that this forced savings  policy  constitutes  a subsidy  equal  to the
difference  between  the interest  paid on the required  savings  and the interest the institution  would  have had to
pay on marginal  additional  liabilities. Footnote  39 on page 47 reviews  LKP's total subsidy  if forced  savings
were counted  as a subsidy  in this way.
6 This analysis  is based on a Subsidy  Dependency  Index (SDI)  for each program. See Annex  7 for a description  of
how the SDI  is calculated.
15elirninate  subsidies  declined  sharply  from 1991  to 1993. It rose somewhat  from 1993  to 1995,  but
still  stood at 98 percent  in 1995. P4K's 1995  required  rate, excluding  in-kind  contributions  by the
Ministry  of Agriculture,  was 86 percent. PHBK  and P4K are continuing  to extend  their
geographic  coverage  and consequently  are incurring  start-up  costs that inflate  their required
unsubsidized  interest  rates. Thus even  if the programs  do not become  more efficient,  the interest
rates required  for them to operate without  subsidies  will  probably  decline. Information  on BKD
subsidies  was not available.
These  required  interest  rates are very  high  by international  commercial  bank standards,  especially
considering  that Indonesia's  inflation  rate has been 10 percent or less over  the last 5 years.
Further,  these required  interest rates are much  higher  than  the 32 percent interest  rate that BRI
Unit Desa currently  charges  or the 18 percent  rate BRI Unit I)esa would  have  had to charge  in
1995  to maintain  financial  self-sufficiency  (Charitonenko  Church  et al., 1997). However,  Unit
Desas  typically  serve  a more  affluent  clientele  with considerably  larger  loans. Further,  they send
field  workers  to clients' villages  only  when evaluating  a credit application  or if a borrower  is
experiencing  arrears. The rates required  for BKK,  P4K,  and }LKP  to become  self-sustaining  are
similar  to the rates charged  by many  private  rural  banks (BPRs)  for loans  to a similar  or more
affluent  clientele. BPRs also  typically  do not serve  clients  in their own villages. Box I explores
why  these programs'  required  rates are high.
16Box 1
Explaining  High  Required  Interest Rates  for Microfinance  Programs  in Indonesia
The four microfinance  programs  for which  data were available  would  have  been  required  to charge  interest
rates of 64 to 277 percent in 1995 to operate entirely without subsidies. Required interest rates are high
because  programs:
1. Operate  in Low-Density  Areas. Programs  operating  in low-density  areas have  higher  unit  costs than
those in high-density areas because the coping strategies for reaching inhabitants of remote areas are costly.
Overhead and transportation costs are amortized over fewer transactions, and per-loan costs are higher.
Banks can address this problem by serving a larger percentage of the population.  This strategy may
however require banks to reduce underwriting standards that, in turn, might result in increased credit risk.
Banks would then be required to increase interest rates.  Alternatively, if programs expand their geographic
coverage to attain in low density areas the same lending volume that they achieve in higher density areas,
they will incur higher transportation costs.  Indirect means of reaching remote inhabitants can also be
costly.  In Dompu District, the use of NGOs as financial intermediaries increased the cost of credit to end
users by up to 54 percentage points per year.
2.  Operate in Areas with Poor Transportation Infrastructure. If transportation is problematic,
programs must spend more money to reach borrowers because transportation costs are higher and/or more
field workers will be require to reach the same number of customers.  If banks require clients to come to
their offices, then the cost of transportation per client may actually be higher than if bank staff visit
villages.  However, this increased cost will not be reflected in interest rates.
3. Make Very Small Loans.  The average loan size to GDP-per-capita ratio for the programs studied is 7
to  13 percent.  This compares to 89 percent for the BRI Unit Desa program, and 48 percent for Grameen
Bank.  Banks incur fixed per-loan administrative costs.  Thus, they must charge higher interest rates on
small loans than on larger ones.
4.  Are Incurring Start-Up Costs.  Programs incur start-up costs when they expand to new areas, and
when they make first-time loans.  PHBK and P4K are expanding geographically and adding new clients.
Both programs have already experienced significant declines in required interest rates as they have achieved
greater economies  of scale, and it is likely that this trend will continue.
5.  Could Improve Efficiency. To some extent, most programs could be streamlined.  For example, LKP
units are over-staffed, and P4K has a cumbersome loan approval process.
17Outreach Scope. BKD is by  Tablle  9
far the largest program in
terms of annual volume of
loans  issued  (Table  9).  Real Growth  in Annual  Lending  Annual
BKD  probably  issued  loans  Volume  (Percent)  Loan
in excess of US$100 million  Volume
in 1995.7 Its real volume of  _  - 19  1994  1995  1995_
loans grew modestly in  BKK (all units)  NA  NA  NA  56  42  3,421,250
1993 and1994  anddeclined  BKK(  (existing  NA  NA  NA  20  19  2,212,039
by 8 percent in 1995. P4K  units)  _
is the second largest  LKP (Dompu  57  1  -20  2  28  312,963
program, with loans totaling  District)  __
almost  US$11 million  PHBK  641  -24  7  84  73  5,526,422 almost US$11  million  P4K  96  126  162  87  -14  10,895,930
annually. P4K grew  BKDa  NA  NA _  8  2  -8  113,400,000
extremely rapidly from  a  - er  - - ledn  _ouei
1991 through 1994, but  a! BKD  figures  are  annual  estimates  based  on lending  volume  in
declined  in 1995. PHBK's  December  of each  year.
loan volume was
approximately US$5.5 million in fiscal 1995/96. The program experienced significant difficulties
from fiscal 1991/92 to fiscal 1993/94.  However, PHBK loan volume grew in real terms by 84
percent in 1994/95 and 73 percent in 1995/96. BKK had an annual volume of about US$3.4
million in 1995. Much of the program's rapid growth in the last two years is attributable to
growth in the number of BKK units.  However, the annual real loan volume of existing units also
grew strongly.  Lending growth for the LKP units in Dompu district has been erratic, but was
strong in 1995. These four units made loans of US$312,000 in 1995.  All of these programs are
very small in comparison to BRI Unit Desa which had a lending volume of US$1.9 billion in 1995.
This system's real lending volume grew by almost 19 percent in 1995.
For BKD, lending volume is crudely approximated by multiplying the program's volume of lending in December
of each  year by 12.
18All five programs studied accept  Table 10
voluntary savings. The volume of  Outstanding  Voluntary Savings Volume as a
BKK's voluntary savings was equal to  Percent of Adjusted Assetsa
about 25 percent of the program's asset
volume  in  1995.8 Voluntary  savings  |  1992  1993  1994  1995
increased steadily over the three years  BKK (for  units  that  0  12  21  25
since the program began to accept these  accept  deposits)  -
deposits.  The volume of voluntary  LKP  (Dompu  District)  14  22  16  15
savings were equal to  15 percent of  PHBK  NA  NA  NA  NA
asset volume for the LKP program in  P4K  NANA  NA  NA
1995,  down from 22 percent  in 1993.  - 2  -
Voluntary savings are equal to about 3  a! Programs'  outstanding  assets  are  corrected  to simulate
percent of BKD's assets.  Information  their  writing  off  bad debt.  Required  savings  are  also subtracted  from  assets  because  they  function  as a
on the volume of voluntary savings was  reduction  in loan size.
not available for PHBK and P4K (Table
10).
Outreach Depth.  Of the  Table  11
five programs reviewed,  Depth  of Program Outreach
only P4K  explicitly
targets low-income  Average  Loan  Size  Women
households.  The  Loan Size  Percent of GDP  Percent  of
program  claims that  all  (US$)  Per Capita  Borrowersa
beneficiary households  BKK  99  10  40
LKP  (Dompu  75  7  62
have incomes below the  District)
poverty  line.  Limited  PLIBK  71-130  7- 13b  50
data from PHBK  P4K  67  7  50
indicate that about 20  BKD  71  7  50
percent of its client  Range for 9  NA  16- 136  20 - 90
households have incomes  programs
below  the poverty  line.  worldwide
Income data on the other  a]  Women's  share  of loans  was  estimated  by program  managers  or  was
programs' clients were  based  on  a sample  of  program  loans.
not available. One proxy  b/ Program  managers'  estimate  of  the  average  loan  size  per group
member  results  in loans per person equal  to 13  percent of GDP per
for income commonly  capita.  Estimates  of  the number  of members  in each  borrower  group
used to assess  depth of  results  in loans  per person  equal to 7 percent  of per capital  GDP.
microfinance outreach is
loan-size- to-GDP-per-capita.  For the five programs, average loan-size-to-GDP-per-capita in
1995 ranged from up to  13 percent for the PHBK program to 7 percent for LKP, P4K, and BKD.
These figures are lower than those of nine of the most respected microfinance programs
8 The BKK program  did not report voluntary  savings  separately  from required  savings. The value  of required
savings  is estimated  by  multiplying  the  average  required  savings  rate  by  the  outstanding  balance  of  BKK
loans.  The  program's  estimated  voluntary  savings  is total  savings  minus  this estimated  required  savings.
19worldwide (Christen et al., 1995). 9 BRI's Unit Desa system had an average loan size of 89
percent of per capita GDP in 1995 (Charitonenko Church et al., 1997).  These programs' average
loan sizes range from US$67 to US$130 (Table 11). When loan sizes are converted to US dollars
using purchasing power parity, all of these programs have average loans that are smaller in size
than those of the nine microfinance programs.'0
For the five programs studied, women account for 40 to 62 percent of borrowers (Table 11)
versus 24 percent of Unit Desa borrowers (Christen et al., 19q95).  Women account for a relatively
large share of borrowers primarily because the programs' loans are well-suited to petty trading.
In Indonesia, women are heavily represented among petty traders.
Reasons  for Evolution in Program Performance. The BKK system suffered a considerable shock
in 1993. In part this was due to economic concerns that shook Indonesia's entire financial
system.  The problem appears worse on paper than it actually was because records of arrears rates
were corrected in that year.  Finally, political interference catalyzed by elections negatively
impacted units' lending decisions. Since that time however, units have performed well. In 1994
and 1995, BKK could have operated profitably without subsidies, had very acceptable arrears
rates, and impressive outreach depth.  Program managers claim that for each new facility, arrears
begin high and then decline over time.  Borrowers initially assume that this is a subsidized
government program, and it takes time to educate them to the fact that the loans must be repaid.
However, program managers claim to have improved this education process and have trained the
staff of new units accordingly.
LKP in Dompu requires a higher interest rate than either BKK or P4K to compensate for
subsidies. Political influences and weaknesses in program management create the need for this
relatively large subsidy. Indeed, one unit was driven to the blink of insolvency  through corrupt
management practices.
The PHBK program had a troubled start, but has improved significantly  since 1993.  Program
organizers attribute initial, high program costs and arrears rates to inadequate screening of
participating NGOs and groups, and to reliance on the program's Model 2, which provides
financing to credit users through banks making loans to NGOs which lend to credit groups which
lend to members.  Alternative program models are simpler and more direct. Program volume has
increased in recent years partially due to the program's aggressive marketing to rural banks
(BPRs).  BPRs are much closer to PHBK' s target market than many of the larger government and
private commercial  banks.  Also, they have little, if any, bureaucracy and therefore possess the
flexibility  to adopt the PHBK group lending approach quickly. PHBK is still expanding its
9Programs  are:  BRI Unit  Desa  (Indonesia),  Grameen  Bank  (Bangladesh),  BancoSol  (Bolivia),  Bankin  Raya
Karkara (Niger),  Agence  de Credit  pour L'Entreprise  Privee  (Senegal),  La Associacion  Dominicana  para el
Desarrollo  de la Mujer (Dominican  Republic),  Fundacion  Integral Campesina  (Costa  Rica),  K-Rep  (Kenya),
and CorpoSol  (Colombia).
10  The information  required  to convert  loans  values in US dollars  into loan values in US dollars  adjusted  for
purchasing  power  parity  was obtained  from World Bank,  1996.
20geographic coverage.  Once geographic growth is completed, it is likely that the program's
required subsidy level will decline further.
In contrast to PHBK, P4K initially experienced rapid lending volume growth, low arrears, and
declining subsidy rates.  However, program performance has deteriorated since 1993. Program
managers attribute P4K's recent increases in arrears and declining  volume to several factors.
They believe that a reassignment of the program within the Ministry of Agriculture contributed to
defaults because many borrower groups were accustomed to making repayments to specific
agriculture extension workers.  When these did not visit the groups for an extended period, many
did not make other arrangements to deliver payments to a BRI outlet.  A further hypothesis is that
arrears were exacerbated by BRI's policy of canceling the program in districts in which arrears
rates were higher than 10 percent.  Under this policy, many groups with strong repayment records
stopped paying when it became apparent that the program was to be discontinued in their area.  A
reorganization of the program within the Ministry of Agriculture required additional training costs
in locations in which the program already operated.  Finally, program cost-to-output ratios have
increased as the program has incurred start-up costs by expanding to a number of additional
provinces.
The basic structure of the program  may have contributed to its recent problems. The program
uses agriculture extension workers as credit agents who rarely have a banking background and are
not under the control of the bank disbursing the loans.  Furthermore, until 1996 they had no direct
incentive to investigate the creditworthiness of borrowing groups or to encourage these groups to
repay their loans in a timely manner."l Also, extension agents provide a number of free services.
Groups may be less likely to see the funds they receive as a real obligation to be repaid because
their primary contact in the process generally does not charge for services. Finally  BRI operates
this program from its branches rather than through its Unit Desa system, yet Unit Desas are much
closer to the credit end-users geographically and in terms of the types of credits they issue.
Relocating the program to Unit Desas would facilitate collection efforts, and might also increase
the proportion of groups receiving more than one credit.  It would be much easier for groups to
apply for additional credits from Unit Desas than from BRI branches.
Most BKD units lack dynamism; and over time, many have decapitalized. While there were
initially 5,345 units, only about 3,000 active units remained before a recapitalization initiative  in
1992.  Because units are managed on a part-time basis by people with other business activities,
most units lend relatively modest funds to the same customers over time and often make little
effort to expand the volume of their business or broaden their customer base.  This lack of
dynamism  is reflected in the system's low loan-to-assets ratio.  Loans accounted for 49 percent of
assets from 1993 though 1995. Because the units have few fixed assets and no investments, about
36 percent of system resources are deposited with BRI.  This compares to the South Kalimantan
BKK system in which loans account for 84 percent of assets.
In 1996,  program  management  had plans to improve  credit  agents' incentives.
21Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
The programs differ markedly in the degree to which they have been affected by the Regulation
supporting Indonesia's  1992 Banking Law.  PHBK and P4K operate through commercial and
rural banks.  Thus, their operations are not affected by the Regulation.  LKP program managers
believe that they will be able to avoid the Regulation through "cosmetic" changes to their units.
However, the Regulation have strongly influenced the growth of BKKs and BKDs.
The provincial government of South Kalimantan has established 72 new BKK units since the
Regulation was promulgated.  To comply with the Regulation, these new units do not accept
deposits.  This lack of a deposit-taking mandate hurts the new units.  Unit managers cited a lack
of sufficient funds to meet effective demand as their most critical, or second most critical,
problem. For BKKs that are permitted to mobilize savings, deposits are an important source of
funds.  For these units, voluntary deposits were equal to at least 25 percent of net assets in
1995.12 Not only will an inability  to mobilize savings retard lending growth, but it will also deny
customers a valuable service. Finally, it will deprive managers of a useful means of gauging the
creditworthiness of potential loan clients.
Most BKD units are too small to qualify to become BPRs according to the 1992 Banking
Regulation. However, the regulation makes an exception for institutions already in existence
prior to 1992 and possessing a license from the Ministry of Finance. BKDs fall into this
classification. BI is currently determining how it will deal with BKD units that are too small to
become BPRs.  It appears likely that these units will be allowed to continue to operate but will no
longer be able to take deposits from people outside the village in which they are located. The
Regulation prevents the creation of new BKDs.
In an attempt to expand informal credit while still complying with the Regulation, the Indonesian
government has created 975 modified BKD-type institutions since 1994. These new institutions,
called Tempat Pelayanan Simpan Pinjam (TPSP), are almost identical to existing BKDs in their
structure and function.  However, they come under the umbrella of the Koperasi (Unit  Desa
(KUD) village cooperative  system.  These institutions do not.  violate the new regulations because,
according to the Regulation, financial institutions under the government-sponsored cooperative
system are exempt from the minimum capital requirements that other small financial  institutions
must meet if they accept deposits.  For its involvement with tlhe  TPSP units, the KUD system
receives a lump sum and monthly fees.  The system has a very inauspicious history of managing
financial institutions, and appears to be pressuring the TPSP units to make loans at subsidized
rates.  It is unlikely that the cost of KUD involvement with these facilities will be justified in terms
of improved unit performance.
2 The  BKK  program  did not report  voluntary  savings  separately  from  required  savings.  The  maximum  value  of
required  savings  is estimated  by multiplying  the  average  required  ssavings  rate  by the outstanding  balance  of
BKK loans. The  program's  volume  of estimated  minimum  voluntary  savings  is total savings  minus  estimated
maximum  required  savings. Thus in practice,  actual voluntary  savings  are significantly  above  the level
reported  here.
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On the credit side, program managers report that their units face limited competition.  The BRI
Unit Desa system has facilities throughout Indonesia. However, managers from the five programs
reviewed claim that they did not face significant  competition from BRI for lending. They feel that
their customers are generally  too poor or lacked required collateral to qualify for Unit Desa loans.
Of the five programs reviewed, only BKK reports that it faces some competition from BRI for
more affluent customers.  BKK managers claim that they compete with BRI by providing loans
faster, requiring less paperwork. and reducing transactions costs to clients through field staff visits
to clients' businesses.
BKK, PHBK, and P4K report that they face some competition from programs that provide grants
or very low interest loans to low-income families. The Family Planning Board (BKKBN) has
recently launched a highly subsidized,  group-based lending program for poor families
(TAKESRA/KUKESRA). Private firms and individuals with profits or incomes in excess of Rp.
100 million (US$42,800) are required to channel 2 percent of profits/income to this program.
The pressure to repay credits issued through this program is not high. Further, the program's
effective interest rate is negative in nominal terms. 13 The program was launched in 1996 and in
less than one year accumulated Rp. 500 billion (US$214 million) in fumding. Some state-owned
enterprises use the 5 percent of profits they are required to devote to poverty reduction to support
other highly-subsidized  lending activities. BKK, PHBK, and P4K managers feel that these
programs compete on unfair terms for some of their clients and erode good repayment habits.
Cooperative leaders functioning as private moneylenders also operate in the same regions as the
programs studied. Their loans carry a 20 percent flat monthly interest rate (equivalent to about
1,600 percent per year on a declining balance basis).  This rate is much higher than the highest
rates charged by the programs studied. Programs' unit managers claim that in areas where their
institutions operate, these cooperative leaders generally make loans only to individuals who do
not qualify for credit from their units.  14
Most of the programs reviewed compete with BRI Unit Desas for voluntary savings. This can be
difficult, as customers have tremendous confidence in the security of BRI deposits.  Furthermore
most of the programs require borrowers to deposit compensating balances that have restrictions
on withdrawal. This practice can confuse customers and lead them to believe that they will also
have difficulty  withdrawing voluntary savings. LKP, which allows agents to accept deposits in
the field, and BKD, which is located at the village level, can offer greater convenience than Unit
Desas.  Rural banks associated with PHBK frequently attempt to attract customers by offering
interest rates on savings significantly  in excess of those offered by BRI.
13 The  program's  nominal  interest  rate  is 6 percent.  However,  upon  full  loan  repayment.  borrowers  receive  back
10  percent  of  their  payments.
14 Generally  people  who  have  a poor  repayment  history  on  previous  loans  or do not  have  their  own  business  or
farm,  and  are not  steadily  employed.
234.  LESSONS LEARNED  AND RECOMMENDATIONS  FOR
GOVERNMENT  AND DONOR MICROFINANCE  ACTIVITIES
This chapter summarizes lessons from this review, and suggests ways governments and donors
could continue to support microfinance.
The programs reviewed above show that microfinance initiatives can:
*  provide low-income people with a valuable service at an initial, affordable cost to
governments or donors;
*  obtain strong financial performance through the use of incentives for staff and clients;
*  reduce, and even eliminate,  the need for subsidies if they charge high real interest
rates, aggressively pursue repayments, and achieve a significant  volume of business;
*  face political pressures that undermine their commitment to sound banking practices;
*  be weakened through poorly-designed supervision systems;
*  reach clients in remote areas through sub-district based units and field staff,
*  operate efficiently  without relying on intermediary organizations between banks and
borrowers, group lending techniques, or savings requirements for borrowers;
*  serve female borrowers without targeting them in marketing efforts if loan products
meet women's needs and are accessible to them.
Poverty Reduction and Economic Development
Although this review does not measure these programs' impact on poverty reduction and
economic development, a general examination of them indicates that expansion of microfinance is
an efficient tool to promote these goals.  These programs make very small loans, charge interest
rates higher than those of commercial banks, and enforce debt repayment.  The majority of their
clients are too poor to secure the larger and less expensive loEns available from commercial banks.
The fact that the programs face overwhelning demand for credit despite their rates and strict
enforcement of repayment, indicates that low-income clients obtain high returns from investment
of these funds.
These programs required large subsidies when they are first introduced.  However, after they
incurred start-up costs, expanded in scale, and demonstrated a firm commitment to repayment
performance, subsidies declined dramatically.
Supporting development of the microfinance market can be an efficient way for governments and
donors to address poverty reduction and economic development. If unsubsidized private
24provision of microfinance is expanding, government and donor support for this sector is not as
important as it is if the microfinance market is less developed.  However, even if private activity in
this field is dynamic, governments and donors can work to promote the sector in remote areas
where required initial start-up costs are high, and the private sector is hesitant to enter the market
in the short- to medium-term.
Incentives for Customers and Staff
Microfinance programs cannot afford to closely monitor clients or staff.  Carefully-designed
incentives can motivate them to act in ways that strengthen program performance without
requiring high costs.  The programs reviewed provide multiple incentives  to customers and staff.
Most encourage staff to maintain high collection rates and maximize unit profits by linking staff
compensation to the volume of repayments collected and/or profitability. They promote demand
by making it relatively easy for customers to obtain loans.  They facilitate physical access to
services through the use of conveniently located facilities and/or field staff and credit agents.
Most programs have relatively simple application procedures, and provide customers with loans
within a few days or weeks of initial inquiry. None of the programs require physical collateral for
small loans.
These programs encourage prompt repayment by linking  borrowers'  access to future loans and
their future loan sizes to punctual repayment of current commitments. P4K experienced an
increasing repayment problem when it attempted to control arrears by deviating from a policy of
borrower repayment incentives. It canceled the P4K program in districts in which arrears ran
higher than 10 percent.  Under this policy, many groups with strong repayment records stopped
paying when it became apparent that the program was to be discontinued in their area.
Limiting Subsidies
Many of Indonesia's government-supported microfinance programs continue to make low-interest
loans, and frequently do not enforce repayment.  These programs are expensive and create a
negative demonstration effect. Because they provide cheap credit and do not enforce repayment,
customers of more market-based programs expect the same conditions.  If governments and
donors ensure that all of their microfinance initiatives follow market-based principles, they can
promote the long term health of the market.
However, the programs reviewed here demonstrate that limited start-up subsidies can play a
valuable, and temporary, role in the microfinance market.  If these programs had not had
subsidies in their early years, they would have been forced to charge interest rates that clients
could not pay.  Subsidies have given these programs time to develop the approaches, scale, and
staff and client experience necessary to move towards self-sustainability. These programs now
require relatively modest subsidies although they make very small loans. The programs' average
loan sizes ranged from 7 to 13 percent of GDP-per-capita (US$67 to US$130 ).  This ratio for
nine of the world's most respected microfinance programs is 16 to 136 percent.
These programs' attainment of self-sustainability  is partially predicated on charging high real
interest rates that their borrowers can afford,  Most end users are paying interest rates of 100
percent per year or more (when calculated on a declining balance basis and taking into account
25fees) under PHBK, LKP, and BKD.  Yet demand for their loans are very strong.  Many P4K
groups make loans to their own members at a "flat" interest rate of 5 percent per month
(equivalent to approximately 154 percent per year on a comrpounded  and declining balance basis).
Some BKK borrowers prefer a I percent flat weekly interest rate with weekly repayments to a 2.5
percent flat monthly interest rate on a loan with monthly repayments.  Despite the cost of these
programs' credits, repayment rates are generally high because borrowers know that prompt
repayment will entitle them to additional loans.
The programs reviewed here have reduced their subsidy dependence over time. However, they,
and others like them, could likely move more rapidly towards self-sustainability  if they were aware
of the full magnitude of their subsidies, and were under pressure to reduce them.  Microfinance
initiatives could (i) institute accounting and reporting formats that accurately track all (including
in-kind) subsidies, and (ii) appropriately provision for bad debt and depreciate fixed assets.  Their
backers could enforce annual subsidy reduction goals.
Even programs that are not under pressure to become self-sustaining  can help expand the market
for unsubsidized microfinance. If subsidized programs track client repayment performance, they
can provide credit history information to market-based lenders.  This information will reduce the
risk to these lenders of serving the microfinance market, and increase the likelihood of their
entering it.  A former Indonesian subsidized credit program called Kredit Mini/Midi established a
base of good borrowers that the BRI Unit Desa system was able to use to rapidly build its
unsubsidized and highly successful Kupedes program. Programs also can limit the number of
highly-subsidized credits that clients can receive, which would encourage them to access
unsubsidized service. P4K moves borrowers towards less-subsidized services by charging
significantly  higher interest rates after borrowers have obtained four low-interest loans.
Governments and donors also can minimize programs' long-term subsidy dependency by
structuring their support of the sector in the form of temporary set-up subsidies (that would not
include interest rate subsidies) for private providers that would subsequently have to generate
profits to remain in the market.  PHBK employs this approach by reducing over time the subsidy
that institutions and client groups that participate in its program receive.  Governments and/or
donor also could encourage private firms to submit plans for the provision of a set of
microfinance services at the village and/or sub-district level.  Along with their plans, the
institutions could submit a bid for the subsidy or start-up grant they would require to provide
these services. The government and/or donor could then award funds to the institution that
provided the best combination of business plan and subsidy/grant request.
Government Control
Government-owned financial institutions can be vulnerable to political considerations and public
perceptions that depress system productivity. BKK and LKP faced pressure to relax their
underwriting and collections efforts during the 1992 elections, and this risk is ever-present for
state-owned financial intermediaries. Political interference in hiring has led LKP units to be
overstaffed. Many BKD units' lending decisions are based partially on borrowers' standing in
their villages rather than on their creditworthiness.  Several of the programs have accounting and
reporting procedures that are significantly  influenced by political considerations.  Finally,
26managers with BKK and LKP said that the institutions' government ownership contributed to
arrears problems. When the programs began, borrowers assumed that government programs
would not strictly enforce repayment requirements.
Governments can weaken the microfinance sector by granting market power to government
bodies that do not adhere to best practice standards.  In Indonesia, Presidential Regulation No.
71/1992 requires that all microfinance institutions too small to become rural banks either
discontinue deposit-taking services, or become cooperatives.  Also, the government discontinued
plans to expand the BKD system because the Department of Cooperatives feared that the units
would compete with the microfinance activities of the Koperasi UJnit  Desa (KUD) village
cooperative system. Instead of expanding BKD, the government created a similar system and
placed it under the umbrella of KUD. Yet the cooperative movement has not always adhered to
prudent banking standards in its microfinance activities.
If a government chooses to operate a microfinance program, it should ensure that political
considerations do not undermine the program's commitment to sound banking practices.
Granting a government-owned microfinance institution autonomous status can help reduce the
political pressure it faces.  For institutions that initially receive state subventions, governments can
force them to operate with hard budget constraints, and reduce these grants over time thereby
pressuring the institutions to achieve self-sufficiency. Governments can privatize institutions
when they are commercially  viability. For example, the BKK system no ionger requires
government subsidies to operate on a commercially-viable  basis, and could likely be privatized. If
the government develops a microfinance program that operates in collaboration with private
banks, it can train the banks to provide microfinance services without continuing government
assistance. PHBK operates in this way.
Widely publicizing government programs' successes in moving towards, or achieving, self-
sustainability  also helps reduce the political pressure to which they are subject.  If a government
takes public pride in its programs' financial successes, it will be less likely to undermine this
achievement for political purposes.  Donors could help ensure that this occurs by providing
successful government programs with international exposure.  The international attention that the
BRI Unit Desa system obtained is partially responsible  for the government's commitment  to its
self-sustainability.
Supervision
The Indonesian government is concerned about the quality of supervision of semi-formal  financial
institutions.  Also, this analysis  found that even BKK, LKP, and BKD, which are supervised by
provincial development banks or a commercial bank, do not always follow best practice standards.
To address this issue, Presidential Regulation No. 71/1992 requires semi-formal  financial
institutions that accept deposits to become rural banks or cooperatives.  However the Regulation
is difficult for many small institutions to comply with, and may not improve their supervision.
Further, it has limited the volume of their lending growth and may have induced some to expand
their branch networks in sub-optimal ways.
27The long-term health of the microfinance market is predicated on good supervision. To improve
supervision, microfinance institutions, with central bank assistance, could develop industry
standards regarding underwriting; collections; lending limits; loan classification;  provisioning for,
and writing-off, bad debts; the acceptance of required and voluntary savings; accounting;
reporting; etc. These standards could be applicable to semi-formal microfinance institutions; banks
and cooperatives that function as microfinance institutions, and commercial banks' microfinance
activities.
Ideally industries have primary responsibility for supervising themselves. One way to accomplish
this is for microfinance institutions to contract for supervision services with commercial banks
that the central bank judges to have the ability  to perform adequate oversight. To ensure that
supervisors correctly filfill their duties, including enforcing the industry standards discussed
above, the central bank could require regular supervision reports, and conduct random inspections
of microfinance providers.  Central banks could penalize supervising institutions that do not
exercise due diligence. These institutions could bolster employee performance through incentive-
based staff remuneration.
If a government does not believe that it can institute a supervision system rigorous enough to
permit semi-formal  financial institutions to accept deposits, it could allow these institutions to act
as agents for banks authorized to accept deposits.  The banks could pay the small financial
institutions a fee for this service, and extend the same guarantee to savers who use this system as
that enjoyed by their savings customers who access the banks directly. This practice would
provide clients with convenient and relatively safe savings services. However, it would not be as
advantageous to semi-formal financial  institutions as accepting deposits on their own behalves
because the funds mobilized would not be available to the institutions as liabilities.
Serving Clients  in Remote Areas
Of the modalities reviewed here, the BKK/LKP system of a network of small, sub-district based
units with fast and simple procedures and field staff is probably the best means of reaching
households in low-density areas.  This system functions well because (i) customers have relatively
easy access to bank services; (ii) lenders control their field staff, thereby ensuring that they work
in the institution's best interests, and (iii) services are delivered in a direct and cost-effective way.
The modalities that PHBK employs in remote areas are difficult and expensive to implement, and
often do not produce good results.  Borrower groups that function as quasi-financial institutions
require a large amount of training and ongoing monitoring and guidance. NGOs that function as
intermediaries  frequently do not have the skills and commitment  to function as efficient financial
agents.
P4K delivers relatively low-cost credit to poor households in remote areas.  However, the
program's reliance on credit agents who are not controlled by the lender reduces the program's
ability  to enforce loan repayment and pursue repeat business. Further, borrowers have difficulty
accessing the lender directly because bank branches are generally located in district capitals.  If
extension agents do not visit client groups on a regular basis, it is difficult  for customers to obtain
program services. Finally  the system, jointly implemented  by BRI and the Ministry of Agriculture,
28is very cumbersome and inflexible. Borrowers can wait up to six months to receive a loan, versus
days to weeks for most of the other programs reviewed here.
The BKD system of village-owned and operated units is very convenient for borrowers in remote
areas and has minimal overhead costs.  However, the units lack dynamism. Many make loans to
only a small number of regular customers, and do not consider applications of many village
residents who would pose reasonable credit risks.
These programs demonstrate that simple, inexpensive modalities that do not require intensive
training for customers or intermediaries and which allow institutions to retain direct control over
their field staff can facilitate serving remote clients cost-effectively.  Incentives for staff to take
advantage of prudent business growth opportunities will promote program performance.
Intermediaries Between Banks and Borrowers
The successes of BKK, LKP, and BKD demonstrate that microfinance initiatives need not rely on
intermediaries between banks and borrowers to reach remote clients. Further, PHBK and P4K
demonstrate that the use of intermediaries between banks and borrowers can be expensive and
difficult  to implement.
Of the three PHBK modalities, the one that makes use of NGOs as intermediaries between banks
and clients requires the most intense program support and by far the highest interest rates to end
users.  It  also suffers from the highest arrears problems because many NGOs are poorly trained
and equipped to enforce repayment obligations.  PHBK attributes some of its recent growth and
improved performance to a significant  reduction in its use of this lending modality.
P4K managers attribute part of the program's  recent arrears problem to the fact that groups
frequently rely on agriculture extension agents to deliver the groups' monthly loan installments to
the bank.  If extension workers do not visit the groups, many do not make other arrangements to
pay.  Because extension workers are not employed directly by the bank, the bank's ability  to
influence  them is limited. This work also may distract the agriculture extension agents from their
normal job responsibilities. Indeed, many agriculture extension experts recommend that extension
agents' job responsibilities  be confined to information dissemination (Benor and Baxter, 1987).
These programs demonstrate that microfinance initiatives need not rely on intermediaries  to reach
remote clients.  Programs that make use of intermediaries  can enhance results if the intermediaries
are well-trained in banking services, their compensation is paid by the lender, and their
remuneration is linked to the volume of business they generate and the lending repayment rates
they obtain.  If intermediaries are government employees with other job responsibilities,  their
performance should be carefully monitored to ensure that their financial activities do not impinge
on their other work.
Customer Groups
These programs illustrate that lending to groups may not always be as efficient as lending to
individuals. Of the programs reviewed here, BKK had the lowest subsidy levels in 1994 and
1995. Yet only a few BKK units began to make group loans at the end of 1995. The PHBK
29program's  experience shows that group-based programs ca:n  lower their subsidy levels by
reducing group responsibilities. Programs that make group loans must train them to fulfill their
responsibilities. The larger the group's role, the more expensive and time consuming this training.
Further, all borrowers in a group obtain a loan at the same time, whereas the timing of their needs
may differ. Group members usually must also participate in regular group meetings that carry
opportunity costs.  Finally, individuals incur a higher risk from obtaining a group loan because if
one member of their group does not repay, other members mnust  cover that person's debt if they
wish to obtain credit in the future.
Many experts advocate the formation of customer groups to improve the efficiency of
microfinance service delivery. However, lending to groups has a variety of costs to microfinance
institutions and borrowers.  Programs interested in group lending could provide borrowers with a
choice between group or individual  service.  If the program believes that the administrative costs
of individual  lending outweigh the costs of training groups, the program could recoup the cost
differential by levying a higher interest rate on small loans or setting a loan fee that does not vary
by loan size. Customers could then decide whether the higher cost they would face for an
individual  loan was preferable to the monetary and opportunity costs they would incur with
individual  credit.
Required Savings
BKK's results demonstrate that institutions can obtain strong repayment performance without
requiring borrowers to maintain savings accounts.  Some BKIK  units require savings deposits from
borrowers while others do not.  Yet the two sets of units do not experience different repayment
rates.  Microfinance programs could experiment with savings specifications to determine if this
requirement contributes significantly  to their program's performance.
Serving Women and Farmers
Women account for 40 to 62 percent of these programs' borrowers.  This level of female
participation compares favorably to that of several of the world's most respected microcredit
programs." 5 The fact that women account for a relatively large share of borrowers is primarily a
"demand-pull"  rather than a "supply-push" phenomenon. Most of these programs do not
deliberately seek to attract female borrowers.  Rather their loans are better suited to petty trading
than to agriculture.  In Indonesia, women are heavily represented among petty traders.  Further,
the programs transact business in villages and do not require collateral for small loans.  These
features facilitate women's access to services. The performance of these programs demonstrate
that if microfinance institutions offer products that woman find useful and can access, they will
seek these services without targeted marketing efforts,
Few of these programs offer loans that are of significant  use to farmers. Loans are usually of
short duration and payments are generally required on a weekly or monthly basis. Further,
managers of several of the microfinance programs are reluctant to make loans for agricultural use.
Women  account  for 20  percent  of  ACEP's  borrowers  in Senegal,  24 percent  of Unit  Desa  borrowers  in
Indonesia,  and 26 percent  of FINCA  borrowers  in Costa  Rica.
30If microfinance programs wish to provide services to farmers, they should tailor loan products to
smallholders' needs.  This might include offering seasonal loans that do not require frequent
repayments.  It is likely that these loans would not have to carry lower interest rates than current
products to be affordable for at least some agricultural uses.1 6 For programs that do not already
offer these products, staff might benefit from training in how to evaluate the credit risk of
agricultural loans, and encouragement to consider applications for agricultural uses. To reduce
the risk of entering this market, programs could introduce these new loan products initially on a
pilot basis in their best units.  They could then carefully evaluate demand and repayment
performance to determine the loan products and staff approaches that obtain the best results.
16 Often farmers obtain seeds and fertilizer, and pay for these inputs with the crops they subsequently grow.  In
Indonesia, the implicit interest rates on these in-kind transactions can be as high as those microfinance
institutions charge.
31ANNEX 1: SOUTH  KALIMANTAN'S  BADAN KREDIT KECAMATAN
(BKK) PROGRAM
Program Description
South Kalimantan's Badan Kredit Kecamatan (BKK) program began in 1985. It was modeled on
the BKK system of Central Java but has always functioned independently of it. BKKs are semi-
formal financial institutions owned by the South Kalimantan provincial government.  Each unit is
endowed with modest facilities and low-interest loans/capitatl  endowment grants of approximately
US$5,000. 7 USAID financed the first 16 of these facilities, and South Kalimantan's provincial
government financed the 94 additional units.  The provincial government is hoping to convert 10
BKKs to rural banks (BPRs).  These 10 units have each received an additional capital endowment
of Rp. 5 million (US$2,200).  After the promulgation of the 1992 Banking Law and supporting
Presidential Regulation, the provincial government stopped creating BKK units and instead began
to found units called Lembaga Pembiayaan IJsaha Kecil (LPUK).  The only difference between
BKKs and LPUKs is that the former accept deposits, and the latter do not.  There are currently 34
BKKs and 76 LPUKs - one unit in each of the province's 109 sub-districts (kecamatans) and one
additional unit.
BKKs and LPUKs (hereafter referred to collectively as BKKs) are similar in structure and
function to NTB's LKPs discussed in Annex 2.  Units are owned by the Province, and supervised
by the provincial development bank (BPD).  Each unit is located in a sub-district capital and
serves most of the villages in that sub-district. Field staff make frequent visits to surrounding
villages, and customers must come to the facilities for some transactions. The units do not receive
fixed or regular subsidies. However, units were founded with an initial, low-interest capital
loan/grant, and most receive their buildings and furniture free of charge from the Province or a
district.  The Province provides subsidized training, guidance, and supervision; and the provincial
or district governments often furnish units with office equipment, motorcycles, and bicycles.
Finally, units rarely pay taxes, and are not subject to the reserve requirements with which
commercial banks must comply.i 8
Unit profits are divided among stakeholders as follows: 70 percent remain with the units in the
form of retained earnings; 10 percent are divided among employees as a performance bonus; 5
percent are given to an employee welfare fund; 5 percent are given to a local government
development fund; and 5 percent are given to the BPD as a fee for supervision and training.
Supervision.  The units are supervised by the district branch of the BPD.  In theory, the BPD
makes all policy decisions for the BKKs units, including the types of savings and lending products
units can offer, the terms they can charge on these instruments, how they should provision for bad
7 Units are required  to repay only  the interest owed  on the loan.  Further,  this interest is used to partially  cover
costs  of supervising  units and training unit staff.  In practice,  this initial loan  functions  as a capital
endowment  grant, and the annual interest serves  as a partial annual fee for supervision  and training.
isRural banks  (BPRs)  are also exempt  from this reserve  requirement.
32debt, when they should write off loans, what their underwriting and loan servicing procedures
should be, whom they should hire, how they should train staff, etc.  In practice, individual  unit
managers frequently assume at least minor levels of discretion with regard to many of these
policies. The BPD has one full-time supervisor for every 8.5 BKK units.  Supervisors visit units
from I to 4 times per month.
Loan Products
Loan terms vary by unit, but none offers a loan for less than 10 weeks or more than 18 months.
Officially,  the interest rate on loans varies based on the loan's  size and repayment frequency.  In
practice, the rate that an individual  borrower pays depends on the options allowed to him or her
by the branch manager.  Interest rates range from a low of 3.5 percent per month on a declining
balance basis with no savings requirement (an annualized rate of 51 percent), to a high of 1
percent per week on the initial loan balance with a 10 percent savings requirement (an annualized
rate of about 196 percent).  The most frequently quoted rate is 2.5 percent flat per month, with a
10 percent forced savings requirement for the 34 original BKKs and no forced savings
requirement for new units.  For a four month loan, these terms are equal to an interest rate of
about 3.9 percent monthly or 59 percent per year on an annualized, declining  balance basis
assuming no forced savings requirement. For the units that require forced savings, the terms
translate into an effective interest rate of 4.5 percent per month, or 70 percent per year. There is
no fee charged on loans.  Loans over Rp. 200,000 or 250,000 (US$86- $ 107) require land or a
vehicle as collateral. Repayment frequencies range from weekly to monthly, depending on
manager discretion and borrower preference.
Minimum and maximum  loan sizes vary by unit.  However the widest range appears to be Rp.
50,000 (about US$21) to Rp. 1 million  (about US$428).  For most units, loans above Rp.
200,000 to Rp. 250,000 (US$86- $ 107) must be approved by the head of the sub-district.
Until recently BKKs did not engaged in group lending. However, program supervisors familiar
with Bank of Indonesia's PHBK program recognized the potential for group lending to reduce
transactions costs. They introduced the concept on a pilot basis to one BKK unit in 1995.19
Before the official  trial period had ended, other units had spontaneously begun to copy the idea.
Currently 59 groups have outstanding loans with BKK units.  The BKKs are exclusively  using
PHBK's "Model 3" in which the units make loans to "channeling groups" that simply  pass loan
funds down to their members and pass up repayments.  The groups do not attempt to act as
financial intermediaries, and there are no NGOs involved in the process.
The  BKKs' adoption  of the PHBK  group  lending  system  preceded  PHBK's  introduction  to South  Kalimantan.
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As mentioned above, only the 34 original BKK units accept voluntary savings or require forced
savings. Voluntary and compulsory savings earn an annual interest rate of 9 percent.  This rate is
currently slightly negative in real terms and is about equal to the rate paid by most of the other
programs reviewed in this report.  All BKKs are desperate for additional liquidity. Program
organizers feel, however, that the supply of savings is very price inelastic and that increasing the
interest rate paid on deposits will not significantly  increase the volume of funds mobilized.
Staffing
The provincial BPD is responsible for staffing  the BKK units, and staffing norms may be slightly
high given that many units have limited field activities.  However, staffing for BKKs is clearly
more in line with unit needs than staffing for the LKPs in Sumbawa.  The total number of staff per
BKK unit ranges from 3 to 6.  Staffing varies depending on unit volume and the time required for
staff to reach the villages they serve. In most units, managers also serve as field agents, thereby
using their time more productively than the managers of LKPs who do not leave the office.  All
staff must have at least a high school degree and pass a test to be eligible for employment. Most
managers have only a high school degree.  All staff are trained before they begin their jobs.  Unit
managers receive additional training one to two times per year.  Other staff members receive
additional training approximately once every other year.
Staff salaries are based on a complicated system and depend on the employee's position, tenure
within the BKK system, and performance. Salaries range from a low of Rp. 123,000 (US$53) to
a high of Rp. 418,500 (US$179) per month.  On an annual basis, salaries range from 67 to 227
percent of per-capita GDP.  Even the lowest possible salary for a BKK worker is almost as high
as the highest salary paid to LKP staff in Sumbawa.
Also, all BKK employees of a given unit share a total of about 18.2 percent of nominal unit profits
in the form of bonuses and a welfare fund. 20 For the average unit, this bonus and welfare fund
would have amounted to approximately Rp. 669,000 per employee - equivalent to  1.6 to 5.4
months of salary. Thus, for most employees, their bonus will account for a significant share of
their income.  The small number of staff per unit - from 3 to 6 people - combined with the
relatively large size of the potential bonus per worker should act as a significant  motivator for
employee performance.
20 The  actual  formula  to calculate  this is somewhat  complicated  and includes  a quarterly  bonus  equal  to 5 percent
of quarterly  profits  for the first three quarters,  an end-of-year  bonus equal  to 10 percent  of annual profits,  and
an employee  welfare  fund equal  to 5 percent of annual profits. However,  to calculate  the unit's end-of-year
profit, the quarterly  bonuses  are treated as an expense. Thus, the quarterly  bonuses  reduce  slightly  the value
of the end-of-year  bonus and welfare  fund.
34Underwriting and Loan Servicing
Prospective borrowers must have a business or employment to be considered for a loan.  Unit
personnel visit the work site of each prospective borrower before issuing the loan.  At the same
time, the loan officer checks on the prospective borrower's character by talking to the local
village chief and/or neighbors. Most BKK managers have found that neighbors provide more
accurate character references than village chiefs. If the borrower is married, his or her spouse
must also sign the promissory note.  Loans are disbursed 1 day to 2 weeks after the loan
application is received. Borrowers must come to the unit twice to obtain a loan - once to
complete the application and once to collect the funds,
Collections procedures vary across BKK units.  Units serving villages a considerable distance
from their facility send out field staff to collect installments. Units serving villages that have
relatively easy access to their facility require that borrowers make payments at the unit. However,
even these latter units send staff to visit borrowers' villages if payments are more than 2 to 7 days
late.  There is no penalty for late payments. Nevertheless, previous repayment performance is
taken into account when determining whether to issue additional loans.  Units give new borrowers
small loans and allow subsequent loans to rise in value as the borrower proves repayment
reliability.
Program Performance
This section reviews program performance as measured by sustainability  and outreach.
Sustainability is measured by the program's arrears rate, profitability, and the size of the subsidy
required to sustain operations.  Outreach is measured by the volume of annual lending and savings
activities (scope), and the population it serves (depth of market penetration).
Sustainability.  According to  Table 12
data supplied by the BPD, for  Adjusted Annual Arrears and Default Ratesa  for the
the 34 BKKs in existence  34 Original BKKs (Percent)
before 1993, the volume of
loans  in arrears  by more than  19931  19941 19951
3 months was equal to 26  Arrears  27.01  6.21  5.91
percent of the volume of  Default  2 3 . 0 b1  3.0  3.5
outstanding loans in 1995.  a/ The volume  of loans in arrears  and in default  divided  by the
Because  units do not write  volume  of outstanding  loans. Loans  in default  from previous  years
off loans,  it is probably more  that have not yet been written  off are subtracted  from the annual
meaningful to  simulate  volume  of loans in default  and from annual outstanding  loans.
arrears  and default  rates  if the  b/ This figures includes  an adjustment  to correct  for previously
institution  wrote  off  100  unrecorded  defaults. However,  the actual default  rate in 1993  was
percent  of its loans in default  high compared  to that of previous  and subsequent  years.
each year. If the arrears rate
is recalculated in this way and all loans more than 90 days overdue are considered to be in default,
then the volume of loans in arrears was 6 percent of net outstanding loans in 1995. Loans in
default were equal to 3.5 (Table 12). Arrears and defaults were also relatively low in 1994. For
35the last two years, the program's arrears rate and default rate are very sound by international
microcredit standards. 21
However, loans in default were 23 percent of total loan volume in 1993. The high default rate in
1993 is partially an artifact of an audit in that year which required a one-time correction for
previously unrecorded defaults.  Thus, to some extent, the 11993  figure represents the stock of
defaults up to that date, and not simply  the annual incremental defaults occurring in that year. In
addition however, it appears likely that political pressures on lending policy in 1992 (caused by
the election in that year) led to unprecedented arrears in 1993.
It is very difficult  to estimate true unit profitability given the diverse, ad hoc, and often
unrecorded in-kind subsidies received by the 1 0 units from the province, the BPD, and districts.
Further, the way in which provisioning for bad debt is undertaken differs sharply from accepted
best practice.  If all of these factors are ignored, the 34 original BKKs had a real (above inflation)
return on assets of from 6 to  10 percent over the last three years.  This analysis made rough
estimates for expenses for depreciation of fixed assets, adequate loan loss provisioning, taxes,
reserve requirements, full supervision costs, and market retumns  to liability  holders. 22 In addition,
it revised the units' average outstanding assets to take into account adequate loan loss
provisioning.  23  After these adjustments, the units' inflation adjusted return on average assets
was -20.9 percent in 1993; 0.5 percent in 1994; and 1.5 percent in 1995 (Table 13).  24
21 For example, the Committee of Donor Agencies for Small Enterprise Development (1995) set as an acceptable
standard for microenterprise lending, that 10 percent or less of total loans should have late payments of 30
days or more, and lenders should have annual losses from defaults of 4 percent or less of outstanding loan
volume.  For the last two years, BKK's arrears rate are below the 10 percent level even though it includes
loans in arrears by one day or more.  The program's  default rate over the last two years is below 4 percent.
22  The BKK system  funds part of its portfolio  from savings  accounts  required  from borrowers. These required
savings accounts earn an interest rate below that which the program would have to pay to obtain marginal
additional resources from another source.  For the purposes of this analysis, this practice is considered to be
equivalent to generating additional fee income from loans and is not counted as a subsidy.
23  This analysis did not have information concerning when gifts of assets and equipment were received.  Thus, it
was not possible to adjust equity and assets to reflect owners' initial contributions and to then depreciate these
assets over their life.  Thus the estimated depreciation expense is subtracted from annual profits, but its value
is not deducted from assets or from equity.
24 ROA figures are higher and lower than those typically seen for financial institutions because BKKs (like most
microfinance institutions  in Indonesia) have relatively high equity to assets ratios.
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Estimated Earnings Adjusted for Subsidies and Bad Debt Expenses for 34 Original BKKs
Earnings Measure  1993  1994  1995
Adjusted  real  ROA (percent)  -20.9  0.5  1.5
Adjusted  real  ROE (percent)  -29.7  7.5  12.0
Estimated  Subsidy  Dependency  Index  118  0  0
(percent)a
Average  interest  rate charged  (percent)b  64  64  64
Required  annual interest  rate to cover all  139  64  64
costs including  market  return on equity
(percent)
a/ The percent  increase  in the interest  rate that is required  if the units were to be fully  self-supporting  including
paying  a market  rate  of return to equity  holders.
b/ BKK interest  rates  vary by loan size and repayment  frequency. This interest rate  is for one of BKKs  most
common  loans - a four month loan  with a 2.5 percent per month  flat interest rate, payable  in monthly  installments,
with a 5 percent  forced  savings  requirement. Five  percent  was selected  for the savings  requirement  because  some
BKKs  require  a 10  percent savings  component  while others  require  none.
Taking into account  the above  additional  expenses,  the units would have  earned  a real, adjusted
return  on equity  (ROE)  of -29.7  percent  in 1993; 7.5 percent  in 1994; and  12.0 percent  in 1995.
Finally, assuming  equity  holders  earned an interest  rate  equivalent  to the average  3 month time
deposit rate plus a 4 percentage point spread, the units' estimated Subsidy  Dependency Index
(the percent increase in the interest rate that is required if the units are to be fully self-supporting
including paying a market rate of return to equity holders) would have improved sharply from 118
percent in 1993 to 0 percent in 1995 (Table 13).  25
As these figures indicate, 1993 was a very troubled year for the BKK system. However, if only
figures for the last two years are considered, the BKKs are functioning a sound basis.  The units
did not require subsidies to operate on a sustainable basis in 1994 and 1995, and could have paid
equity holders a satisfactory return.
The program's real adjusted ROA and ROE improved from 1994 to  1995 while its Subsidy
Dependency Index (SDI) was constant.  This occurred because Indonesia's real (inflation
adjusted) interest rates increased dramatically in 1995. The program's  ROA and ROE increased
from 1994 to  1995 due primarily  to the fact that loan volume increased very significantly  over the
period but many expenses remained fixed. Like the program's ROE and ROA, the SDI benefited
from the improvements in business performance. However, the SDI was hurt by the increase in
real market interest rates because the SDI is calculated assuming a market interest rate return to
equity holders, not a fixed real return.  The damage that the SDI sustained from the increase in
market interest rates was approximately equal to the benefit of improved business performance.
25  This analysis  is based on a Subsidy  Dependency  Index  (SDI) for each program. See  Annex 7 for a description
of how  the SDI  is calculated.
37Outreach Scope. As indicated above, BKK units are now located in all 109 sub-districts in South
Kalimantan. Information on the percent of total villages senred by these facilities was not
available. However, program managers estimate that units reach over 50 percent of all villages in
the province.
In 1995, total lending for the  Table 14
110 units amounted to Rp. 7.8  Talen14
billion (US$3.4 million). This is  BKK Annual Lending
equivalent to approximately Rp.  1993  1994  1995
70.9 million (US$31,000) per  Nominal  loan  volume  2,962  5,008  7,800
unit.  Lending  volume  for the  (Rp.  million)
entire system increased by 60  Growth  in real  loan  volume  NA  56  42
percent in real terms in 1994,  (percent)  .
and 37 percent in real terms in  Nominal loan volume (US$)  1,410,333  2,297,110  3,421,250
1995. The units made 34,518  Pre-1994  unit volume  100  77  65
loans in 1995, up from 18,080 in  percent  of  total  volume
1993 (Table 14). If figures  Number  of loans for all  18,080  31,870  34,518
exclude lending  by the  76 units  units_________ Growth  in number  of loans  NA  76
founded in 1994 and 19957  then  (percent)
total loan volume for the 34
existing BKKs increased by 20 percent in real terms in 1994 and 19 percent in real terms in 1995.
Existing BKK units had an average volume of Rp. 148 million (US$63,000) each in 1995.
Existing units made approximately the same number of loans in 1995 as they did in 1993,
indicating that their real lending growth was derived from an increase in real average loan sizes.
38As indicated  Table 15
above, only the 34  Voluntary and Required Savings for
original BKKs  the BKK Units that Accept Deposits
collect savings. In
1995, total savings  1993  1994  1995
for these 34 units  Total nominal savings  (Rp.  323.4  621.2  974.4
stood  at  Rp.  974  million)
million  (about  Real growth  in savings  (percent)  NA  77  43
US$427,000).  Total nominal savings  (US$)  153,990  284,948  427,357
The real volume of  Total savings  percent  of total  30.0  37.6  40.3
savings deposits  outstanding  loans
grew  by 77  Estimate  of voluntary  savings  16.1  27.0  31.0
percent  in 1994  percent of net outstanding loansa
an  3percent  in  Real  growth  in voluntary  savings  142  56
and 43 percent in  (percent)
1995. By the end
of 1995, savings  a/  The volume  of voluntary  savings  is compared  to that of outstanding  loans
of 1995,  savings  net of required  savings  because  in practice,  savings  required  to obtain  a loan
represented  40  can be viewed  as equivalent  to borrowers  receiving  a smaller loan.
percent  of  Comparing  voluntary  savings  to loans net of required  savings  allows  an
outstanding loans  analysis  of the  importance  of voluntary  savings  in funding  loans.
net of bad debt for
these 34 units.
Information was not available to separate voluntary from required savings. However, at a
minimum,  voluntary savings would have accounted for 31 percent of  outstanding loans net of bad
debt and required savings in 1995,26  up from 0 percent in 1992 when voluntary savings accounts
were first introduced  (Table  15).
Outreach Depth.  The BKKs  do not keep  data on borrower  income.  Borrowers  are primarily
petty traders.  Approximately  40 percent  are women.  The average  loan size for the units  in 1995
was about  Rp. 226,000  (US$99).  This is probably lower  than  the average  loan size for the PHBK
program,  but higher than  the average  loan  size per individual under  the LKP,  P4K, and BKD
programs.  It is equivalent  to  about  10 percent  of per capita  GDP.
BKK units  are located  in all  109 sub-districts  in South  Kalimantan.  However,  the units'  ability to
penetrate  into remote  areas  varies by region.  The BPD  claims that  some units serve villages as far
as 70 kilometers  away.  Interviewed  unit managers  reporting  serving clients  as far as 15 to 25
kilometers  away from their facility.  The unit serving clients 25 kilometers  away reported  that the
26 As discussed  above,  units require mandatory  savings  from borrowers  of from 0 to 10 percent  of loan volume.
The outstanding  volume  of mandatory  savings  is estimated  by assuming  that all loans are matched  by the
maximum level of required savings.  Information on the initial loan sizes of all loans outstanding at the end
of the year was not available  in an aggregated  format. The author multiplied  the year end outstanding
balances  of loans  by 10  percent  to obtain  an estimate  of  the  program's  volume  of required  savings  at year  end.
This will underestimate  required  savings  as the amount  of required  savings  is based  on the size of initial
loans, not outstanding  loan balances. However,  it will overestimate  required  savings  in that many  loans have
a required savings rate of less than  10 percent.  The volume of voluntary savings is assumed to be equal to the
total volume of savings minus the estimated volume of required savings.
39trip took two hours each way by motorcycle due to the sub-district's difficult terrain.  This unit
was only able to serve 15 of the 27 villages in its sub-district due to the area's limited
infrastructure.
Productivity.  BKKs operate with fewer staff per unit than LKPs and make better use of the staff
they employ. 27 The district branch of the BPD has one full-time supervisor for every 8.5 units, as
compared to the LKPs' one supervisor for 4 units.  Also, sorne BKK unit policies appear to be
more streamlined than those in the LKP program.  For examlple,  LKP requires borrowers to visit
the unit office at least three times to obtain a loan.  The BKKs require only two visits.
However, it is likely that the BKKs could improve their operating procedures.  Like LKPs, BKKs
can be vulnerable  to political considerations. For example, arrears jumped sharply in 1993 due
partially to political pressures to relax underwriting procedures before the 1992 election.  Also,
profits are first calculated after subtracting bad debt expenses.  However, for political reasons,
these expenses are subsequently added back to income after the books have been closed. Thus,
despite the fact that a large share of their portfolio is in defauilt  and that units record a heavy
annual bad debt expense, they do not accumulate loan loss reserves.
Furthermore, BKKs offer relatively limited services at the village level. BKKs do not allow field
staff to accept savings deposits.  In contrast, LKP savers can make deposits through field staff.
Many BKK units require borrowers to make their monthly repayments at sub-district units rather
than allowing them to give field staff the funds.  In general, the BPD deliberately limits the scope
of BKK field activities to minimize  the risk of malfeasance and because, managers claim, the
units' lean staffing does not allow for lengthy visits to any single village. With the information
available, it is not possible to evaluate whether the program',s savings in personnel costs and
improved security compensate for the loss of customer convenience. In all probability, the answer
to this question varies by sub-district.
Reasons for Evolution in Program Performance.  The BKK system performed very poorly in
1993.  In part this was due to larger economic concerns that shook Indonesia's entire financial
system.  Also, the problem appears worse on paper than it actually was because records of arrears
rates were corrected in that year. Finally, political interference negatively impacted units' lending
decisions.  Since that time however, units have performed relatively well as measured by the ROE
and ROA they would have obtained in the absence of subsidies, and the fact that the program
does not require these subsidies to operate sustainably. The strong growth in loan volume over
the last few years for existing BKKs demonstrates that demand for their product is high.
Program managers claim that for each new facility, arrears begin high and then decline over time.
Borrowers initially assume that this is a subsidized  government program, and it takes time to
educate clients to the fact that the loans must be repaid.  Hovvever,  the BPD claims to have
refined this education process over time.  Thus, units opened in the last several years have much
lower initial arrears rates than units opened in the 1  980s and early 1  990s.  Older units often
continue to have a large percent of their assets in default, but this is primarily due to the fact that
27 Although  LKPs  do make  almost three times  the number  of loans per unit as the BKKs.
40defaulted loans are not written off their books.  However program supervisors fear that, as
occurred in 1992, units will face political pressure to reduce underwriting standards before the
1997 election.
Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
BKK units established before 1992 are exempt from the Regulation's stipulation that financial
institutions that accept deposits must either meeting a minimum  capital requirement or becoming
cooperatives.  The units established after 1992 (the LPUKs) must conform with the Regulation's
guidelines. Thus, the BPD decided that the LPUKs would not accept deposits.
The fact that new units do not accept required or voluntary savings will clearly hurt the
institutions and their clients.  For the four units visited, managers cited a lack of funds to meet
effective demand as their most critical or second most critical problem. For BKKs that are
permitted to mobilize savings, voluntary savings were equal to at least 31 percent of outstanding
loans net of required savings in 1995. Not only will an inability  to mobilize savings retard lending
growth for the new units, but it will also deny unit customers access to a very valuable service.
Finally, it will deprive managers of a useful means of gauging the creditworthiness of potential
loan clients.
While the BPDs in NTB and South Kalimantan supervise the same type of institution and face the
same Banking Law and Regulation, they are interpreting compliance with the regulations in very
28 different ways.
Competition
All of the units interviewed faced only limited competition for credit clients. Units reported that
only two other lending programs operated in their areas - the BRI Unit Desa system and semi-
formal lending by cooperative leaders.  None of the units reported competition from rural banks
(BPRs).  If average loan size can serve as a proxy for income, then it is likely that BKKs serve a
much poorer clientele than BRI, and one that may have very little access to BRI loans. 29
However, BKKs' underwriting requirements for loans over Rp. 250,000 (US$110) do not differ
significantly  from BRI's.  Thus, it is reasonable to assume that many of the BKKs' larger clients
could access BRI loans.  Furthermore, BRI loans carry a lower interest rate than loans from
BKK. 30 Nevertheless, BKK managers claimed  that they competed very effectively with BRI by
28 The  BPD  in NTB  will  convert  some  of  its existing  LKP  units  into  BPRs  and others  into  nominal  cooperatives.
Those  converted  to cooperatives  will  redefine  voluntary  savings  as "mandatory  members'  contributions".
BPD  managers  in NTB  also  said  that  they  foresaw  no difficulty  in establishing  new  units  which  would  accept
deposits  using  the  same  nominal  cooperative  structure.
29 The  average  ratio  of loan-size-to-GDP-per-capita  for  BRI  was  81 percent  in 1993.  This  compares  to a ratio  of
10  percent  for  the  BKK  system  in 1995.
30 BRI  KUPEDES  loans  carry  a 32  percent  effective  aunual  interest  rate  if repayment  is prompt.  Interest  rates  on
BKK  loans  vary  from  51  to 81  percent.
41providing loans more quickly, requiring less paperwork, and ireducing  transactions costs to clients
through field staff visits to clients' businesses.
The only other major source of financing available to BKK clients is loans provided by
cooperative leaders.  These individuals use their position in the cooperatives to function as private
moneylenders. The rate they charge (20 percent flat per month) is about 3 times as high as the
highest rate BKK units charge.  BKK unit managers claim that these individuals make loans only
to people who do not qualify for BKK loans. 3'
BKK units compete with BRI for voluntary deposits.  BKK offers an interest rate on deposits
approximately equal to that of BRI's SIMPEDES program.  Despite the fact that BRI has a very
strong reputation for stability  and offers various non-financial  incentives to attract savers, the
volume of BKK's voluntary savings has grown rapidly. Thus, it appears that BKK has been able
to compete with BRI for voluntary savings.
31 Generally  people  who  have  a poor  repayment  history  on previous  loans  or do not  have  their  own  business  or
farm,  and are not  steadily  employed.
42ANNEX 2:  LUMBUNG KREDIT  PEDESAAN (LKP) PROGRAM
Program Description
The province of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) owns a system of semi-formal  financial institutions
called Lunmbung  Kredit IPedesaan  (LKP).  The author visited LKP units in Dompu District, and
this report reviews only the LKP units located in this district.  One unit was established in each of
Dompu's four sub-districts between 1989 and 1991. Each unit is located in a sub-district capital
and serves most of the villages in that sub-district via approximately weekly field staff visits to the
villages.  Units have a very similar structure to that of  the BKKs.
Three of the units were founded through capital endowment grants (about US$5,800 to
US$8,400 per unit) from USAID, and the fourth received an initial endowment by the province.
The units do not receive fixed or regular subsidies from the government. However, over the last
several years. both the provincial and distnrct  governments have provided the units with
motorcycles, upgraded facilities, and modest additional capital endowment grants.  In addition,
supervision costs are partially borne by the provincial development bank (BPD).  Finally, units do
not pay taxes.
In theory, unit profits are divided among stakeholders as follows: 50 percent to the provincial
(and sometimes district) government as dividends; 15 percent to general reserves; 15 percent to
special reserves; 10 percent to employee bonuses: and 10 percent to an employee welfare fund.  In
practice, the provincial and district governments' annual dividends and the funds for general and
special reserves are added to retained earninas.  Thus, the units actually retain 80 percent of their
profits.
Program Suipervision. The units are supervised by the district branch of the BPD.  The BPD
makes all policy decisions for the LKP, including the types of savings and lending products units
can offer, the terms they can charge on these instruments, how they should provision for bad debt,
when they should write off loans, what their underwriting and loan servicing procedures should
be, whom they should hire, how they should train staff, etc.  The Dompu district branch of the
BPD has one full-time supervisor to oversee the.four LKPs in its district.  Two of these units are
within walking distance of the BPD branch. Despite the fact that the supervisor oversees only 4
units, one unit manager was able to effectivelv bankrupt his unit by making fraudulent loans and
embezzling funds.
Loan Product
LKPs have one loan product, a 12 week loan repayable weekly in 12 equal installments. The first
installment represents the interest due on the loan. the next a forced savings payment, and the final
10 are repayment of capital. Many other government-owned, semi-formal  financial institutions in
Indonesia offer the same product with similar repayment terms.  The effective interest rate for this
product, including a fee of Rp. 2,500 (US$1.10), is about 8.3 percent per month or 160 percent
annually on a declining balance basis. This figure assumes that the forced savings, and the interest
earned on this savings, is returned after the loan is repaid, as BPD supervisors claim.
43The loan size ranges from Rp. 50,000 (about US$21) to Rp. 300,000 (about US$214).  Loans
above Rp. 200.000 (US$86) must be approved by the BPD which supervises the LKPs.  Loans do
not require physical collateral.
Group Leniding. LKPs do not offer group loans.  NTB's BPD staff who were supervising the
LKP system did not believe that this lending modality would be useful for LKP, although the
PHBK program was operating in the same area and presumably demonstrating some of the
advantages of group lending schemes.
Savings Product
Units have one voluntary savings instrument - a demand deposit with no restrictions on
withdrawal. The instrument pays a  10 percent annual return. This rate is almost identical to the
rates paid by the other programs reviewed in this report. and is also about the same as the rate
BRI Unit Desa pays on small demand deposits.  Forced savinss also carry a 10 percent annual
interest rate.
Staffing
Units are staffed by from 6 to 11 employees. All emplovees must have at least a high school
degree, and unit managers should have a college degree.  StafFmust pass a test before they are
eligible  for employment. All staff receive one month of training before they begin work.
In 1995, staff salaries range from Rp. 90.000 (US$39) to Rp. 150,000 (US$64) per month. On an
annualized basis. this is equivalent to a range of 49 to 79 percent of per-capita GDP.  In addition,
all employees of a given unit share a total of about 20 percent of nominal unit profits in the form
of bonuses and a welfare fund.  For the most successful unit. this bonus and welfare fund would
have amounted to an average of about Rp. 400,000 per employee - equivalent to from 2.5 to 4.5
months' salary. Employees are eligible  for an additional bonus if 94 percent or more of total
payments due during a 3 month period have been collected by the end of that period. However,
none of the units have been able to achieve this collection rate for the last several years. 32
Underwriting  and  Loan Servicing
Prospective borrowers must obtain a written recommendation from their village headman and
have a functioning business.  Unit personnel visit the business site of each prospective borrower to
verify business viability before issuing the loan.  If the borrower is married, his or her spouse must
also sign the promissory note.  Loans are disbursed within two weeks of the unit receiving the
borrower's application.  Each borrower is visited weekly to solicit his or her repayment
installment. Borrowers who do not repay are also visited weekly to attempt to collect past due
funds. The staff attempt to find out why repayments are delayed and encourage partial
repayments for delinquent borrowers.
32 This is not surprising  given that the units carry  loans  on their books which  have defaulted  some  time ago and
should be wnrtten  off.
44Program Performance
This section reviews program performance as measured by sustainability  and outreach.
Sustainability  is measured by the program's arrears rate, its profitability, and the size of the
subsidy required to sustain operations.  Outreach is measured by the volume of annual lending and
savings activities (scope) and the population it serves (depth of market penetration).
Sustainahility. This analysis  Table  16
estimates arrears rates  Adjusted  Annual  Arrears  Rates" for LKP Units in
assuming that units wrote off  Dompu  District (Percent)
100 percent of their loans in
default each year. 33  If the  Units  1992 1  1993  1994  1995
arrears rate is recalculated in  Total  16  30  NA  _  2____
this way, the volume  of loans  Hu'u  20  78  NA  NA
in arrears is equal to 20  Monitabaru  4  4  NA  7
percent of net outstanding  Sariutu  23  23  NA  37
loans in 1995 for the system  Bada  *  8  i  22  NA  22
as a whole (excluding one  a/ (Volumc  of Loans  in Arrears in Year I -Volume  of Loans  in
unit for which data are not  Default  in Year 0)/
available).  In all, one unit  (Outstanding  Loan  Volume  in Year I - Loan Volume  in Default  in
has maintained consistently  Year  0).
low arrears rates since 1992.  b/ Excludes  the  Hu'u  unit  for  w.lhich  1995  data  were  not  available.
The other three units had
loans in arrears  equal  to  18 percent  of total loans over the period.  For Hu'u,  loans in arrears
reached 78 percent of total loans in 1993. The program did not have arrears data for the unit
thereafter (Table 16). The program's arrears rate is significantly  higher than that which would be
considered sound by international microcredit standards.3 4
33 The LKP  system  defines  loans in default  as being more  than 90 days late in payment.
34 The Committee  of Donor Agencies  for Small  Enterprise  Development  (1995)  set as an acceptable  standard  for
microenterprise  lending,  that 10 percent  or less  of total  loans should have  late payments  of 30 days  or more.
BKK's  arrears rate in 1995  includes  loans that are one day  late or more. so it is not directly  comparable.
However,  it is twice  as high as the standard,  and did not include  arrears information  for the program's most
troubled  unit.
45Simulating  the units'
default rates if LKP  Table 17
wrote off 100 percent  Adjusted  Annual  Default Rates" for LKP Units in Dompu
of its loans in default  District (Percent)
each year, the volume
of loans in default is  Units  1993  1994  1995
equal to 5.5 percent  Total  11.5  3.8  5,5D
of net outstanding  Hu'u  45.8  31.0  NA
loans in 1995 for the  Montabaru  1.7  0.3  1.1
system as a whole  SanuIu  2.4  3.6  0.6 system~Bad  2.2  1.6  12.6
(excluding one unit  Bada  _____6  1_
for which data is not a/ (Volumc  of  Loans  in Arrcars  bv  90 Davs  or More  in Year  I -Volume  of
available). Two units  Loans  in Arrcars  by  90 Days  or More  in Year  0)/
have maintained  (Outstanding  Loan  Volumc  in Year  I -Loan  Volume  in Arrears  by  90
consistently low  Days  or Mores  in Year  0).
default rates over the  b/ Excludes  the Htu'u  uniit  for  whichi  1995  data  were  not available.
last three years.  One
unit had low default rates in 1993 and 1994, but experienced a significant upsurge in 1995, and
one unit experienced default rates in excess of 30 percent for the two years for which information
was available (Table 17). The program's default rate is somewhat higher than that which would be
considered sound by international microcredit standards.3 5
It is very difficult  to estimate unit profitability as income statements and balance sheets provided
by the BPD contain some apparent errors, omissions, and inconsistencies. Further, basic earnings
measures, such as return on equity and return on assets, are problematic given that the LKPs
receive endowment grants and in-kind gifts including supervis.ion  by the BPD at a subsidized cost.
The units receive an additional implicit subsidy in that they do not pay taxes on income.  Finally,
the units do not adequately provision for bad debt.
If all of these factors are ignored, the three units for which information is available showed a
combined real (above inflation) return on assets of I to 6 percent over the last three years.
However, if rough estimates of expenses for depreciation of fixed assets, adequate loan loss
provisioning, taxes, reserve requirements, and full supervision costs are made, 36 and the units'
35 The  Committee  of  Donor  Agencies  for  Small  Enterprise  Development  (1995)  set  as an acceptable  standard  for
microenterprise  lending.  that lenders  should  have  annual  losses  from  defaults  of  4 percent  or less  of
outstanding  loan  volume.  LKP's 1995  rate  is above  this  level  and  did not include  defaults  for its most
troubled  branch.
36 There  is no need  to impute  additional  interest  to LKP  liabilities  because  LKP  pays  market  interest  rates  on
liabilities.  For  a number  of ycars  the LKP  system  had loans  from  the  provincial  BPD  for  which  it paid
below-market  "interest  rates";  which  also served  as fees  for supervision.  However,  these  loans  were  converted
to equity  in 1995.  For  the  purposes  of this analysis.  these  loans  are  treated  as equity  for  all years  and  the
interest  expense/supervision  fee  is treated  as a supervision  fee.
The  LKP  system  also  funds  part  of  its portfolio  from  savings  accounts  required  from  borrowers.  These
required  savings  accounts  earn  an interest  rate  below  that  which  the  program  would  have  to pay  to obtain
marginal  additional  resources  from  anotlier  source.  For  the  purposes  of this  analysis.  this  practice  is
46average outstanding assets are adjusted to take into account adequate loan loss provisioning,  3 7
then the units' adjusted real return on average assets was -22.3 percent in 1993. -8.8 percent in
1994. and -5.2 percent in 1995 (Table 18). Taking into account the above additional expenses, the
units' adjusted real return on average equity was -33.3 percent in 1993, -9.7 percent in 1995, and
-2.8 percent in 1995.
Assuming that equity holders earned an interest rate equivalent to the average 3 month time
deposit rate plus a 4 percentage point spread, the units' Subsidy Dependency Index (the percent
increase in the interest rate that is required if the unit were to be fiully  self-supporting including
paying a market rate of return to liability and equity holders)  would have improved sharply
from 104 percent in 1993 to 24 percent in 1995.'9 The program's equity to assets ratio was 68 to
73 percent from 1993 to  1995. Reducing this ratio to a level more in line with that of commercial
banks and replacing equity with liabilities would have reduced the program's Subsidy Dependency
Index.  However, the program could not have achieved full self sustainability  through this
approach.
considered  to be equivalent  to generating  additional  fee  income  from  loans  and  is not counted  as a subsidy.
However.  footnote  39 on  page  47  examines  what  the  program's  total  subsidy  would  have  been  if access  to
these  required  savings  were  treated  as a subsidy.
37 This  analysis  did not  have  information  concerning  when  gifts  of assets  and  equipment  were  received.  Therefore,
it was  not  possible  to adjust  equity  and assets  to reflect  owners'  initial  contributions  and to then  depreciate
these  assets  over  their  life. The  estimated  depreciation  expense  is subtracted  from  annual  profits.  but its  value
is not deducted  from  assets  or from  equity.
38 See  Annex  7 for  a description  of how  the  SDI  is calculated.
39 LKP.  like  the  other  programs  reviewed  here,  funds  part  of its portfolios  from  savings  accounts  required  from
borrowers.  If this  forced  savings  policy  were  considered  a subsidy.  the  amount  of the  subsidy  would  be  equal
to the difference  between  the  interest  paid  on the  required  savings  and  the  interest  the  institution  would  have
had to pay  on marginal  additional  liabilities.  When  the  SDI  is recalculated  to incorporate  this additional
subsidy,  it increases  from  104  to 107  percent  in 1993,  and  from  24 to 27  percent  in 1995.
47Table 18
Estimated LKP Earnings Adjusted for Subsidies and Bad Debt Expenses
Units  Earningys  Measure  1993  1994  1995
Three of four units
_  Adiusted  rcal ROA  (percent_  -22.3  -8.8  -5.2
Adjustcd  real  ROE (percent)  -33.3  -9.7  -2.8
Subsidv  Dependencv  Index' (percent)  104  41  24
Currcnt  interest  rate (percent)  160  160  160
Reqtuired  interest rate  to cover  all costs  325  225  198
including mi  rket return on equity  (pecent)
Best  performning  unit
Adjusted  rcal ROA  (percentli  -0.2  -0.9  4.9
Adiusted  rcal ROE  (percent)  5.6  3.1  11.9
Subsidy  Dcecndencv  Index (percent)  0  1  4
Currcnt  interest  rate  160  160  160
Rcquired  intcrest  rate to coNer  all costs  160  176  154
including  market  return  on  equity (percent)  _
a/ The percent incrcase  in the intcrest  ratc that is reqwred if the units were to be fully  self-supporting  including
paying  a market  ratc of return to equity  holders.
In 1995, the program  would  have had to charge  a  198 percent  annual interest  rate to completely
eliminate all program subsidies and pay liability and equity holders a market return on their
investments. This rate is higher than the rate required for BKK and P4K, but below the rate
required for PHBK.  It is about 24 percent higher than the rate the units currently charge.
Again taking into account the additional expenses above, the best performing LKP unit could
have provided an adjusted real return to equity holders of fronm  3 to 12 percent since 1993 . This
unit's subsidy dependency index would have varied from I0 to -4 percent over the last three years
(Table 18).  The interest rate required to eliminate all of the unit's subsidies ranged from 154 to
176 percent.
Outreach Scope.  The district of Dompu has four LKP units for its six sub-districts. When the
units were founded, the district had only 4 sub-districts.  District leaders hope to be able to create
new units for the new sub-districts, but have no firm plans for doing so.  Units serve 34 of the 45
villages (76 percent of villages) in the sub-districts where they are located.
48In 1995, total lending  Table  19
for the four units was  LKP Annual  Loan  Volume
about  Rp. 714 million
(US$313,000).  This is  |  1991  19921  19931  1995
equivalent  to  an  Nominal loan volume  485.722  527.5391459.889  510.269  713,555
average  loan  volume  of  (Rp. millioll)
Rp.  178 million  Growth  in rcal  loan  NA  -16  5  23
(US$8,00)  pr  uit.  voluiie (perccnt)_________ (US$78,000) per unit  Loan  volumie  (US$)  246.559  258.598 218.995  234.068  312.963
However,  loan volume  Numbcr  of loans issued  6.409  4.689  3.079  3.122  4.148
is not divided equall  Growth  in number of  23  -27  -34  1  33
among  units.  The  unit  loans  issued  (percent)
with the largest  volume
accounted  for 47 percent  of all loans,  and the unit with the smallest volume  accounted  for 4
percent.  Over  the last five years.  combined  lending for the four units has increased  slightly in real
terms in every year  except  1993.  However,  this pattern  belies important  differences  across  units.
Specifically, one  unit grew  at a real compound  annual rate of about  32 percent,  while lending
volume  in each of the other  three  units declined  in real terms by an annual average  compound  rate
of from  I to 28 percent.  The number  of loans issued by the four  units in  1994 was less than one-
half of the number  issued in  199 1.  Lending  rebounded  somewhat  in 1995, when  the number of
loans issued approached  two  thirds of the number  in 1991 (Table  19).
Savings deposits  Table  20
grew rapidly between  LKP Required and Voluntary Savings
1991  and  1993  (Table
20).  However,  ___  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
savings declined  at a  Total nominal  savings  43.2  57.3  77.9  67.1  64.4
real  annual  rate  of  21  (Rp.  million)  __  _  _
in 1994 and  12  Real growth  in savings  NA  23  24  -21  -12
percent  1995.  Trends  (percent)
in savings for  Total nominal  savings  (US$)  21.953  28.106  37.093  30.758  28,249
individual units  Total savings  percent of total  36  39  50  38  30
outstanding  loans
approximately  Voluntary  savings  percent  of  21  22  35  22  18
followed  this  general  net outstanding  loansa
pattern.  By the end  Real growth  in voluntary  15  50  -31  6
of  1993, voluntary  savings (percent)  I_  I
savings were equal  to  a/ The volume  of voluntary  savings  is compared  to that of outstanding  loans  net
3  5 percent  of  units'  of required  savings  because  in practice,  savings  required  to obtain  a loan  are
outstanding  loans net  equivalent  to borrowers  receiving  a smaller loan.  Thus, comparing  voluntary
of bad  debt and  savings  to loans net of required  savings  allows  an analysis of the importance  of
required  savings, but  voluntary  savings  in funding  loans.
declined to  18 percent  by  1995.  In 1995, total savings  for the four units stood  at Rp. 64
million (about  US$28,000).
40 The volume  of voluntary  savings is compared  to that of outstanding  loans net of required  savings  because  in
practice,  savings required  to obtain  a loan are equivalent  to borrowers  receiving  a smaller  loan.  Thus,
49Outreach Depth. The LKPs do not keep data on borrower income. Borrowers are primarily  petty
traders.  Approximately  60 percent are women.  The average loan size for the four LKP units in
Dompu in 1995 was about Rp  170.000 (US$75).  This is lower than the likely average loan size
for the BKK and PHBK programs. and onlv slightly higher than the average loan size per
individual  under the P4K program.  It is equivalent to about 7 percent of per capita GDP.
The BPD claims that units may serve villages as far as 100 kilometers awav via bus trips that
might take up to 3 to 4 hours each way.  In practice, the reach of individual  units varies.  One unit
said that it did not visit any villages further than one hour away from the sub-district capital by
motorcycle.  In practice, this meant that its range was limited to less than 30 kilometers. This
range excluded the unit from serving one of the villages in its sub-district.
Productivity.  While most units are recording at least a small annual profit on paper, their real,
unsubsidized returns are generally negative. Furthermore, the units are not being managed with a
keen regard to efficiency. The provincial BPD is responsible for staffing the units, and is using the
LKPs as a means of employment generation without regard to unit needs. For example, one unit
had from 6 to 8 staff members in the unit office (not includingi  field staff) on any given day to
handle from 10 to 30 transactions.  The district branch of the BPD had one full-time employee to
supervise the four units, a task that should have taken no more than 25 percent of his time.
Excessive staffing creates unnecessary costs for the units, thereby depressing profits.
Furthermore, it dampens employees' motivation to perform well. As indicated above, at a
successful unit the annual bonus based on unit profits can contribute very significantly  to
employees' total compensations.  However, the BPD increases unit staff sizes when the units are
earning enough money to support additional salaries. The addition of each new employee reduces
the bonus available for the current employees since the same total bonus and welfare fund (20
percent of profits) is divided between a larger number of people.
Unit policies also did not appear to be designed with productivity and client needs in mind. For
example, LKP policy required borrowers to visit the unit office at least three times to obtain a
loan.  A private BPR serving the same clientele in the same district which also made use of field
staff required borrowers to visit the office only once. LKP customers can give savings to field
staff, but must go to the unit to withdraw funds from their savings account.
Reasons for  Evolution in Program Performance.  The units are heavily influenced by the
expertise and honesty of their management.  For example, one unit was driven to the brink of
insolvency through corrupt management practices.  Units are also influenced by the natural
endowments (in terms of income, population density, and infirastructure)  of their sub-districts.
Further, as indicated above, the units are owned by the NTB provincial government and
controlled by the provincial development bank.  It appears likely that both of these entities have
objectives for the units beyond profitability, growth, and client service.
comparing  voluntary  savings  to loans  net  of  required  savings  allowzs  an analysis  of  the importance  of
voluntary  savings  in  funding  loans.
50Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
The supporting Presidential  Regulation for Indonesia's  1992 Banking Law does not permit
informal financial institutions like LKPs to accept deposits unless they become BPRs or
cooperatives.  Informal financial  institutions in existence before 1992 can become BPRs without
meeting the minimum  capital requirement that institutions created after 1992 must obtain.  All
four of the Dompu LKP units were established before 1992. However, Dompu's BPD planned to
convert only two of the four units into BPRs.  For the other two, they plan to comply with the
letter of the law by nominally  declaring the units to be cooperatives and redefining voluntary
savings as  required members' savings." They plan to open new LKP units also nominallv
declared cooperatives in the two sub-districts that currently do not have these facilities
Competition
LKPs report virtually no competition for borrowers.  Few LKP customers could qualifv for BRI
loans.  There are virtually no BPRs in the area. and the PHBK program operates on too small a
scale to erode their customer base.  Like BKKs, LKPs report that cooperative leaders use their
position in the cooperative  system to function as private moneylenders charging a 20 percent flat
monthlv interest rate (equivalent to  1,600 percent per year on a declining  balance basis). This rate
is well above the LKP rate of about 160 percent.  Thus, these individuals  do not compete with the
LKP units.
Units do compete with Unit Desas for deposits.  LKP units pay an interest rate on deposits similar
to the rate paid by the Unit Desas.  LKPs can be more convenient than Unit Desas in that field
staff visit villages on a regular basis and accept deposits.  Nevertheless, the recent decline in the
volume of outstanding savings indicates that the units are having trouble mobilizing  funds in this
way.
51ANNEX 3: PROGRAM  HUBUNGAN BANK DAN KSM (PHBK)
PROGRAM
Program Description
Program Hubungan Bank dani KSA/V  (PHBK) is a group lending program sponsored by the
Central Bank of Indonesia (BI) and the German government's Agency for Technical Cooperation
(GTZ).  The program has been in existence since 1989- It currently operates in Bali, Java. North
Sumatra, Lombok, South Sulawesi, and Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB).  Operations will shortly
begin in Irian Jaya, North Sulawesi, and South Kalimantan. In each province, the program is
managed from BI's branch offices. The program provides technical assistance to banks. NGOs.
and borrower groups to help them develop group lending skills. Banks and NGOs lend to
borrower groups.  Since 1992, the program has provided no liquidity support for these loans.
Lenidinig  Models.  The program operates along three basic models.  In the first model. borrower
groups function as financial intermediaries  (KSP).  Banks provide them with a group loan that
they on-lend to their members.  NGOs train groups in record-keeping and financial  intermediation
skills and provide general support to the group for a period of up to 9 months.  The PHBK
program pays the NGOs for their training and guidance activities. The program also trains (but
does not compensate) the banks.
Model 2 functions similarly  to model I with the exception that banks lend to NGOs which then
lend to groups acting as financial  intermediaries.  Thus, NGOs act as financial  intermediaries, and
also train groups.
In Model 3. the bank lends to a channeling  group (KPM).  Each individual  within the group
receives a portion of each loan made.  In practice, loans are almost always divided equally among
group members. Each member is responsible for repaying his or her share of the loan.  If a
member does not repay, then the remaining  members are liable for the unpaid segment of the loan.
Banks generally recruit groups to participate in these loans in one of two ways. Banks encourage
good customers who have some status in their market segment or community to form their own
groups.  Also, banks identify groups by working with formal or informal village  or religious
leaders.  Generally, each group has a well-respected leader who is known to the bank prior to the
issuance of the group credit.  This leader may also provide collateral for the credit.  The bank or
members may pay the group leader a commission, or the leader may undertake the task without
remuneration.  Individuals are often willing to assume this responsibility  without monetary
compensation because of the status they receive from performing the role.  Under this model, the
program trains only the banks.  It is up to the banks to organize and train groups.
This model is much cheaper for the program to support than the other two.  Further, because the
training investment is made in banks rather than in groups, and banks have a lower dropout rate
than groups, it is less likely that resources will be wasted.  However, this model can have higher
costs for banks than the other two.  NGOs are not involved in this model.
52In practice, many banks, NGOs, and borrower groups are engaged in lending activities that
combine various aspects of the three models.  For example, some banks use NGOs almost as
financial intermediaries (along-  the lines of Model 2), and pay them a fee for their services.
However, they do not require the NGOs to assume credit nrsk. Some borrowers band together in
a channeling  group that divides all loans evenly among members (along the lines of Model 3), but
charge members a spread that is retained by the group, and that may later be used to make
additional loans to members (thereby simulating  aspects of Model 1).
Evolution of Lending Models.  PHBK now discourages banks from lending to NGOs with the
purpose of their serving as financial intermediaries  (Model 2) as this was found to be difficult to
implement in practice.  Under this mode, defaults were high as few NGOs had the capability to
function as viable financial intermediaries.
In provinces that have attained a relatively high concentration of banking facilities. PHBK is also
phasing out, or has phased out, support for groups as financial intermediaries (KSPs in Model 1).
The program has found Model I expensive to implement and slow to expand because the role of
the group as financial intermediary requires very significant  training and support.  Furthermore,
Model I is only necessary when low population density creates high transaction costs for
borrowers and banks.  Thus. in areas like Java and Bali that have achieved significant  coverage by
financial  intermediaries, the project now focuses exclusively  on promoting Model 3 - direct links
between banks and channeling  groups of borrowers.
However, the program continues to support NGOs and groups as financial  intermediaries (Models
1 and 2) in provinces such as NTB, North Sulawesi and South Kalimantan, where, program
managers believe, the low density of financial  intermediaries makes it impossible  for the direct
bank/borrower links under Model 3 to reach most rural inhabitants.
Participating Banks. As of March, 1996, 323 banks and bank branches were participating in
PHBK. This figure increased from 148 in 1995. Participating banks include private rural banks
or Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (BPRs); provincial development banks (BPDs); public and private
commercial  banks; and provincial and village-owned  financial facilities (LDKPs and BKDs).
However, different types of banks participate with varying degrees of enthusiasm. BPRs currently
account for 56 percent of participating banks; state-owned commercial banks, 23 percent; private
commercial banks, 11 percent; and regional development banks, 10 percent.  Program managers
have found that BPRs are the most eager to participate. The number of BPRs involved in the
program has more than tripled in the last 18 months since PHBK began targeting marketing
efforts to them.  The program has been least successful in attracting private commercial  banks.
Five private commercial banks have signed Memorandums of Understanding to participate in
PHBK, and two additional banks are preparing to.  However, only two of these banks are actually
making PHBK loans and even they are doing so on only a very modest basis. Furthermore, they
are lending to NGOs for these to on-lend to groups (Model 2), a model that the program no
longer supports due to NGOs' poor performance as financial  intermediaries.
Program Supervision. Banks and NGOs are supervised by Bank of Indonesia staff and
consultants.  Groups that function as financial  intermediaries are supervised by NGOs; and groups
53that simply channel credits to members are supervised by banks.  This supervision is very
expensive for the more complicated lending models and in remote areas.
Loan Products
Banks. NGOs, and credit groups are free to choose the terms under which they will make loans.
Loan products vary from one BPR which made loans for 10 weeks with daily repayments, to
other banks making 12 month loans with monthly repayments. The PHBK program encourages
financial intermediaries  to require a 20 percent forced savings deposit in lieu of collateral. In
practice, individual  banks differ in the extent to which they require this forced savings component.
Given that the three types of lending intermediaries set their own loan terms. interest rates vary
widely across participating institutions.  In general, the larger the number of financial
intermediaries  between the originating institution and the end user, the higher the interest rate paid
by the end user. Thus Model 3 (in which loans pass from banks to "channeling groups") usually
has the lowest rates to the end user, and Model 2 (in which loans pass from banks, to NGOs, to
borrower group financial  intermediaries, to end users) has the highest. Rates also tend to be
higher in more remote areas and for loans with daily repayments.  In Sumbawa. most banks were
lending at a 2.5 to 3.0 percent flat rate per month; NGOs that on-lent to groups were lending at a
5.0 to 5.5 percent flat rate per month; and credit groups were lending to members at a flat rate of
5.5 to 7.5 percent per month (including a 1.5 percent flat rate required savings component).  On a
declining balance basis, and including fees and forced savings requirements, rates generally ranged
from about 3 to 15 percent per month or 100 to 450 percent per year for end users.  However in
less remote locations, banks lending to channeling groups may charge rates as low as 1.9 percent
per month on a declining balance basis.  This rate, including fees and forced savings requirements,
can translate into interest rates as low as about 46 percent per year for end users.
Savings Products
All participating  banks offer groups the opportunity to hold voluntary saving accounts.  The
interest rate paid on these accounts varies by bank.  In Sumbawa, private rural banks (BPRs)
were paying an interest rate of 12 to 16 percent per year on demand deposit accounts.  These
rates are positive in real terms, although generally below the level paid by BPRs in more
competitive markets. They are somewhat higher than the rates paid by the other programs
reviewed in this report and than those paid under BRI's SIMPEDES program.  Forced savings
accounts paid the same interest rate as voluntary accounts.  The interest rate charged on time
deposits range from 16 to 22 percent per year for a I year deposit.  Bankers believed that for
these small depositors, convenient access to savings was far more important than earning a high
interest rate.  They therefore did not think that raising the interest rate paid on deposits would
increase the volume of savings they could mobilize.
Generally, NGOs functioning as financial intermediaries  and credit groups (KSPs) also accept
voluntary savings deposits.  These funds may be recycled in the form of loans to groups or
members, or they may simply be deposited on the saver's behalf with a bank.
54Staffing
Staffing for the PHBK program is heavy and includes Bank of Indonesia (BI) employees and
consultants at the national level and in Bl's branch offices. Further, the work of training credit
groups is contracted out to NGOs.  Staffing costs are primarily  responsible for the high total
program costs discussed below.
Staffing of BPRs is also very heavy compared to staffing of the province-owned financial
institutions (BKKs and LKPs) reviewed in this report, and compared to Bank Rakyat Indonesia
(BRI's) Unit Desas. One BPR interviewed reported a staff of 23.  This compares to staffs of 3 to
11 for BKKs, LKPs, and Unit Desas.  However. BPRs tend to have larger lending programs than
BKKs and LKPs.  This BPR made 2,000 loans in 1995. An average BKK in South Kalimantan
made 3 14 loans in the same year, and the average LKP made about 1,000.
This review did not systematically  collect salarv information for either PHBK workers or BPR
staff.  However, one BPR manager reported paying credit agents/field staff a base salary of Rp.
95.000 per month (US$4 1), and a bonus of 15 percent of the interest he or she collected.  The
BPR manager stated that a good credit agent could make as much as Rp. 250,000 (US$107) per
month including this bonus.  This base salarv is extremely low when compared to base salaries of
BKK and LKP workers.  Further, if the field worker earned one-half of this theoretical maximum
bonus, then his total compensation would still rank at the bottom of the compensation scale for
BKK units.  However, this compensation would be roughly in line with that received by LKP
employees.  While bonuses represent an important part of total compensation for BKK and LKP
workers, they were unlikely to account for more than 50 percent of total income for these
employees.  In contrast, bonus pay could be equal to well over 100 percent of a credit agent's
base pay at this BPR.
Underwriting and Loan Servicing
Underwriting and loan servicing techniques are left to the discretion of individual  banks, NGOs,
and credit groups.  Furthermore, they depend on the type of lending model employed.
MWodel  1.  When banks lend to savings groups and rely on an NGO to train and support the groups
(Model 1), banks generally also depend on the NGO to assist in underwriting and loan servicing.
In this model, NGOs identify and screen groups.  The banks retain the credit risk however, and so
bank staff generally undertake their own appraisal.  Banks review the repayment history the group
has experienced in lending out its own funds. Banks usually also require that groups submit the
names of all group members who may receive part of the loan and a description of their
businesses. Banks may select businesses from the list, and visit them on a random basis. Banks
also generally start groups off with small, short-term loans, and allow these loans to grow in size
and repayment term as groups demonstrate repayment capacity. In theory, groups should also
demonstrate savings capacity by saving a fixed amount each month for a period of several months
prior to receiving their first loans.  In practice however, many groups collect the total required
savings amount from members at one time and deposit these funds in a lump sum in the bank.
In Sumbawa, where the lending bank was located an hour or more away by car from the credit
groups, the bank relied on an NGO to collect payments from groups.  The bank paid the NGO
550.25 percent of the initial loan balance per month for performing this collections function.
However, the NGO was not happy with this arrangement and maintained that the fee was
insufficient  to cover its costs.  One BPR also allowed borrowers to make repayments to the local
BRI Unit Desa outlet.  The Unit Desa then transferred these payments to the bank.
In theory, credit groups also appraise loan requests from their members. This probably occurs in
mature groups functioning like real credit institutions. The groups visited however were located
in Sumbawa, where implementation of the program is still relatively new. Groups on this island
did not receive a loan from a bank and then review loan appliications  from members to determine
how funds would be disbursed, rather they simply divided the loan evenly among all members.
Given the amount of time it takes to train groups and fulfill program requirements. groups first
enrolling in the program can wait six months or more to obtain their first loan. This contrasts
with several days or weeks for BKK and LKP borrowers, buit  is similar to the wait required under
the P4K prog-ram.
Model 2.  In Model 2, banks make loans to NGOs that make loans to groups. that make loans or
pass finds  to their members.  Under this model. NGOs assume the full credit risk for the loans
they make to groups.  In theory of course, banks should be concerned about the credit-worthiness
of the end-users of the loans, since their repayment record will largely determine whether the
NGO will be able to repay the loan to the bank.  In practice in Model 2, banks do not concern
themselves much with the creditworthiness of end-users.  N(GOs  undertake many of the credit
review practices banks engage in in Model 1. However, NGOs also generally  know the groups
they work with quite well, and so may not be as structured in their formal credit analysis.
Model 2, like model 1, requires a significant  level of sophistication on the part of the credit group.
Furthermore, forming links between groups, NGOs and banks can be very time-consuming. Thus,
groups first enrolling in the program under Model 2 can also wait six months or more to obtain
their first loan.
Model 3.  In Model 3, once a group has been assembled, underwriting proceeds as described
under Model I above.
Under Model 3. the group leader assumes responsibility for collecting the payments of group
members. Banks then collect payments from group leaders.  One BPR reported that they had
invested significant  resources in training channeling  groups in bookkeeping, management, and
other business skills. However, another BPR said that they provided no training support to
channeling groups.  BPRs also differ in the extent to which they require forced savings as
collateral from channeling  groups.  As in Models I and 2, lenders usually start groups off with
small, short-term loans and increase their size and term over time as groups demonstrate
repayment capacity.
Requirements for channeling groups under this model are much less than the requirements for
credit groups under Models I and 2.  Further, individuals are linked more closely to banks under
56this model than the other two.  Thus, the time from group formation to first loan disbursal can be
as little as a few davs to a few weeks.
Program Performance
This section reviews program performance as measured by sustainability and outreach.
Sustainability  is measured by the program's arrears rate, its cost per unit outputs, and the size of
the subsidy required to sustain operations. Outreach is measured by the volume of annual lending
and savings activities (scope) and the population it serves (depth of market penetration).
Sustefinability. PHBK  Table  21
experienced early  Arrears  Rates for PHBK Program
problems with high
arrears.  However.  Fiscal  Year
recent repayment  1990/91 1991/92  1992/93  1993/94 1994/95 1995/96
performance has been  Number  of credits  17.2  21.1  29.0  19.9  11.5  12.9
sound.  Information on  ovcrduc  percent  of
the share of the PHBK  number  of credits
portfolio at risk was not  outstanding
available. However, the  Volume  of payments  5.0  14.2  13.3  16.5  8.7  5.7
program's  ratio of  overdue  percent  of program's  raho of  volume  of loans
number of credits  outstandinga  _
overdue to number of
credits  outstanding 41 a/  Overdue  payment  is defined  as a payment  that  is one  day  late  or more.
climbed sharply over the two years from fiscal 1990/91 (April 1990 to March 1991) to fiscal
1992/93. By the end of fiscal 1992/93, loans in arrears accounted for 29 percent of outstanding
loans.  This figure has since declined, and stood at 13 percent in 1995/96 (Table 21  ).42  The
volume of late payments as a share of the volume of outstanding loans rose from fiscal 1990/91 to
1993/94 and then declined. This rate was 5.7 percent in fiscal 1995/96. Data do not allow for a
calculation of the program's annual default rate.  However, program organizers report the
cumulative default rate as being below 2.8 percent. 43 Further. their figures show this rate
declining  slightly over the last two years.  The program's arrears rate and default rate would likely
be judged sound by international microcredit standards. 44
41 Where  credits  overdue  is defined  as credits  whose  payments  are  one day  late  or more.
n Actual  annual  arrears  rates  may  be  below  the  figures  presented  here  because  many  participating  banks  do not
write  off  loans. Thus,  current  annual  arrears  rates  reflect  some  bad  debts  incurred  in previous  years.
43  In the  absence  of data  on default  rates,  the maximum  possible  cumulative  default  rate  is assumed  to be the
inverse  of  the  cumulative  repayment  rate. In  fact,  the  cumulative  default  rate  will  be below  this figure  since
at least  some  of the  loans  for  which  repayments  are  currently  late vill  eventually  be repaid.  The  cumulative
repayment  rate is defined  as: total  cumulative  repayments  / (cumulative  repayments  + cumulative  arrears).
44 For  example,  the  Committee  of  Donor  Agencies  for Small  Enterprise  Development  (1995)  set  as an acceptable
standard  for  microenterprise  lending,  that 10  percent  or less  of total  loans  should  have  late  payments  of 30
days  or more.  and lenders  should  have  annual  losses  from  defaults  of  4 percent  or less  of outstanding  loan
volume.  PHBK's  arrears  rate  is slightly  above  the 10  percent  level  but includes  loans  in arrears  by  one day  or
more.  The  program's  default  rate  is likely  below  4 percent.
57PHBK program costs are high.  Further, according to data provided by Bank of Indonesia, 70
percent of total costs are, BI's "in-kind" costs (salary and allowance expenses of regular BI staff
working on the project and rent for project office space).  45  It is therefore useful to examine
program cost ratios considering total costs and "cash outlay'  expenses only (all costs incurred by
GTZ and BI that are in excess of regular BI staff salaries and rent for office space in BI
buildings).
Even when only cash outlay costs are considered.,  the ratio of annual program costs to annual
lending is high in 1995/96, but has declined rapidly in the last two years.  In fiscal 1992/93, the
program's  ratio of total costs to funds lent was approximately 304 percent (or 86 percent if BI's
in-kind costs are excluded from the calculation). This figure declined to approximately 94 percent
by 1995/96 (or 28 percent if Bl's  in-kind costs are excluded). The cost per group receiving a loan
was about US$11,654 in 1992/93. (US$3,304 excluding in-kind costs) and had declined to
US$1,764 (US$522 excluding in-kind costs) in 1995/96. Finally,  if it is assumed that most
program expenses are incurred for groups receiving their first loan, it is useful to compare annual
program costs to the number of first loans received per year. The program spent an estimated
US$16,856 per first loan received (USS4,729 excluding in-kind costs) in 1992/93, and about
US$2,079 per first loan (US$615 excluding in-kind costs) in 1995/96 (Table 22).
45 Program  costs  considered  here  include  all costs  that  Bank  of Indonesia  and  donors  attnibute  to the program.
These  costs  do not include  the  costs  that  banks  incur  in making  program  related  loans. Banks'  costs  are
excluded  because  information  regarding these  costs  was not available. Further. it is assumed  that banks  are
fully  compensated  for the costs  they incur through  the revenues  they  earn on program loans. Because  banks
receive  no special  incentive  to participate  in the program,  it is unli:kely  that thev  would  continue  to do so if
they  were not recouping  their full costs. Similarly,  NGOs' costs are not included  in this section  because
NGOs  are compensated  by the program  for their services. Thus, their costs should  already  be captured  in
expenditures  by BI and donors.
58Table 22
Approximate PHBK Program Costs in Comparison to Program Outputs:
Fiscal 1990/91 to Fiscal 1995/96
Total  Cost  Per Program  Output  t
1 l991,/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994195  1995/96
Annual cost  (US$)  3.687.167  3.994.965  4.253.810  4.647.182  5.164,454  5.231.503
Cost percent of annual loan  357  227  304  292  168  95
volume
Cost per group  credit (US$)  8.821  7.412  11.654  6.012  3.699  1.785
Cost per new  group credit  14.574  16.8S6  16,682  10.169  6,134  2.103
Cash  Outlav  Cost Pcr  Pro  ram Out  )ut (USSY  _
1  990/91  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96
Annual cash  cost  (US$)  954.434  1.124.984  1.205,954  1.379.258  1.697,107  1.589.218
Cost percent of annual loain  92  64  86  87  55  29
volume
Cost per group  credit (US$)  2.283  2.087  3.304  1.784  1.216  542
Cost per new group  credit  3.772  4.747  4.729  3.018  2.016  639
(US$)  I
a/ Costs  exclude  BI in-kind  expenditures  on thc program.
The costs  detailed  above effectively translate  into very large subsidies for borrowers.  To gauge
the magnitude  of this subsidy, this section  provides  rough  estimates  of the percent  increase  in the
interest  rate that  banks would have to  charge their  PHBK clients if the banks were  to  maintain
their current  level of profits while fullv funding this program.  This percent  increase  in the
required  interest  rate is a lower-bound  estimate  of the Subsidy  Dependency  Index  (SDI).46 As
Table  23 indicates,  the program's  subsidy  dependency  index follows  trends  in program  costs.  In
fiscal  1990/9 1, banks  would have had to  increase  their interest  rate by approximately  628 percent
to pay for the full cost  of the program.  Over the following  5 years. this figure  declined  sharply,
and stood  at  158 percent  in fiscal  1995/96.  While a  158 percent  increase  in the interest  rate is still
very high, it is impressive  that this figure declined by almost one-half  from fiscal  1994/95 to
1995/96 alone.  To fund direct  program  costs,  banks would  have had to increase  their  interest  rate
46 SDI figures  presented  here are only rough  estimates  of actual figures  because  the author was required  to make a
number  of significant  estimations  and assumptions. Because  this program  operates  through private  banks, we
assume  that the total  program  subsidy  is equal  to the cost of running  the PHBK  program,  that is. that banks
are not subsidizing  these  loans in other wvays.  The SDI  calculation  also requires  an estimate  of the total
interest  collected  annually  on program loans. This information  is not available. An estimate  for this figure
vas calculated  based  on the average  interest  rate charged  on loans,  the program's  annual average  outstanding
loan volume,  and the program's  annual arrears rate. The average  interest  rate  charged  on loans is assumed  to
be 107  percent per year on a declining  balance  basis including  all interest  charges,  fees,  and forced  savings
requirements.
Further. the SDI is calculated  assuming  a market  return for equity  holders. Since  information  on
participating  banks' current  returns  to equity  holders  was not available.  we assume  here that these  rates  are
acceptable  at their current  level. If banks' actual returns  on their loans  under this program are below  the
market  level,  then the figures  presented  here underestimate  the actual SDI.
See Annex  7 for a description  of how the SDI  is calculated.
59by 163 percent in fiscal 1990/91, and by 48 percent in 1995/96.  Table 23 also provides rough
estimates of the interest rate banks would have had to charee clients to maintain their current level
of profitability and cover program costs.  In fiscal 1990/91. banks would have had to charge an
annual interest rate of approximately 781 percent.  By fiscal 1995/96, this figure had declined to
277 percent.  To fund the direct costs of the program and maintain profitability  in fiscal 1995/96,
banks would have had to charge an interest rate estimated at 159 percent.
Table 23
Estimate of Subsidy Dependency Indexa  and
Required  Interest  Rates to Cover Program  Costs for PHBK Program
Fiscal  Ycar
199(/91  199  1/92  1 )992/93  1993/94  1994/95 11995/96
Low.er  bound  estimate  for SDI  with full  628  515  574  471  2981  158
program  costs  (perccnt)  _l
Lower  bound  estimate  for  SDI  with  direct  163  145  163  140  981  48
costs  onlv (percent)  ___  _  _  __L
LowNer  bound  estimated  average  current  107  107  107  107  107  107
intercst rate (percent)  b
Estimated  average  interest ratc rcquired  781  659  723  613  427  277
to fund  full  program  cost (percent)  _
Estimated  average  interest rate required  282  263  282  257  212  159
to fund  direct program  cost  ( ercen2t)  __3  257_22  15
a] The  percent  increase  in the interest  rate  that  is required  if the  program  were  to operate  without  subsidies.
b/ Annual  average  intercst  rate  calculated  on  declining  balance  basis  including  all fees  and  forced  savings
requirements.  An  estimated  average  of the  rates  commonly  charged  by  rural  banks  and commercial  banks  to
channeling  groups.
Outreach Scope.
PHBK experienced  Table 24
significant  difficulties  PHBK Program Lending Volume
from fiscal 1991/92 to
fiscal 1993/94.  Since  Fiscal  Year
1994 however,  the  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96
program  has grown  Nominal  loan  3.534  2.915  3,406  6,813  12.821
rapidlv. In real terms,  volume  (Rp.  million)
PHBK volume  Growth  in real loan  64  -24  7  84  73
declined by 24  volume  (percent)
percent  in fiscal  Nominal  loan  1,757.384 1,399,328 1,593,589  3,075,107 5.526.422
1992/93, and then  volume  (US$)
grew aby  cnt  in  Numberofgroup  539  365  773  1,396  2,931
grew  by  '.7  percent  in  loans  issued
fiscal 1993/94; 84  Growth  in number  of  29  -32  112  81  110
percent in  1994/95;  group  loans  issued  _
and an estimated 73
percent in 1995/96 (Table 24).  Total loan volume was Rp. 12.8 billion (US$5.5 million) in fiscal
601995/96. This represents approximately Rp. 40 million  (US$17,000) per participating bank
branch.  PHBK disbursements in fiscal 1995/96 were approximately 55 percent as large as the
P4K program's.  Nevertheless, PHBK has expanded verv rapidly over the last several years,
whereas P4K's lending declined in 1995/96.
PHBK management  Table 25
does not keep track  PHBK Required  Savings
of the volume of
voluntary savings  |  Fiscal  Year
generated  under  this  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96
program.  The real  Nominal  outstanding  savings  424  651  1.263  2,077
volume of required  (Rp.  million)
savings  deposits  Real growvth  in savings  (percent)  NA  41  79  51
grew  by 79 percent  Nominial  outstanding  savings  (US$)  203.3 13  304,399  570.165  895.345
in 1994 and 51  Savings  pcrcent of outstanding  loans  20  24  24  19
percent in 1995. By
the end of fiscal 1995/96. required savings stood at Rp. 2.1 billion (about US$900,000), and
equaled 19 percent of outstanding loans (Table 25).
Outreach  Depth. This program's objective is to deepen rural financial markets.  The program
defines its target group as households that have not previously received a commercial  bank credit.
According to the program' s 1993 Impact Study carried out in Yogyakarta and Central Java, 93
percent of beneficiaries in those provinces met this criteria.
Although the program does not target a specific income group, it is nevertheless interesting to
obtain some indication of the income of program beneficiaries. The program's monitoring system
does not track beneficiaries' incomes. The 1993 Impact Study found that among surveyed
participants in two provinces, less than 20 percent had monthly household expenditures below the
poverty line. More than 40 percent of respondents had household expenditures more than twice
as high as the poverty line. Furthermore, about I I percent of households were in the highest 13
percent of the income distribution.  If these findings are representative of borrowers under the
program today, then this program cannot be considered to be primarily reaching the low-income
population, although some low-income households are being served.  It is likely that virtually all
of P4K's loan recipients have incomes as low or lower than the poorest one-third of PHBK
participants.
The program does not keep track of the number of borrowers per group, and estimates for this
figure are based on old data that no longer accurately reflect the makeup of participating groups.
Thus, it is difficult  to estimate the average loan size per individual  borrower.  One program
manager's estimate of the average loan size per group member results in loans per person equal to
13 percent of GDP per capita.  However, management estimates of the number of members in
each borrower group results in loans per individual  being equal to about 7 percent of per capital
GDP.  If the program's actual average loan size to end users is in the middle to higher end of this
range, then this program has the largest average loan size of the 5 programs reviewed here.
Nevertheless, this figure is much lower than the loan size-to-GDP-per capita figure for 9 of the
most respected microcredit programs in the world (Christen et al., 1995).
61The program does not keep track of the number of beneficiaries  who are women.  One program
impact survey found that approximately 50 percent of surveyed borrowers were women.  The
program attracts many women because loans with relatively short terms, frequent repayments, and
high interest rates are most appropriate for petty traders.  In Indonesia. women make up a large
share of the people engaged in this occupation.
For banks participating in this program, geographic outreach varies significantly. Some banks
engage only in lending to channeling  groups (Model 3), and service clients who are no more than
6 kilometers from one of their branches. Other banks serve groups much further away by relying
on the more indirect lending to credit groups (Model l), or to NGOs that onlend to credit groups
(Model 2).  As indicated above, one BPR was using Model 2 to serve clients located one hour or
more away from the bank by car.
Productivity.  The PHBK program has very high overhead costs, as reflected in its high unit costs
and subsidy dependency index. PHBK's national-level  staff is large and spends a very significant
amount of time and money supporting regional initiatives. Similarly, regional staff spend a large
amount of time working with NGOs and banks. However, the program is rapidly becoming more
cost effective as it is increasingly  able to benefit from econornies of scale. and as the shift to the
relatively simple model of banks' lending to channeling  groups (Model 3) reduces ongoing
support requirements.
Reasons for Evoluition int  Program Performance.  Program rnanagers attribute PHBK's troubled
start and improved performance to financial sector and program-specific circumstances. The
program experienced particular difficulties in 1991/92 and 1992/93.  This was a troubled period
for the entire Indonesian financial sector, which experienced significant liquidity  problems and
escalating arrears rates.  Program volume was also adversely affected and took some time to
recover after the program stopped providing subsidized liquidity  credits to participating banks in
1992.
Program managers attribute initial, high program costs and arrears rates to inadequate screening
of participating NGOs and groups, and to high reliance on the program's Model 2.  Model 2
provides financing to credit users through banks making loans to NGOs that lend to credit groups
that lend to members.  Alternative program models are simpler and more direct with banks
lending directly to credit groups which lend to members (Model 1), or banks lending directly to
end-users loosely organized as a channeling group (Model 3).  Model 2 was found to require the
most intense program support and to have the highest program costs.  It also suffers from the
highest arrears problems because many NGOs are poorly moltivated  and trained to make market-
based loans. For the last several years, the program has been phasing out this model wherever
possible, and its share of total program volume has declined from 60 percent in 1993/94 to  17
percent in 1995/96. However, as indicated above, this Model is sometimes the only way that the
program can function in remote areas.  The program must screen NGOs carefully  to ascertain that
they have the commitment to follow sound banking practices.  Further, it must provide them with
training that will enable them to perform these functions effectively.
62Program managers anticipate that PHBK will continue to improve its productivity as the program
redirects its technical assistance in high density areas from Model I (lending to credit groups) to
Model 3 (lending to end users loosely organized as a channeling  group).  As discussed above,
Model 3 is the most cost effective of the three models, and the easiest and quickest to propagate.
While the program will continue to support the slower and more expensive Models I and 2 in
more remote regions, organizers anticipate that the ever increasing  volume of loans undertaken
under Model 3 will rapidly drive down unit costs.
Also, program volume has increased in recent years partially due to the program's aggressive
marketing to rural banks (BPRs).  BPRs are small, local banks that are usually privately owned
and have few, if any, branches. They are much closer to PHBK's target market than many of the
larger commercial banks.  Also, they have little, if any, bureaucracy and therefore possess the
flexibility  to adopt the PHBK group lending approach quickly.
Finally, this program is still expanding its geographic coverage.  Thus, a significant  share of the
program's subsidy can be attributed to start up costs in new regions and to reach new groups.
Once the program has ceased to expand geographically and has slowed its coverage of new
groups within regions, it is likely that its required subsidy level will decline still further.
Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
Because the PHBK program relies primarilv on BPRs. provincial banks, and commercial banks, it
has not been impacted significantly  by the Presidential Regulation supporting the 1992 Banking
Law.  The Regulation discouraged the program from an early goal of upgrading credit groups to
semi-formal financial  institutions.  However. this idea would almost surely have been abandoned
even if the Regulation had not been promulgated.  The upgrading process was extremely difficult
and costly, and the results were poor.
Competition
PHBK, like P4K, complains of "unfair" competition from the new and highly-subsidized
TAKESRA/KULKESRA  group-based lending program for poor families. PHBK also mentions
the P4K program as a source of competition since P4K provides loans to groups at approximately
one-fifth of the effective rate charged by banks in the PHBK program.
63ANNEX  4: PEMB1NAAN  PENINGKATAN  PENDAPATAN  PETANI-
NELAYAN  KECIL  (P4K)
Program  Description
Pembic1aanz  Peningkatant  Peidacrpatan  Peianri-nelayan  Kecil (P4K)  is a group-based
microenterprise promotion and lending program targeting the rural poor.  It is jointly implemented
by the Ministrv of Agriculture and BRI.  The program receives significant  financial and
management support from the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the
United Nations Development Program (LNDIP),  and the Dutch government. The Asian
Development Bank (ADB) is also considering supporting the project.  Directly the program
focuses on building microenterprise skills, providing credit, and promoting savings. In addition,
the program attempts to link borrower groups with community activities and social service
agencies. The program operates throughout Java. Bali. and Lombok. It has expanded on a pilot
basis to  12 additional provinces.
Currently, 80 percent of the finds BRI lends under the project are provided to it in the form of a
loan from IFAD. BRI supplies 20 percent of loan funds.  BRI plans to provide 100 percent of
loan funds for the expansion into 10 of the 12 provinces in which the program is currently being
piloted.  Loan funds for the remaining  two pilot provinces will come from the 5 percent of profits
that state owned enterprises are required to allocate to poverty reduction programs.
Mechanics.  Ministry of Agriculture extension agents are the principle implementers of the
program.  They identify communities  with the potential to participate in the program based on the
community's income level and opportunitv for microenterprise development. The agent, in
conjunction with the community,  identifies promising areas for small business development.
Within the targeted communities, the agent identifies poor households interested in participating
in the program.  Only households with annual per capita incomes below the monetary equivalent
of the price of 320 kilograms of rice (approximately Rp. 320,000 or US$138 in today's  prices) are
accepted.  Household income is determined via a detailed questionnaire that extension agents fill
out based on information supplied by the household.
Households that qualify for participation are encouraged to form groups of 8 to  16 families. The
average group size is 10.8 households. To receive its first loan, a group must save a minimum of
Rp. 50,000 (US$22).  In addition, they must participate in two training sessions provided by their
agriculture extension agent.  During the second session, the agriculture extension agent helps the
group complete their business plan. This business plan is approved by the district office of the
Ministry of Agriculture and is then sent to the appropriate BRI branch. The BRI branch must also
approve the business plan.  In theory BRI's approval process includes a field visit to the group,
although it appears that this does not always occur.  Thus, the group may receive it's loan without
having had a previous contact with a bank agent.  The loan is frequently disbursed in the village
itself
64The average length of time from the time a household completes its qualifving questionnaire until
it obtains its loan is six months. This compares to a two-week or less wait for BKK, LKP, and
BKD borrowers.  First time borrowers under the PHBK program receive their loans from a few
days to more than six months after forming as a group. depending on the organization of the
group, the supply of loans, and the type of lending model used.
P4K loans are made only through BRA  branches, not through BRI's Unit Desa network.  Groups
must make their last payment directly to a BRI branch.  All other payments can be made at a BRI
branch, a village post, a mobile service unit, or a Unit Desa.
Each group receives one loan which is divided among group members as they choose  - usually
evenly. The group assumes joint liability for repayment of the loan.
In theory, agriculture extension agents provide follow-up support to groups including organizing
an additional training course in implementation of the business plan, and providing  guidance in
areas such as bookkeeping, finance, and marketing. The extension agents are also charged with
encouraging groups to save and repay their loans, and to link with other social services. In
practice, the degree to which extension agents perform these follow-up activities probably differs
considerably across program sites and individual  workers.
Incentives  for Ministry of Agricuiltutre  Workers. Agriculture extension workers receive a number
of incentives to identify groups and assist them in obtaining credits. Extension workers
participating in the program receive a travel allowance of US$5 per month. In addition, they
receive US$5 per group for conducting the first course that groups must participate in, and
US$15 per group for conducting the second course.  Groups can receive a loan after the their
second course.  The extension agents receive an additional US$10 per group for conducting a
course on implementing business plans that groups take after they receive their first loan. Also,
extension agents' promotions and salary increases are based on a point system. Extension agents
receive one point for every group they form.  Agents do not receive incentives for helping to
ensure that groups repay their loans promptly or that thev receive additional loans.
Program organizers would like to provide additional incentives to extension workers to encourage
them to provide follow-up support to groups that have already received their first loan.  Ideally,
these incentives would take the form of payment for additional courses centering on helping the
groups make optimal use of their loans.  However, the program's target group is primarily
households with little or no land who use the loans for off-farm business pursuits. Most
agriculture extension agents are poorly positioned to provide advice concerning off-farm
activities.
BRI recognizes the importance of providing extension wvorkers  with incentives  to continue their
commitment to participating groups.  As discussed below. loan terms change for groups after
their fourth loan.  BRI uses some of the increase in the interest rate charged on these later loans to
reward agriculture extension workers and their managers for groups' prompt repayments.
Specifically,  extension workers receive a fee equal to from 0.2 to 0.35 percent of the initial loan
amount for each monthly payment promptly received. Extension managers receive a fee equal to
650.1 to 0. 15 percent of the initial loan balance for each prompt repayment. This incentive system
will be extended to all loans in new provinces.
(Group  Formalization atnd Up)grading. In the past. the program attempted to link groups into
broader associations with the idea that these "super" groups could become financial
intermediaries,  as occurs in PHBK's credit group model (Model I).  However, generally only the
more affluent groups and group members could take advantalge  of these more sophisticated
structures and, in any case. the concept was generally  not very successful. The program will not
focus efforts on this area in the future.
Program Supervision. As indicated above, the program is split between group development
which is controlled by the Ministry of Agriculture. and lending. which is controlled by BRI.
Program managers receive data from BRI but appear to have virtually no influence over BRI's
P4K policies and procedures.  Within BRI, the program is overseen by the Small Business, Food,
and Cooperative Division.  Program managers exert somewhat greater influence over the Ministry
of Agriculture's involvement with the program.
Loan Products
First fotur Loans.  Loan terms are usually from 12 to 18 months.  Repayment frequency can be
monthly, quarterly, semi-annually or annually, depending on the nature of the use of the loan.
Groups must save at least Rp. 50,000 (US$2 1) to obtain their first loan.  Group savings for the
second loan must be at least 10 percent of the loan capital required, and savings for the third and
fourth loan must be at least equal to 20 percent of the loan required.  After the fourth loan, the
groups' forced savings requirement is 25 percent of the loan amount.  Savings earn interest at the
same rate as savings placed in BRI's voluntary savings account program - SIMPEDES.  This rate
is about 9 percent for small balances.  Groups can withdraw their savings at any time after they
have repaid their loan.
For the first four loans, the interest rate charged on loans is fixed at I percent per month on the
initial loan amount. Assuming monthly installments, and taking into account the forced savings
requirement, this is equivalent to a monthly interest rate of about 1.8 to 2.4 percent on a declining
balance basis or 24 to 33 percent annually. The effective interest rate varies depending on the
amount of forced savings required.  A small incentive in the form of an interest rebate is provided
for on-time payments. This rebate reduces the effective  annual interest rate yield to about 22 to
31 percent.  A stamp duty of Rp. 1,000 (about US$0.43) is charged on all credit agreements.
For a first loan, the maximum loan size per group member is Rp. 100,000 (US$43).  This figure
increases to Rp. 300,000 (US$128) for the fourth loan. The initial maximum loan is equal to
about 5 percent of GDP per capita, and the final maximum,  about 15 percent.
66Additiotnal  Loanis  and E-xpanded  Program.  Less than 2 percent of groups organized under P4K
have received more than four loans.  However, for groups that do receive a fifth loan or more, the
loan terms change.  Specificallv,  the interest rate increases to 1.5 percent per month on the initial
loan amount and the savings requirement increases to 25 percent of the loan amount.  Taking into
account the interest rate, the required savings, and the interest paid on required savings, these
terms are equivalent to a 62 percent annual interest rate on a 1  2-month, declining  balance loan
with no forced savings component and monthly installments. From 0.3 to 0.5 percentage points
of the interest rate is paid to Ministry of Agriculture extension workers and managers as an
incentive for them to insure prompt repayment. It is likely that these same terms will apply to all
loans in the 10 additional provinces into which the program is expanding.
Intra-grouip  Loansi. Many P4K groups collect voluntary savings from members and lend these
funds out to other members. Each group determines the interest rate it will charge on these loans.
Typically,  groups lend out these funds at a 5 percent flat rate per month.  This is equivalent to
about a 154 percent annual rate on a declining balance basis.
Savings Products
P4K groups are encouraged to voluntarily save funds with BRI.  In addition. individuals may
deposit funds with their group to be on-lent to other group members. BRI pays groups an interest
rate on savings equal to the amount it pays on its popular SIMPEDES savings accounts.  This is
currently about 9 percent.  The interest rate paid on forced savings accounts is also 9 percent.
This rate is approximately equal to inflation. Groups themselves determine what interest rate they
will pay to members for funds that are on-lent to other group members. This rate varies by group
but is considerably more than the rate paid by BRI.
Staffing
P4K is heavily staffed. The program has its own full-time staff. In addition, field workers and
managers in the Ministry of Agriculture work on program-related activities as do BRI employees.
The author did not collect detailed staffing or salary-related information for this program.
Underwriting and Loan Servicing
As indicated above, agriculture extension workers function as credit agents under this program.
In theory, BRI conducts its own credit review of P4K loans, and borrowers are responsible for
making payments to BRI.  In practice, BR! relies heavily on the extension workers to screen and
prepare groups, and the groups frequently rely on the extension workers to collect their payments
and deliver them to BR!.  This use of extension workers lowers transaction costs for BRI and
borrowers, but it entails a cost for the Ministry of Agriculture.  This practice can create problems
with repayment and limit groups' access to additional credits, as discussed in greater detail below.
Program Performance
This section reviews program performance as measured by sustainability and outreach.
Sustainability is measured by the program's arrears rate, its cost to output ratios. and the size of
the subsidy required to sustain operations. Outreach is measured by the volume of annual lending
and savings activities (scope) and the population it serves (depth of market penetration).
67Sustainahility. Information  Table 26
on the total volume of loans  P4K Ar]rears Rates
in arrears was not available.
This analysis attempts to  Calendar  Year
estimate  these figures  by  ___  1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
providing  information on  Number of groups Xwith arrears  5.1  4.7  6.2  1o.5  18.7
the number of groups with  percent of groups with
loans in arrears  as a percent  outstanding loans'
of  the  number  of  groups  Volume of payments overdue  2.4  1.4  1.6  8.1  7.4 of the number of groups  percent  of volumc of loans
with  outstanding  loans.  outstandinlga  - -i 
Groups with arrears
remained a small percent of  a/ Because BRI does niot  write off P4K loans  these figures  lli
remaind  a smll  perent  o  overestimnate  actual arrears.
groups  with credits  through
1993. However, groups with arrears increased to  10.5 percent of groups with credits in 1994,
and 18.7 percent in 1995.  However, the above figures will overstate actual arrears rates because
BRI does not write off loans in default.  Payments in arrears were equal to about 7.4 percent of
outstanding  credits at the end of 1995.  Figures for the first two months of 1996 indicate that
arrears were likely be significantly  higher that year.  Disturbingly, arrears have increased every
year since 1992, when groups with arrears accounted for 4.7 percent of total groups and
payments in arrears were equal to 1.4 percent of outstanding credits (Table 26).  The 1995
payment arrears rate is only slightly higher than that of PHBK.  However, PHBK's rate (which
also includes loans that are actually in default) has declined every year since fiscal 1993/94.
Project data indicate that P4K's cumulative default rate since inception is probably about equal to
that of PHBK-approximately 2.5 percent.
P4K's rising arrears rate is of considerable concern to program managers who are looking at ways
of addressing the issue.  This issue also appears to have contributed to a delay in plans to expand
the program to fill-scale in 10 provinces currently participating in a pilot.
P4K is an ambitious program that provides a variety of services to borrower groups in addition to
those that relate specifically  to financial services. For this report, program expenditures have been
allocated between financial services and all other activities. Financial  services account for about
69 percent of total program costs. 47 The cost figures presented below are estimates of costs for
financial services only.  They include costs associated with program management, and with the
Ministry of Agriculture's involvement in the project.  They also include the implicit cost of the
subsidy embodied in the low-interest loan IFAD provided to 13RI.  To facilitate comparison with
the PHBK program, they do not include BRI's direct costs of undertaking P4K lending activities.
47 Financial  services  costs  were  estimated  based  on program  organizers'  estimates  of  the  amount  of time  that
management and field staff spent on a variety of tasks.  Spending on general program-related overhead that
could  not be  directly  allocated  was  divided  between  financial  services  and non-financial  services  in the  same
proportion as these activities'  shares of total non-overhead expenditures.  Specifically, financial services
accounted for  about 69 percent of non-overhead expenses.  Thus, these activities were allocated 69 percent of
total overhead costs.
68However, these costs will be taken into account when calculating the Subsidy Dependency Index
discussed below.
The P4K program achieved very impressive declines in cost per funds lent from 1991 to  1993
(Table 27).  In 1991. total program costs were equal to 176 percent of funds lent. Only 2 years
later in 1993, total program costs were equal to  18 percent of funds lent (or 9 percent if the
Ministry of Agriculture's in-kind costs of salaries for extension workers are excluded from the
calculation). In 1993 the program's total spending was about US$105 per group receiving a loan
(or about US$ 10 per individual). Given the program s tight targeting of the very poor (see
below), these figures are impressive.  In recent years. program cost effectiveness has declined.
but remains strong.  In 1995, total program costs were equal to 30 percent of funds lent (or 23
percent if the Ministry of Agriculture's in-kind costs are excluded), and the program was spending
about US$213 per group receiving a loan (about USS20 per individual).
Thus, in 1995, P4K was more cost effective than PHBK (as measured by total program cost per
volume of funds lent, and total and cash-only costs per group receiving credit). One reason that
P4K is able to operate at a lower cost than PHBK is that extension agents earn lower salaries than
Bank of Indonesia staff.  Also, because P4K has an annual volume almost double that of PHBK. it
is able to take fuller advantage of economies of scale. Finally, P4K's simpler structure may
contribute to lower costs.
However, P4K's cost effectiveness ratios have detefiorated over the last two years, whereas
PHBK's have improved. This shift is probably driven by PHBK's rapid expansion, and P4K's
much slower growth.  In addition, P4K managers attribute their recent productivity decline to the
shift in P4K responsibility  within the Ministry of Agriculture, which necessitated a great deal of
additional training, and to the program's expansion on a pilot basis to 12 additional provinces.
Table  27
Estimated Financial Services Costs for P4K Program
in Comparison to Program Outputs:
For Calendar Years 1991 to 1995a
Total Cost Per Pr gram Out ut
1991  1992  1993  19941995
Annual  cost (US$)  1.683.723  1.202.411  1,121.263  2,776,900  3,279.289
Cost percent  of annual loan  volume  176  53  18  23  30
Cost per grou  credit (US$)  697  238  105  146  213
Cost per new  group credit  (US$)  813  320  137  197  383
Cost per Program  Output  Excluding  Ministr of Agriculture  In-Kind  Expenditures
1991  1992  1993  1994  1995
Annual cash  cost (US$)  1.118,709  642.641  576,804  2,036,908  2,503.066
Cost  percent of annual loan volume  117  28  9  17  23
Cost per group  credit  (US$)  463  127  54  107  163
Cost per new group  credit (US$)  540  171  70  145  292
a/ Program  costs  were provided  for fiscal  years. Costs  by calendar  year are estimates  based
on fiscal  year data.
69The costs detailed above and the fact that BRI earns a below-market rate of return on this
program, translates into subsidies for borrowers.  To gauge the magnitude of this subsidy, this
section provides rough estimates of the program's Subsidy Dependency Index (the percent
increase in the interest rate that is required if the program were to be fully self-supporting
including paying a market rate of return to liability and equity holders). 4  The program's Subsidy
Dependency Index (SDI) follows trends in program costs.  In 1991, BRI would have had to
increase the program's interest rate by approximately 1,598 percent to pay for the full cost of the
program.  Over the following 2 years, this figure declined sharply, and stood at 209 percent (125
percent excluding Ministrv of Agriculture in-kind contributions) in 1993. Since 1993. the SDI has
increased, and stood at 262 percent (218 percent excluding MOA in-kind contributions) in 1995.
In 1991, BRI would have had to charge an annual interest rate of approximately 461 percent to
fully fund the program and provide market returns to investors.  By 1993, this figure had declined
to 84 percent.  By 1995. this figure had increased to about 93 percent (Table 28).
48 SDI  figures  presented  here  are only rough  estimates  of actual  figures  because  the author  was required  to make  a
number  of significant  estimations  and assumptions. We assume  that the total  program  subsidy  is equal  to  the
cost  of running  the P4K program,  that is, that BRI is not subsidizing  these loans in other ways. The SDI
calculation  also  requires  information  on the  total  interest  collected  annually  on  program  loans. This
information  is not available. An estimate  for this figure  was calculated  based  on the average  interest  rate
charged  on loans. the progrm's  annual average  outstanding  loan volume.  and the program's  annual arrears
rate. The average interest  rate charged  on loans is assumed  to be 27 percent per year on a declining  balance
basis  including  all interest  charges,  fees,  and  forced  savings  requirements.
Further,  the SDI is calculated  assuming  a inarket  return  for equity  holders. If BRl's actual returns  on their
loans under  this program  are below  the market  level,  then the figures  presented  here underestimate  the actual
SDI.
See  Annex  7 for a description  of how  the SDI  is calculated.
70The program's  262  Table 28
percent SDI for 1995 is  Estimate of Subsidy Dependency  Indexa and
high compared to other  Required  Interest  Rates to Cover Program  Costs for P4K Program
programs reviewed in
this report.  However,  Calendar  Year
the SDI measures the  1991 11992 1993 19924  1995
percent increase  in the  Lower  bound  estitiatc  for  SDI  with  full  1598  520  209  234  262
current interest rate  prograin costs  (percent)
required  for the  Lower  bound  estimate  for  SDI  with  direct  1087  303  125  184  218
program to become  costs  onlv  (percent)
Estimated  currcnt  average  annual  interest  27  27  27  27  27
self-sustaining. Thus  ratC (percent)b
P4K's high SDI is  Estimated  average  interest  rate  required  to  461  168  84  91  98
primarily due to the  fund  fiull  program  cost  (percent)  _
fact that the program's  Estimiiated  average  intcrcst  rate  required  to  322  109  61  77  86
current interest rate of  fund  direct program  costs  (percent)
about 27 percent on an  a/ The percent  incrcasc  in the intercst  rate  that is required  if the  program  were  to
annual declining  operate  witlhout  subsidics.
balance basis is  b/ Annual  average  interest  rate  calculated  on declining  balance  basis  including
extremely low in  forced  savings  requirements.
comparison to other programs'.  Thus, this high SDI implies that the program would have to
charge an interest rate of about 98 percent to be fully self supporting.  This figure is less than one-
half that required for PHBK and LKP.
Furthermore, the program was reorganized within the Ministry of Agriculture which led to
additional training costs in locations in which the program had been operating for some time.
Also, like PHBK, P4K is expanding its geographic coverage. Thus a significant share of its
expenditures represent start up costs for new regions.  Therefore, it is likely that the program's
subsidy will decline in the coming years.
Currently, many P4K groups retain voluntary member savings at the group level and lend these
funds out to group members. Groups lending out their own funds typically charge an interest rate
of 5 percent "flat" per month. This is equivalent to  154 percent per year on a declining balance
basis.  The volume of loans made with groups' own funds is very small. However, the high
interest rates charged on these loans indicate that if the program were to reduce its current
subsidy by charging higher interest rates on loans, it is likely  that many current clients could afford
the higher costs.
71Outreach Scope.  Tablle  29
Lending volume  P4K Program Lending Volume
under the project
has expanded  very  Fiscal Year
rapidly since fiscal  11991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1  1995/96
1991/92  (April  1991  Nominal  loanl  1.888  4.62(  13.209  26.889  25,279
to March  1992).49  volume  (Rp.
Lending  under  the  millioni)  l
Growth  in real loan  113  145  186  104  -6 program  was  Rp.  *'olunic  (Perccnt)
1.9 billion in fiscal  Nomiiial  loan  938.793  2.217.9  45  6.181.011  12.136.816  10.895,930
1991/92  volumeic  (US$)
(US$939,000)  and  Number of group  2.365  4.9:53  10.504  18.733  15,137
had  risen  to  Rp.  loans issucd  _
25.3 billion  Growtli  in number  102  1l9  112  78  -19
(US$10.9  million)  of loans issued  _
by fiscal  1995/96.  Estimated  number  25.542  53.492  113.443  202.316  163,480
by fiscal1995/96. of individuals 
In real  terms,  P4K  rcceiving loans  --------  --- _  C
volume  grew  from
104 to  186 percent  annually from fiscal  1991/92 through  fiscal  1994/95.  However.  real lending
contracted  by 6 percent  in fiscal  1995/96.  Approximately  163,500 households  received  credit  in
1995/96,  down  sharply from 202,000  in the previous  year (Table  29).
P4K  management  track  Table  30
savings  deposited  with  P4K Savings  Volume
BRI  and those held  at
the  group  level.
Savings  deposited  with  |__  Fiscal Year
BRI  include groups'  19992  1992193 1993194  1994195i 199596a
voluntary  and required  Nominal  outstanding  394  795  2.169  4.426 I  6,596
savings.  Savings  held  savings  (Rp.  million)  _ Real  growth in savings  122  85  153  86  i  35
at  the  group  level  are  (percent)  _  _
entirely  voluntary.  Nominal  outstanding  195.946  :381.693  1,014.765 1,997.8031  2.843,273
Total  savings  under  the  savings (US$)
program  stood  at  Rp.  Savings  kept within groups  39  - - 32  32  32
6.6  billion  (US$2.9  percent of total savings  _
million) at the end  of  Savings  percent  outstanding  31  29  28  24  4  32
fiscal  1995/96.  In real  Bank loans  _  l
terms,  savings  have  a/ Program  estimate  based on data as of December,  1995.
increased  very rapidly
over the  past 4 years.  For most of this period,  this growth  rate has been  slightly slower than  the
rate  of growth  in P4K lending volume.  Savings were  equal to about  one-third  of total  outstanding
49 Some  data for the P4K  program  is presented  in calendar  years and some in fiscal  years. This is due to  the fact
that P4K program managers  track program  performance  by fiscal years  and BRI provided  data to the author
by calendar  years.
72loans in fiscal 1995/96.  Interestingly, this figure is significantly  higher than in the previous year,
indicating that robust growth in savings continued even when lending growth slowed. Voluntary
savings kept at the group level accounts for about one-third of total savings (Table 30).
Outreach Depth.  P4K is the only one of the programs studied that explicitly  targets low-income
households. The program carefully screens applicants to ensure that all participating households
have annual per capita incomes below the monetary equivalent of the price of 320 kilograms of
rice (approximately Rp. 320.000 or LJS$137  in 1996 prices).  Program documents claim that only
about 15 percent of households nationwide have incomes at this level or below. When adjusted to
1993 Rupiah prices and compared to Indonesia's household expenditure survey, this is equivalent
to virtually all program recipients having incomes in the bottom 25 percent of the income
distribution for Central Java.  It also implies that almost all participants have incomes as low or
lower than the poorest one-third of PHBK program beneficiaries.
The program's average loan size is Rp. 155,000 (US$66).  This is equivalent to about 7 percent
of GDP per capita. Women's groups account for 38 percent of all P4K groups, and women
account for about 50 percent of P4K beneficiaries. Approximately 60 percent of clients use loans
for off-farm agricultural activities, 20 percent for home industries; and 20 percent for trading.
Productivity.  The P4K program is relatively cost-effective as reflected by its unit costs and the
reasonable interest rate required to eliminate all subsidies. Further, the subsidy figures detailed
above include the start-up costs of expanding the program to new regions of the country and to
first-time borrowers.  It is likely that once the program has been rolled out nationwide and most
target beneficiaries have received their first loan, required subsidy levels will decline significantly.
Nevertheless, it is possible that this program has a hidden cost for rural development. Ministry of
Agriculture extension workers function as credit officers in this program. The cost of the time
they devote to this activity is included in program costs.  However, it is possible that other rural
development initiatives suffer because extension agents divert time from other activities, for which
they do not receive top-up allowances, to P4K, which provides compensation in excess of their
regular salaries.
Furthermore, while the program is reasonably cost effective now, it could significantly  improve its
cost-per-output ratios if  more groups obtained repeat loans.  P4K's loan volume (like that of
PHBK) is derived primarily  from groups receiving their first loan, rather than existing groups
receiving additional loans.  Costs per unit output could decline significantly  if more groups
received repeat credits because there are start-up costs to the program, BRI, and individual
beneficiaries in organizing groups and underwriting initial loans.
The program estimates that about 21 percent of groups that form never receive a loan.  (These
groups are referred to as "sleeping").  In addition, many groups become inactive after their first
credit (known as "resting.").  Only 19 percent of groups have received more than one credit.
However the program does not track the number of credits that groups have received as
compared to the year in which they received their first loan. Thus it is impossible  to calculate
what share of groups have been "resting" for years and are unlikely to be revived, and what share
73have only recently repaid their first credit and may receive additional fuinds. This is a very critical
issue for program viability and should be explored in  more depth via a systematic survey of active
and inactive groups.  The program also has not yet explored why some groups rest.  Thus, it is
not clear to what extent groups disband versus are unable to obtain additional credits.
Reasotns  for EfvoItlion in lrogrctn  Perftormclnce.  Program managers  attribute P4K's recent
increases in arrears and declinina,  volume to the following issues  It is possible that a reassignment
of the program within the Ministry of Agriculture contributed to defaults because many borrower
groups were accustomed to making repayments to specific a,,riculture extension workers. When
these did not visit the groups for an extended period of time. some groups did not make other
arrangements to deliver payments to a BRI outlet.  A further hvpothesis is that arrears were
exacerbated by BRI's policy of canceling the program in districts in which arrears ran higher than
10 percent.  Under this policy. many groups with strong repayment records stopped paying when
it became apparent that the program was to be discontinued in their area.  BRI's policy of
canceling credit provision in whole districts also accounts in large part for the contraction in real
lending volume in 1995/96.
However, it is also possible that the program's basic structure has contributed to some of its
problems. The program uses agriculture extension workers as credit agents.  However, extension
workers do not generally have a financial or banking background. nor are they under the control
or supervision of the bank disbursing the loans.  Furthermore, they have no direct incentive to
investigate the creditworthiness of borrowing groups, or to encourage these groups to repay their
loans in a timely manner. By acting as a go-between for banks and groups, extension agents
reduce the transaction costs for both parties.  However, they also act as a buffer between the two,
inhibiting  them from forming direct links.  It is possible that few groups receive more than one
loan because their primary, and sometimes virtually  exclusive, contact in the banking process is
the extension agent, and this latter has no incentive to help groups obtain more than one loan.
Also, the program's lengthy and bureaucratic loan approval process. which requires that loans
applications be considered by the Ministry of Agriculture and BRI, may discourage groups from
applying for additional loans.  Finally,  extension agents provicle  a number of free services. Thus,
groups may be less likely to see the funds they receive as a real obligation to be repaid because
their primary contact in the process generally provides free services.
BRI operates this program from its branches rather than through its Unit Desa system. This is
highly  surprising given that BRI branches are located only in district capitals, and generally  make
quite large loans.  In contrast, Unit Desas are located in sub-district capitals, and make much
smaller loans.  Thus, Unit Desas are much closer to the credit end-users both geographically and
in terms of the types of credits they typically issue. Relocating the program to Unit Desas would
facilitate collection efforts and might also increase the proportion of groups receiving more than
one credit as it would be much easier for groups to apply for additional credits at these branches.
The program is making some adjustments to improve its performance. BRI will provide small
financial incentives  for extension workers to expand lending and promote timely repayment in new
provinces. Also, BRI has reversed its policy of cutting off all loans in districts with high arrears.
In theory, it will now stop giving loans to all the groups serviced by a single extension worker
74when the arrears rate for groups working with that worker exceeds 5 percent.  However,  BRI
does not yet track arrears by individual extension workers, and it appears that this new policy has
vet to be fully  implemented. Also. the program's other significant  issues detailed above have not
been addressed.
Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
P4K is not impacted by the Presidential Regulation supporting the 1992 Banking Law because the
program operates through BRI which is a commercial bank.
Competition
P4K faces competition from two programs that provide grants or very low interest loans to P4K's
clientele. The Family  Planning Board (BKKBN) has a highly subsidized, group-based lending
program for poor families  called TAKESRA/KUKESRA. This program is funded by the 2
percent of profits that some private firms and individuals are required to channel to poverty
reduction.  Groups receive a grant or a loan with an effective interest rate that is negative in
nominal terms. The pressure to repay these credits is not high.  In addition, the Inipres  Desa
TerUitiggatl  (IDT) program provides grants to "disadvantaged" villages for them to use as
revolving credit funds. These funds generally carry no or very low interest rates and little
pressure to repay funds.  P4K organizers feel that these programs compete for the same clients as
the P4K program while providing loans with significantly  lower interest rates and little repayment
pressure.
75ANNEX 5: BADAN KREDIT  DESA (BKD) PROGRAM
Program Description  5'
The BIadcan  Kred/it  I)ess  (BKD) is a system of village-owned financial  institutions located in
West, Central, and East Java, and Yogyakarta.  BKD units were first established in 1898 and have
existed in their present form since 1952. The  BKD concept is based on a Dutch system of village
banks.  Each BKD unit is owned by an individual village, and operated by three residents of the
village. Units generally transact business onlv one day per week. They operate from a village
public building or the home of one of the village leaders.  There are 5,345 BKD units. of which
4,806 were active at the end of 1996.
BKDs were established with small capital grants from provincial governments. Their loan capital
is derived primarily from this initial grant, retained earnings, and required and voluntary savings.
BKD units sometimes also borrow from BRI. other BKD units, local governments, and other
parties.  In practice however, most BKDs keep large deposits with BRI branches or Unit Desa
and have little need of loans.
BKD earnings are used for commissions  to their staffs and fees to an accountant and BRI. The
profits remaining after these deductions stay with the unit in the form of retained earnings.
Supervision. BRI managers at regional and head offices define the business of BKDs.  BKD
records are prepared weekly by an accountant hired by the unit. BKDs are supervised by BRI
staff or contract workers.  BKDs generally receive at least one supervision visit per month.
Supervisors review the units' bookkeeping, cash handling, ancl  portfolio quality.  They arrange for
excess BKD funds to be deposited with BRI branches, organize BRI loans to BKDs, and
facilitate BKD units' lending to each other. Supervisors can dismiss  unit staff.  BRI staff who act
as supervisors are paid Rp. 9.6 million (US$4. 1  10) annually for their service.  This is equivalent
to about 4.3 times annual per capital GDP.  Supervisors hired as contractors are paid less but are
part of a BRI pension plan. All BKDs within a district share responsibility  for pavment of the
district's supervision fee.  The fee is allocated across BKDs based on the volume of their lending
activities.  Thus, BKDs with a relatively high annual loan volume pay a larger share of the
supervision cost than BKDs with a low volume.
Loan Products
Loan of 10 to  12 weeks account for about 65 percent of BKDs' loan volume. These loans have
an interest rate and payment terms almost identical to that of the LKPs in NTB.  The loan is
repaid in 10 to 12 equal installments. The first installment represents the interest due on the loan,
the next a forced savings payment, and the final 8 to  10 are repayment of capital.
Seasonal/agricultural loans account for about 20 percent of BKCDs'  loan volume, and 35 day loans
account for 15 percent.  Loans of 20 to 22 weeks account for about 0.2 percent of loan volume.
50 The author did not collect detailed  data for the BKD program.  The following annex contains  some general
infornation.
76In theory borrowers can reclaim their forced savings after they have repaid their loan. In practice,
borrowers'  ability  to withdraw their required savings varies by BKD office. Many BKDs allow
withdrawals only for religious holidays or do not allow withdrawals at all, such that the forced
savings becomes a fee.
The interest rate for the BKD 12 week loan product is equal to 7.2 percent per month or 131
percent per year on a declining  balance basis assuming that the forced savings is returned without
interest after the loan is repaid. The monthly interest rate is 9.5 percent and the yearly rate 347
percent if the forced savings payment is never returned.
In 1995, loans generally ranged in size from a minimum of Rp. 25,000 (US$11) to a maximum  of
Rp. 600,000 (US$257).  However, seasonal credits could reach Rp. I million  (US$428).
Savings Products
BKDs have accepted voluntary savings deposits since 1991. These accounts earn interest at a
rate of 9 percent per year. This rate is about equal to inflation and the rates paid by BKKs, LKPs,
and BRI on small deposits.  Rural banks (BPRs) often pay rates almost twice as high.  Forced
savings do not earn interest.
Staffing
Each unit is staffed on a part-time basis by three village inhabitants. Staff is appointed by the
village chief but must be approved by BRI supervisors.  Staff can by dismissed by the village chief
acting on advise from the supervisors. Staff compensation consists of a commission equal to 2.5
percent of the principal payments collected which is divided between the staff members. Staff
receive no other compensation.
Underwriting and Loan Servicing
For each unit, loans are underwritten and serviced by the three BKD staff members. Because the
staff members live in the villages they serve, they generally have good information about
individuals' creditworthiness.  Staff members have an incentive to perform these functions
prudently because their compensation is based on collections.
Program Performance
The author did not collect detailed information on BKD program performance. The following
represents the available data concerning program sustainability  and outreach.
77Sustainabilitv. Data on  Table 31
default and arrears are  Incremental Annual Default and Arrears Rates for BKD
problematic because
BKDs only write off  ,  19929. 1993  1994  1995  1996
loans in default if the  Loan  volume  in default  6.0  4.4  2.0  2 6  4 9
borrower moves, or if  percent  of outstanding  loans
the loan is more than 5  Loan volume  in arrcars  22.9  17 8  15.9  17.6  21.2
years overdue. Table 31  ) I  percent  of outstanding  loans
estimates default and
arrears rates for the program by simulating  the program writin.g  off all loans in default each year.5'
Using this approach, annual default rates ranged from 2 percent to 6 percent in the mid-1990s.
Loans in default accounted for approximately 4.9 percent of loans in 1996, up from 2.6 percent in
1995. The loan volume in arrears was equal to  16 to 23 percent of outstanding credits during the
mid-  1990s. The volume of loans in arrears in 1996 was 21 percent of outstanding loans, up from
16 percent in 1994.
BKDs do not adequately provision  Table 32
for bad debt. To partially adjust for  Adjusted  BKD Profitability as Reported by
the reporting inaccuracies that this  BRIP
creates, BRI reported the BKD
system's profitability if the units  Profitability  1993  1994  1995  1996
wrote  off  100 percent  of their loans  Measure
in arrears  past the final due date  each  ROA (percent)  I  1.4  9.2  9.2  8.7
year.  If calculated in this way, the  Real  ROA  1.6  0.6  0.2  0.7
system  had  a return  on  assets  of  8.7  (percent)  I  __  _  I
nercent  and a return on equity of  ROE (percent)  14.4  11.7  11.7  11.0 percent  RealaROEt4rn  o2.9q2i0y2.8
11.0 percent in 1996. These rates  (percent)  4.3  2.9  2.0  2.8
translate  into a real return on  assets  -pe-e-  -
of 0.7 percent and a real return on  a/ These  figures  simulate  the  BKD  system's  profitability  if
the units wrote off 100 percent of their loans in arrears past
equity of  .8 percen.  Nominalthe  final  due  date  each  y'ear.
returns have declined slightly over
the last three years, but real returns rebounded slightly in 1996 (Table 32). The author did not
collect the data required to estimate the BKDs' unsubsidized profitability. However, the major
inaccuracy in BKD reporting is the fact that the units do not adequately provision for bad debt.
Thus, it is likely that the figures presented above which partially compensate for this do not
greatly over-state the units' performance.
Outreach Scope.  Active BKDs are located in 4,806 villages on Java.  In Eastern Java and the
island of Madura, BKD units are located in about 20 percent of all villages (Christian, 1995).
51 Loans in default are assumed to be loaiis  that are in arrears by more than 6 months past the loan's final due date.
78Information on total annual  Table 33
lending was not available.  BKD Estimated Annual Lendinga
The data in Table 33 above
are estimates of annual  |  1993  1994  1995  1996
lending derived by  Nominal lending  232.312  256.847  258.589  305.330
multiplying  lending during  volume  (RI). million)
the month of December of  Gronth in real  8  2  -8  9
each  year  by  12.  Using  this  lending volumc
(p)ercent)  _  _  _  _  _  __  _  _  _
rough  approximation,  Nominal  lending  110.624.920 117.819.793 113.416.153  130.698.739
lending  grew  from  Rp.  232  volume (USS)
million (US$  II  million) in  Number of loans  1.713.336  1.639.104  1.606.884  1.757,028
1993 to  Rp. 305 million  issued  ____  _  _
(US$131 million)  in 1996.  Growth in number of  3  -2
The program  issued  loans  issued  (percent)
approximately  1,760,000  ai Estiinates  arc derived bv iiultiplying  the lending  volume in December of each
loans in 1996, up  slightly  car by 12.
from 1.713,000 in 1993. The real volume of lending grew in each vear except 1995.
Total savings  Table 34
under the program  BKD Required and Voluntarv Savings
stood  at  Rp.  23
billion  (US$9.8  1993  19941  1995  1996
million) at the end  Total nominal savings (RI).  16.053  18.2391  20.070  22.827
of 1996.  In real  million)  l_
Growth in real savings  4  51  1  5
terms,  savings  (perent)
have grown  slowly  Total nominal savings (US$)  7.644.063  8.366.48818.802.677 9.771.259
but consistently  Total savings percent of total  25. 1  25.21  24.6  25.7
since 1993. The  outstanding loans  i
volume of  Voluntary saiings  percent of  5.4  5.3!  4.8  4.9
outstanding  net loansa  .
savings was equal  Voluntarv savings real  3.2  1.61  b.2  0.5
to about  26  growth rate (percent)  .
percent  of total  a<  The volume  of voluntary  savings  is compared  to that of outstanding  loans net of
outstanding loans  required  savings  because  in practice.  savings  required  to obtain  a loan are equivalent
et  f likely  to borrowers  receiving  a smaller  loan.  Thus, comparing  voluntary  savings  to loans
net  net of required  savings  allows  an analysis  of the importance  of voluntary  savings  in
default  in 1996.  funding  loans.
That figure  has
been  constant  over the last four vears.  BKD  units have offered  voluntary  savings  products  since
1991.  Since  1993, voluntary  savings  have been  equal to about 5 percent  of outstanding  loans net
79of likelv defaults and net of required savings. 52 The voluntary of voluntary savings declined in real
terms in 1995 and 1996 (Table 34).
Outreach  Depth.  BKDs had an averag-e  loan size of Rp. 173,776 (US$74) in 1996. This is
equivalent to about 6.5 percent of GDP-per-capita.
ProdcZcivity. BKDs have extremely low fixed costs.  Units operate out of existing village
facilities, and staff are paid entirely on commission. Even the cost of BRI supervision is tied to
the units'  annual loan volume. This cost structure makes BKDs uniquely suitable for delivering
financial services in very remote, low-density areas.  However, because their loan portfolio is
entirely concentrated in a single village. units are very vulnerable to systemic credit risk.
Furthermore, most units lack dynamism as discussed below.
Reasons for Evoluitiont  in Progran?  Performance.  Most BKD units lack dynamism; and over time,
many slowly decapitalized. While there were initially 5,345 units; by 1992, only about 3,000
active units remained. BRI recapitalized an additional 1.000 units in 1992. Units are managed on
a part-time basis by people with other business activities. In practice,  most units lend to the same
small group of customers over time. and often make little effort to expand the volume of their
business or broaden their customer base.  This lack of dynamism is reflected in the system's very
low loan to assets ratio.  Loans accounted for 48 to 49 percent of assets from 1993 though 1996.
This compares to the South Kalimantan  BKK system in which loans account for 84 percent of
assets.  BKD units have very few fixed assets and no investments. Thus, during the mid 1  990s,
36 to 39 percent of their assets were held as demand deposits in BRI branches and Unit Desa.
In the early 1990s, BRI undertook an information and promotion campaign to encourage fund
managers to expand their customer base.  However, this initiative met with little success.  Further,
BRI's enthusiasm for the project was diminished when the 1992 Banking Law prohibited the
expansion of the BKD system and the BKDs were instructed not to compete with KUD savings
and loan initiatives.
Response to Regulation No.71/1992 Supporting the 1992 Banking Law
Most BKD units are too small to qualifv to become BPRs according to the 1992 Banking
Regulation.  However, the regulation makes an exception for institutions already in existence
prior to  1992 and possessing a license from the Ministry of Finance. BKDs fall into this
classification. BI is currently determining how it will deal with BKD units that are too small to
become BPRs.  It appears likely that these units will be allowed to continue to operate but will no
longer be able to take deposits from people outside the village in which they are located.  Further,
the Regulation prevents the creation of new BKDs.
52 The volume  of voluntary  savings  is compared  to that of outstanding  loans net of required  savings  because  in
practice,  savings  required  to  obtain  a loan  are equivalent  to  borrowers  receiving  a smaller loan.  Thus,
comparing  voluntary  savings  to loans net of required  savings  allows  an analysis  of the importance  of
voluntary  savings  in funding  loans.
80To allow for growth in the number of BKD type institutions, the government has created 975
similar institutions spread across 24 of Indonesia's 27 provinces since 1994. These new
institutions are called 1eL?/fl)at  llelayacrt nSimpanl  Pitnjani  (TPSP).  They are almost identical to
existing BKDs in their structure and function except that they come under the umbrella of the
Koperami  Unit Desa (KUD) village cooperative  svstem.  These institutions do not violate the
Regulation because financial institutions under the cooperative  system are exempt from the
minimum  capital requirements that threaten the existence of other small financial  institutions.
These new institutions have  Table 35
been funded by grants from  Approximate Costs to Establish New TPSP Units
the National Development
Planning Agency  Input  Cost  (USS)  Percent  of
(BAPPENAS) to KUD.  As  Total  Costs
of 1996, BAPPENAS  had  Total  7.958  tOo
provided  a total of  Start-up  capital  endou-inent  grant  3448  43
approvimatel  Rp. l 8 billion  (rclaiiied  by  TPSP ulit__i
approximately Rp.  in  8  to  Start-up  grant for fixed assets (retained  216  3
(US$7.9  mnillion)  to the KUD  by TPSP unit)  _____  _____
system to establish 975 TPSP  Tcchnical  support.  project  monitonng  2.968  37
units.  Thus, it costs  and materials  printing (retained  by KUD)
approximately  Rp.  18.5  Training for staff and KUD and BRI  1,326  17
million  (US$8,000)  to  supervisors  (paid  to BRI)
establish each new TPSP.
This grant is used as follow: Each TPSP unit receives a one-time sum of  Rp. 8 million
(US$3,500) as seed loan capital and an additional one-time grant of Rp. 500,000 (US$220) to
purchase equipment and supplies.  BRI receives approximately Rp. 3.1 million  (US$1,300) per
unit to train three unit staff members and the KUD and BRI supervisors. KUDs receive almost
Rp. 6.9 million (US$3,000) to provide technical support and project monitoring, and to print
materials. Thus, new TPSP units retain 46 percent of the funds spent to establish thenL the KUD
system keeps 37 percent of these funds, and BRI, 17 percent (Table 35).
In contrast to BKDs, TPSPs are supervised by BRI and by the KUD  system. Unlike BRI's BKD
supervisors, BRI's TPSP supervisors are paid entirely on commission. They receive 15 percent of
the interest collected by the TPSP branches they supervise.  Each supervisor is responsible for 18
TPSPs.  TPSPs are also overseen by a KUD technical administrator who receives a salary of Rp.
120,000 (US$53) per month. KUD technical administrators each oversee 6 TPSPs.
Thus, the 1992 Presidential Regulation has forced new BKD-type institutions to fall under the
auspices of the KUD system.  This has resulted in a start up cost of about US$3,000 per unit to
cover KUD expenses and an ongoing cost of about US$53 per unit per month for KUD
supervision.  It is not yet clear whether these costs will be justified in terms of improved unit
performance. However, the KUD  system has a very inauspicious history of managing financial
institutions, and appears to be pressuring the units to make loans at subsidized rates.
81Competition
BKDs' relatively low maximum loan size and high interest rates ensure that they do not compete
with BRI's Unit Desa branches. BKDs may have difficultv competing with BKKs and other
provincial-owned financial institutions in villages served bv both types of facilities, because BKKs
also provide small, non-collateralized loans and village-level service. Further, they charge a
substantially  lower interest rate than do BKDs.
82ANNEX 6: CLASSIFICATION  OF LOANS, LOAN LOSS PROVISIONING,
AND WRITE-OFFS
For the five programs reviewed, classification of outstanding loans by age of arrears, provisioning
for bad debt, and write-off practices do not meet best practice standards, and are frequently ad
hoc and inconsistent across time.  Only three of the five programs reviewed classify outstanding
loans by the age of past due payments. Further, even for these three, aging categories are too
broad to permit a careful analvsis  of portfolio quality. The programs use methods to establish loan
loss provisions that vary over time, and are frequently determined by the program's profitability
rather than the quality of its portfolio.  The BKK program provisions for bad debt annually and
then adds these sums back into equity rather than maintaining a reserve for bad debt. Some of the
programs do not write off loans in default at all. Others do so only after a number of years or if
the borrower leaves the area.
These approaches make it difficult  for program managers to: identify in a timely manner trends in
loan portfolio performance: assess measures taken to improve repayment rates; and gauge
program profitability.  The programs should adopt guidelines more in keeping with internationally-
accepted best practice for microfinance institutions.
Microfinance management ouidelines recommend that programs classify loans by their age of past
due payments, and provision accordingly. The most precise way to determine appropriate
provisioning standards is to examine loans categorized by age of late payment at a point in the
past such that all loans in that portfolio will currently either be repaid or in default. The analyst
should then assess what percent of loans that were current at that time subsequently defaulted,
what percent of loans 1-30 days late subsequently defaulted, what percent of loans 31-60 days
late subsequently defaulted. etc.  The percent of loans in each category that later defaulted can
then be used to determine appropriate provisioning levels. For example, if approximately 20
percent of loans that were 31-60 days late in payment subsequently defaulted, then the program
should maintain  provisions for bad debt equal to 20 percent of the volume of loans that currently
have payments 31-60 days late.
To determine the most appropriate provisioning levels, this analysis should be carried out
separately for each of the program's loan products if these products vary in their likelihood of
default over time.  For example, a loan that has a weekly repayment requirement and a one month
term, is not backed by collateral, and is 3 months in arrears may be much more likely to default
than a loan that has an 18 month term and a quarterly repayment requirement, is backed by
collateral, and is also 3 months in arrears.  Thus, ideally the above analysis should be carried out
for each of these loan products, and different provisioning guidelines applied to each.
The analyst also should establish that the market conditions prevailing at the point in time that the
analysis is based on have not changed substantially. For example, the analysis might be based on
the ultimate repayment performance of loans in the portfolio three years ago, during a period of
economic prosperity. If the region is currently suffering economic hardship, then the repayment
83performance of loans in the portfolio during this previous period is unlikely to accurately predict
repayment performance of loans currentlv outstanding.
If data limitations prevent an analysis  Table 36:
of previous repayment performance  Recommended  Portfolio Aging and Loan Loss
for a portfolio of loans categorized  Provisioning for Miicrocredit Programs
by age of arrears. recordkeeping
procedures  should  be established  to  Loans With Payments  Loan Loss Provisioning
allow for this evaluation in the  (Percent  of Loan
future.  Once these procedures are in  Volume)
place, the microfinance provider will  Current  0-3
then have to wait one year or more  1-30 davs late  0-10
3,1-60 davs  latc  10-25 before there will be sufficient data to  61-90)  davs  late  50
perform this exercise.  In the  91-120 davs latc  50-100
meantime,  the microfinance  121-180  davs  latc  50-100
institution  should  provision  181-360  davs late  100
according to generally-accepted  Morc  thian  360 days late  100
ranges for provisioning based on the
aging of loans at risk. Three
microfinance management guidelines 53 Recommend that institutions categorize loans and
provision for bad debt as detailed in Table 36.
Currently the Ministry of Finance require that institutions maintain loan loss reserves equal to no
more than 3 percent of outstanding loans.  This restriction should be lifted for institutions judged
to follow appropriate loan provisioning guidelines.
Microfinance management guidelines Recommend that programs write off loans when the
probability of the loan being recovered, or continuing to generate income, is so low that it is
rmisleading  to continue to show the loan as part of the institution's financial situation.  Also, if
loans are never written off, it becomes increasingly difficult  for program managers to assess
current repayment rates because the results of previous periods of high default are interrningled
with more recent portfolio performance.  Finally, if loans are effectively  in default but have not
been adequately provisioned for and thev are not written off, the program will not accurately
report its profitability.  The Inter-American Development Bank (1994) maintains that
microfinance programs with loans of relatively short maturity should write off all loans that are
more than 90 days late in repayment. Programs should bear in mind that writing off a loan does
not remove the borrowers' obligation to repay it.  The program should continue to pursue
collection of loans it has written off until the cost of doing so outweighs the monetary benefit of
likely repayment and the demonstration benefit of discouraging other borrowers from default.
53 SEEP (1995); Inter-American Development Bank (1994); and William  Tucker,  presentation  at Microfinance
Seminar for World Bank Staff. April 23-24. 1996,
84ANNEX 7: SUBSIDY DEPENDENCE  INDEX FOR RURAL FINANCE
INSTITUTIONS54
Two main problems face the analyst who must rely on conventional accounting data to measure
the financial performance of rural finance institutions (RFIs): the difference  between the expense
and income (including reimbursement of specific expenses by state or donor) captured and
reflected in the RFI income statement and those expenses and incomes not recorded in the RFI
income statement, and the lack of a design in conventional accounting practices to reflect and
appropriately report on all types of subsidies received by an RFI.
Conventional accounting practice measures the cost of funds priced at their actual cost.  The
opportunity cost of an RFI's borrowed funds - that is, the cost the RFI would have to pay for its
funds if access to concessional funds were eliminated - is not taken into account.  The SDI
calculation assumes that the volume of the RFI's outstanding loan portfolio remains unchanged.
Hence, the change is caused by substituting concessional borrowed funds with voluntary savings,
obtained at a market deposit interest rate.  Thus. if the central bank loans to an RFI at 2 percent,
conventional accounting practices list the cost of the loan at 2 percent p.a.  However, if the cost
of alternative non-concessional funds is 12 percent p.a., then the SDI considers the 10 percent
difference in interest rates on those funds and identifies this subsidy received by the RFI.  The
rationale is that if the subsidized RFI paid only 2 percent p.a. on central bank rediscounting
facilities instead of the prevailing  market deposit rate of 12 percent p.a., the accounting profit and
the financial ratios measuring the RFI's profitability would not convey that such ratios were only
obtained due to the significant  subsidy embodied in the cheap central bank rediscounting facilities.
Providing an RFI with concessional funds is the most common method of subsidization, yet
calculating the value of the subsidy implicit in the RFI's  concessionally  borrowed funds requires
information not included in the RF's  financial statements.  The same is true for the RFI's equity.
In contrast to the profit maximizer, who does not differentiate between profit that is subsidy-
dependent as long as continued subsidization is ensured and profit that is fully subsidy-
independent, subsidy dependence is crucial to RFI's performance assessment. The social cost of
RFI operations, of which subsidies constitute a significant share, is essential in determining the
social justification for their existence and continued operations, because rural RFIs are often
public or quasi-public institutions. To illustrate the futility of the current financial  reporting
system, one may ask, for example, what is the meaning of an RFI's return on equity of 20 percent
when 50 percent of the RF's  financial  obligations constitute concessional borrowed funds from
the central bank (rediscounting facilities), carrying an interest rate significantly  below market
deposit interest rates, and one-third of its payroll cost, 80 percent of its loan losses and all training
expenses are assumed by the government.
54 The Subsidy Dependency Index was introduced in Yaron.  1992b.  This annex is excerpted from:  M. Gurand,
G. Pederson. J. Yaron.  1994. Outreach and Sustainability of Six Rural Finance Institutions in Sub-Saharan
Africa.  World Bank Discussion Paper No. 248.  Washington. DC:  Agriculture and Natural Resources
Department. World Bank, pp. 72 - 75.
85Furthermore, breaking away from applying financial prices of inputs and outputs and instead using
shadow prices reflecting the social cost of investing in the real goods sectors have become
common practices in assessing and measuring the social desirability of investments. Applying
economic shadow prices permits calculation of the economic rate of return (ERR), which often
diverges from the financial rate of return (FRR).  Application of the SDI calculation seeks to
achieve a similar goal: to measure more accurately the social cost involved in an RFI's continued
operations.  There is. however, a difference between the ERR's and the SDI's approaches: the
SDI does not claim to fully assess and measure the social benefits of resources allocation through
an RFI to the real aoods sectors.  The SDI, however, better estimates the social cost of the
subsidy involved by applying approximate market interest rates to the financial  resources used by
the RFI.
The objective of the SD! methodology is to provide a comprehensive method of assessing and
measuring the overall financial costs involved in operating an REI and quantifVing  its subsidy
dependence. The SDI methodology suggests moving away from over-reliance on the financial
profitability ratios of conventional accounting procedures in the financial  analysis of RFIs.  The
SDI aims at providing a public interest analysis of RF  financial performance and subsidy
dependence. This tvpe of analysis involves  taking fuill  account of the overall social costs entailed
in operating an RFI. including the  full value of all subsidies received by the institution. The SDI
makes explicit the subsidy needed to keep the institution afloa.t. much of which is not reflected in
conventional accounting reporting.  The proposed SDI is a user-friendly device that is simple to
calculate because it does not require collecting detailed information on an RFI's operational costs.
The SDI is instrumental in:
i.  placing the total amount of subsidies received by an RFI in the context of its activity level,
represented by interest earned on its loan portfolio (similar to calculations of effective
protection domestic resource cost or job creation cost);
2.  tracking an RFI's subsidy dependence over time, and
3.  comparing the subsidy dependence of RFIs providing similar services to a similar clientele.
The dialogue with borrowing countries can be significantly  enriched by using the SDI as a routine
instrument measuring an RFI's performance during appraisal. supervision and completion of
projects.  As with any other financial measurement tool, however, the SDI is only as accurate as
the data used to compute it.
The SDI assesses and quantifies subsidy dependence. Its assessment and calculation require the
application of certain procedures as well as judgment, and consistency from period to period is
more important than the absolute accuracy of the figures included in the SDI computation. The
SDI is a ratio that measures the percentage increase in the average on-lending interest rate
required to compensate an RFI for the elimination  of subsidies in a given year while keeping its
return on equity equal to the approximate non-concessional borrowing cost.  The index assumes,
for simplicity,  that an increase in the on-lending interest rate is the only change made to
compensate for loss of subsidy. Although removal of subsidies received by an RFI is not always
86politically feasible or desirable, measurement of any subsidy is always warranted economically  and
politically.
Calculating the SDI involves aggregating all the subsidies received bv an RFI. The total amount
of the subsidy is then measured against the RFI's interest income because lending is the prime
activity of a supply-led RFI. Measuring an RFI's annual subsidies as a percentage of its interest
income yields the percentage bv which interest income would have to increase to replace the
subsidies and provides data on the percentage points by which the RFI's on-lending interest rate
would have to increase to eliminate subsidies.
Computation of the Sutbsidly  I)ependenice  Index  SIM)I).  The amount of the annual subsidy received
by an RFI is defined as:
S = A  (m - c) + [(E * m) - p] + K
where:
S =  Annual subsidy received by the RFI;
A.=  RFI concessional borrowed funds outstanding (annual average);
m =  Interest rate the RFI would be assumed to pay for borrowed funds if access to
borrowed concessional funds were eliminated;
c =  Weighted average annual concessional rate of interest actually paid by the RFI on
its average annual concessional borrowed funds outstanding;
E  Average annual equity;
P =  Reported annual profit (before tax) (adjusted, when necessary, for loan loss
provisions, inflation, etc.);
K =  The sum of all other annual subsidies received by the RFI (such as partial or
complete coverage of the RFI's operational costs by the state).
The financial ratio that is suggested as an SDI is:
S
SDI =  --
LP*  i
where:
SDI  =  Index of subsidy dependence of RFI;
S  =  Annual subsidy received by the RFI (see above);
LP  =  Average annual outstanding loan portfolio of the RFI;
i  =  Weighted average on-lending interest rate received on the loan portfolio of
the RFI.
The SDI by itself does not clarify how the subsidy was used and whether most benefits were
accrued to clients or were consumed by an inefficient  bureaucracy. The latter question, though
87important, requires far more detailed data and even then is often subject to interpretation. The
advantage of the SDI is its simplicitv.  and as such it focuses exclusively  on the intake subsidy, i.e..
the value of subsidy received by the RFI. The SDI should be seen in some instances as a lower
bound because full financing of RFI activities is likely to be difficult  at current market borrowing
rates (m) if an RFI's financial  performance is dismal. However, calculating this lower bound is
vital for ascertaining either the RFI's progress toward self-sustainability  or the social desirability
of its continued subsidy  dependence.
An SDI of zero means  that an RFI achieved full self-sustainability. An SDI of 100 percent
indicates that a doubling of the average on-lending interest rate is required if subsidies are to be
eliminated. Similarly,  an SDI of 200 percent indicates that a threefold increase in the on-lending
interest rate is required to compensate for the subsidy elimination. A negative SDI indicates that
an RFI not only fully achieved self-sustainability, but that its annual profits, minus its capital
(equity) charged at the approximate market interest rate, exceeded the total annual value of
subsidies, if subsidies were received by the RFI.  A negative SDI also implies that the RFI could
have lowered its average on-lending interest rate while simultaneously  eliminating any subsidies
received in the same year.
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